32-40.
In this article by Alexander Styhre, liberation is a theme that is emphasised. Like Garrick and Clegg, Styhre is also an academic from the Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden, and he also takes a critical stance towards the theorising of knowledge in KM. He has published a book titled Understanding Knowledge Management: Critical and postmodern
perspectives (Styhre, 2003a) which indicates the approach he takes in the following article.
Overview
This article begins with an introduction to organisation theory and some of the theoretical roots of KM. In outlining the different sources of KM theory, Styhre highlights the inconsistencies underlying theoretical concepts of knowledge. For example, he says that ‘knowledge’ is often conceived as a ‘stable and somewhat fixed entity based on a number of epistemological assumptions’ (p. 33) which KM theory does not address. In doing so, other perspectives, such as a processual view of knowledge, are sidelined because the concept of knowledge is limited only to concrete applications. His article, therefore, offers a different conceptualisation of knowledge in order to address this limitation.
Critical reading
This article is distinct from many other articles on KM because it deliberately challenges not just the theories of mainstream authors but more
fundamentally, their concepts of knowledge. Styhre’s argument is that the dominant image of knowledge in KM theory is reductionist and limited. He proposes an alternative view that highlights the intangible qualities of knowledge but does not dismiss the more tangible aspects of it either. As his paper opposes mainstream concepts of knowledge, Styhre spends more time refuting these traditional concepts than elaborating on his framework. Even as he questions the assumptions of mainstream KM theory, Styhre’s own opinion of knowledge is apparent in the arguments he expresses. In many instances, Styhre personifies knowledge and these instances generate the key ideas presented in this article.
Knowledge as a person
In this article, ‘knowledge’ takes on the qualities of a person and its complexities. For example, the author says knowledge has a ‘body’ (p. 33) and it can ‘see’, ‘say’, ‘write’ and ‘do’ (p. 37). Moreover, knowledge is an enabler as it ‘enables us to do things’ (p. 37) by interacting in social practices (p. 34). In addition, action can be taken against knowledge such as being ‘captured’ or ‘reduced’. In response to such aggression, ‘knowledge actively transgresses’ its restraints (p. 33) and is ‘always in conflict with managerial objectives’ (p. 35). From my perspective, these descriptions of knowledge are behavioural and as such point to a concept of knowledge that is more
complex than fairly static metaphors such as ‘knowledge as an asset’. The above descriptions also imply a tension between ‘knowledge as a person’ and ‘managerial objectives’. This tension, in my view, plays out on two levels. Firstly, it reflects the vigorous argument the author is making against mainstream KM theory and its emphasis on codification. Secondly, the author feels that knowledge has been imprisoned by traditional
conceptions of knowledge and wishes to ‘free’ knowledge from its confines. That is why there are repeated appeals for liberation and resistance from the author for the cause of ‘knowledge’.
This sense of ‘knowledge as a prisoner’ is most apparent when the author declares that ‘knowledge needs to be freed from its conceptualisation as being a linear succession from data and information’ (p. 38). Other
indications that such a perspective is present include exhortations to ‘break with the logocentric images of knowledge’ because it presents knowledge as ‘some clearly bounded and manageable resource’ (p. 34). Such images are like psychic prisons because ‘we cannot easily think outside of its
‘reduced’ in particular is drawn on quite frequently with reference to
knowledge being reduced to data and information (p. 33). The implication is that knowledge is far more superior and complex than data and information (in the sense of codification) much like an individual is more than just ‘human resource’. Moreover, ‘if knowledge is regarded as a functionalist resource, then many other aspects of knowledge are overlooked and neglected’ (p. 37). The same would apply to limited understandings of humans as resources rather than complex beings. Thus, knowledge must not only be ‘freed’ but we must ‘seek to overcome incumbent theories and justified beliefs’ (p. 38) in order to establish a more holistic view of knowledge.
This call to liberation and resistance is substantiated by references to well- known authors such as Latour, Deleuze, Foucault and Knorr Cetina who provide a backdrop to the author’s alternative conception of knowledge. In the various quotes that Styhre selects, the overall argument is that
knowledge is neither concrete nor static. Instead Styhre offers a concept of knowledge that is ‘fluid and moving’ (p. 35). However, before moving into Styhre’s main idea, there is another cluster of terms closely associated with ‘knowledge as a person’ and it pertains to the social aspects of knowledge in its personified form.
Knowledge as a process
Knowledge as a process emphasises the dynamic nature of knowledge. It is also related to ‘knowledge as action’ (Andriessen, 2006, p. 99) because a process implies action towards an end, or a purpose. For example, in the text knowledge is said to integrate ‘praxis and lexis’ (p. 33) and it ‘bridges seeing and saying’ (p. 36). These are purposes toward which ‘knowledge’ is active.
Styhre refers to Whitehead’s (1978) concept of ‘an event’ to explain the process-based view of knowledge. From my reading of the text, ‘an event’ is theorised as neither static nor fixed but as a ‘route’ made up of a series of encounters. In other words, it is a process. Such a view according to the author is a ‘radical critique of the Cartesian-Newtonian ontology of
separated bodies and its mechanistic worldview’ (p. 36) because a Cartesian perspective assumes knowledge is a fixed or static entity. Given Styhre’s opinion of functionalist assumptions, it is unsurprising that he recommends an alternative that undermines a mechanistic worldview.
Returning to Whitehead’s concept of the ‘event, in the context of an
organisation the ‘event’ of knowledge is ‘what is pragmatically being used in organisations in the course of action’ (p. 34). The word ‘action’ refers to social practices; the interaction between various ‘actors, departments and sites’ (p. 34). Styhre argues that knowledge is a social process because social settings and a shared ‘signifying’ language give rise to shared meaning (p. 36) and hence to collective knowledge. As he later points out, ‘mainstream
knowledge management theorists overlook the fact that both data and information are complex social constructs and not brute facts detached from human understanding’ (p. 38). Thus, he says, knowledge is an ‘enactment’ rather than an entity which, therefore, overturns mechanistic ideas of knowledge.
This cluster of terms around the concept of knowledge as a process form part of the arguments that Styhre makes against mainstream concepts of
knowledge. They are not particularly significant as a cluster but support the notion of ‘knowledge as a person’ and lend credence to Styhre’s main concept of knowledge which will be discussed in the following section.
Knowledge as fluidity
The term ‘fluid’ has several meanings. It could mean ‘liquid’ as opposed to ‘solid’; ‘watery’ as in having the qualities of water, ‘flowing’ referring to movement and ‘adaptable’ or flexible. Styhre refers to all of these
connotations in his proposed conception of knowledge. He explains, ‘what is fluid is moving, changing, uncontrollable and amorphous’ (p. 35). In
addition, ‘knowledge is fluid and emergent, not fixed and stable’ (p. 34), which implies a consistency which is liquid in contrast to something solid and, therefore, fixed. These descriptions cover all four connotations of the word ‘fluid’ and perhaps he has done so deliberately because he believes the concept of knowledge is just as open.
For example, Styhre says ‘knowledge is always indeterminate and fluid because it is immanent in a multiplicity of undertakings and changing language games’ (p. 32). Here knowledge is not only seen as continually changing but also as part of the cause for change as implied by the word ‘immanent’. This same sense of knowledge being both the cause and outcome is again present when Styhre declares ‘we need to think of knowledge as what is fluid and becoming’ (p. 35) and that ‘knowledge is [thus] fluid and moving, embedded in social relationships and emerges in the practices and use of concepts’ (p. 36).
The words ‘embedded’ and ‘emerges’ imply that knowledge is somehow hidden. Not in the sense of waiting to be discovered, but waiting to be called upon (p. 33). For example, ‘knowledge is manifested and brought into action through practices but is simultaneously given expression through the
concepts being invoked’ (p. 33). There is an impression of mystery and magic through the word ‘invoke’. Coupled with the metaphor of knowledge as fluidity, there is a sense of knowledge being mysterious and elusive; ‘like
open drawers filled with folders extending indefinitely into the depth of the dark closet’ (p. 35).
To give his conceptualisation of knowledge a point of reference, Styhre makes use of Deleuze and Guattari’s example of a rhizome. We are told ‘a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, intermezzo’ (Deleuze & Guattari, in Styhre, 2003b, p. 36). This indeterminacy makes the rhizome ‘an analytical model capable of capturing a fluid image of knowledge’ (p. 36). Such a link between knowledge and what is, essentially, a plant or a root (such as ginger) is odd to say the least. A biological referent adapted by philosophy and now adopted to explain management theory is quite a leap in thinking. In some respects, it reflects the author’s own difficulty in expressing such a ‘fluid’ concept. He tries to overcome this difficulty by acceding that knowledge is both tangible and intangible. He says ‘knowledge is thus both what is being used in practice but is equally what is translated into documents, models and concepts’ (p. 35). As a result, ‘what is known must always be given a stable name: a concept, a model, a symbol. Such a concept or name serves to capture what is fluid and moving’ (p. 35). In other words, knowledge has to be expressed through language which gives form to its formlessness.
Echoing traditional semiotics, Styhre highlights how language is a ‘signifying system’ (p. 35), a ‘linguistic and semiotic framework’ (p. 33), a ‘conceptual framework’ (p. 33) within which knowledge can be ‘fixed’ (p. 35). Even as knowledge is ‘fluid’, it exists within the construct of language. Hence, on the one hand the author prefers knowledge to be unconfined but, on the other hand, he needs to ‘capture’ knowledge in a language of different terms in order to free it from established ones. There is clearly a tension in these descriptions which suggests there is a conflict within the author regarding his concept of knowledge. Another indication of such tension is apparent
when he dismisses the notion of a knowledge hierarchy as ‘uncomplicated’ (p. 33) in its theorising of knowledge moving smoothly between data and information. Styhre feels that this is an unjustified assumption. Yet, if we recall the connotations of knowledge as fluidity, there is an underlying assumption that knowledge moves smoothly from point to point.
Furthermore, the author argues against knowledge being fixed in time and space (p. 34). Yet, he conceives of knowledge as ‘constituted on a single plane or surface wherein practices and concepts are entangled’ (p. 32). In other words, knowledge occupies a particular place or landscape. Within this place, the movement of knowledge is neither smooth nor linear as implied by the knowledge hierarchy, but includes ‘bifurcations, ruptures, crises, digressions and unanticipated passages’ (p. 33). This is an image of harsh territory and potential danger and stands in marked contrast to the ‘fluid’ descriptions of knowledge. The only other reference made to ‘place’ is when the author talks about ‘new emerging organisational landscapes’ (p. 38). Perhaps the implication is that ‘old’ mainstream ideas of knowledge are no longer relevant in new, unexplored, harsh organisational landscapes. In the context of finding less positive notions of knowledge, this is one potential indication. Nonetheless, there is still an inherent contradiction in his position on knowledge.
Looking back, the overall perspective of knowledge by the author is largely positive. Firstly, the author makes a clear distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘images of knowledge’ (p. 32). In his arguments against established KM theory, he levels his criticism only against the conceptions of knowledge. In the contrasts Styhre makes between his concept of knowledge and traditional ones, even though he considers the ‘entitative’, ‘realist’, ‘functionalist’,
‘reductionist’ views as ‘conceptually crude’ (p. 32), his own perspective does not portray knowledge negatively either. In fact, he alludes to knowledge as
being the ‘mastery’ held by a medical doctor and the ‘social accomplishment’ of knowledge, its gifts and endowments. Even when knowledge is said to change in indeterminate ways, it is usually turned into something ‘new’, or is ‘further refined’ (p. 35) as opposed to degenerating. Therefore, these are very positive perceptions of the concept of knowledge.
In summary, we have seen how the complexity of knowledge has been highlighted through the metaphors of ‘knowledge is a person’ and
‘knowledge is fluidity’. These metaphors are imbued with a strong sense of activity and motion which characterises the notion of ‘knowledge as a process’. In the analysis of the text, we have also seen how the author contends with mainstream ideas of knowledge and offers alternative views in order to ‘de-familiarise the belief’ in knowledge as a mere organisational resource.
In the first metaphor of ‘knowledge as a person’, the idea that knowledge has been imprisoned by functionalist thinking is apparent. We then saw how the notion of ‘knowledge as fluidity’ provides liberation and resistance to established concepts because ‘the fluid and inherently indeterminate nature of knowledge does not really fit into the will to manage and control
knowledge expressed by mainstream knowledge management theorists’ (p. 37). The author’s offer of ‘an event’ and the rhizome as alternative
conceptions of knowledge further undermine the entitative view of knowledge. Indeed, when the author finally mentions the ‘new, emerging organisational landscapes’ such as networks, virtual organisations and e- businesses (p. 38), mainstream KM theory seems old, inflexible and irrelevant.
The text, however, is not without tension. In proposing abstract perspectives of knowledge, the author is aware that unless the concept of knowledge is
somehow named, it cannot be expressed. As such, he places conceptual frameworks and linguistic systems around ‘knowledge’ and visualises ‘knowledge’ on a surface or ‘route’ that extends indefinitely. Even so, the ‘route’ is fraught with ‘ruptures’ and ‘unanticipated passages’. And so, to some extent, the author struggles with his own perspective of knowledge. I would suggest that the author’s struggle lies in the contradiction of his arguments. For example, Styhre argues against entitative views of
knowledge but, at the same time, assumes that knowledge can be ‘captured’. He does so by providing definitions, which on the surface stand in contrast to logocentric views. Nevertheless, definitions still function as a form of ‘pinning down’ that support entitative purposes. In addition, he omits the role of the reader which is essential to the constructionist worldview that he is trying to promote. He cites Latour and Knorr Centina who point out how unstable naming is, yet he proceeds to ‘name’ concepts of knowledge. In many ways, he has an unacknowledged debt to the entitative theorists he would eschew.
If we consider how the clusters relate to each other, we can see that
‘knowledge as a person’ assumes some physicality in that it can be captured and imprisoned. Similarly, ‘knowledge as a process’ implies that there is some form of object that moves from one occurrence to another. In contrast, ‘knowledge as fluidity’ is decidedly indeterminate, unpredictable and potentially disruptive. The author attempts to resolve this contrast by suggesting that a ‘fluid’ concept would liberate the imprisoned concept of knowledge from mainstream theorising. However, he does not resolve the underlying tensions in his concept of knowledge and, thus, has not been very successful in establishing his notion of knowledge or liberating existing ones. To his credit, however, Styhre has raised some very valid points about the concept of knowledge which KM theorists cannot ignore.
Agon analysis
As we have seen, Styhre enters the debate on knowledge directly and offers alternative concepts of knowledge. His approach can be said to be
constructionist but as I have suggested in the cluster analysis, Styhre is not very reflexive of his own text. This creates quite a bit of tension in the text as the author struggles to define knowledge but not in reified or logocentric terms. The term that I think captures this struggle, or agon, is the word ‘rupture’. Styhre’s main concept of knowledge is fluid, smooth and indeterminate. Yet he conceptualises this ‘fluid knowledge’ on a harsh, bifurcated landscape. As a consequence, there is a clash of concepts as seen in the naming and defining of knowledge while he argues that knowledge is like an ever extending rhizome. In attempting ‘epistemological breaks’ with reductionist views of knowledge, Styhre’s concept of knowledge causes a rupture within his own arguments and lines him up on the side he wishes to break from.
On the surface, this cluster-agon relationship is a reflection of the argument Styhre is making against mainstream concepts of knowledge in KM. At a deeper level, it is reflective of his arguments opposing each other. In this regard, much of his rhetorical momentum is curtailed towards the end of his article as he does not resolve the inherent tensions in the text.
Reflexive reading
Styhre’s article promised to be just as interesting a read as Garrick and Clegg’s article but it soon proved to be otherwise. I agreed with many of the initial arguments he made regarding the fixed and static nature of
knowledge in mainstream KM. I was also intrigued by his examples of the rhizome and the ‘event’ as mentioned in the analysis. His references to Deleuze, Foucault and Knorr Centina suggested that philosophical notions of knowledge, so absent in KM, might be given voice in his article.
Unfortunately, Styhre did not manage to ‘contain’ all his ideas and eventually he also attempted to define knowledge and link it to
organisational outcomes. Hence, at the dominant level, I identified with the text but at the critical level, I struggled to find coherence in the concepts that Styhre presented.