Most studies on modality make some reference to subjectivity and ob- jectivity, but the way this relation is understood depends both on how modality and its types are defined, and what is meant by subjectivity and objectivity (for an overview of the approaches see, e.g. Narrog 2012). Since modality was traditionally said to first of all express the speaker’s perspective, it was usually associated with subjectivity. For Palmer (2001 [1986]), subjectivity is an essential characteristic of modality because it is “the grammaticalization of speaker’s (subjective) attitudes and opinions” (Palmer 2001 [1986]: 16). A similar view has been expressed by Grze- gorczykowa (2010: 145).
However, a number of scholars have argued that modal expressions can be used both subjectively and objectively, e.g. Lyons (1977), and Coates (1983). In some accounts the subjective or objective reading of an expression is said to depend on the context (e.g. Coates 1983; Narrog 2005, 2012). Subjectivity has also been said to have a scalar character (Coates 1983), some expressions being more subjective than others. Traugott and Dasher (2002: 21) argue that the specific choices from the objective/sub- jective continuum which speakers make depend on their social role and authority (cf. also Macaulay 1995). Generally, they link objective language with authority (at least in the Euro-American tradition), and subjective language with the lack of authority or dissociation from it.
The three major types of modality – epistemic, deontic and dyna mic – have all been defined with reference to the notions of subjectivity and objectivity. Most scholars agree that in the case of epistemic modality, subjectivity can be considered to be its defining characteristic (Halliday 1970; Hoye 1997). Hoye (1997: 43), for instance, argues that subjectivity is “an essential feature of epistemic modality since the speaker is express- ing judgements in accordance with his own (subjective) set of beliefs”. Since objective information is independent of the speaker’s intentions or judgements, and epistemic modality always involves the speaker as the
“filter” of information, the state of affairs described by him/her necessar- ily depends on his/her perception, knowledge and intentions. Verstraete’s (2001) analysis also shows the association of epistemic modality with sub- jectivity. A number of linguists, however, argue that markers of epistem- ic modality can have both subjective and objective meanings (e.g. Lyons 1977; Coates 1983), the difference being that objectivity is associated with logical inference and logical statements, while subjectivity is associated with the speaker’s judgement (cf. Coates 1983; Narrog 2012: 24). The ob- jective element in epistemic modality has also been associated with refer- ences to evidence, in particular by those linguists who consider epistemic modality to include evidentiality, e.g. Krzyżyk (2008). She argues that ob- jectification of the speaker’s opinion may involve references to objective evidence (Krzyżyk 2008: 36). The connection between objectification and evidence has led Nuyts (2001a, 2001b) to argue that subjectivity should not be associated with epistemic modality but with evidentiality, defined as “characterization of the status or quality of the sources (evidence) for that qualification” (Nuyts 2001a: 35). In his view, “an epistemic evaluation based on better or stronger evidence is probably considered more objec- tive than one based on shaky evidence” (Nuyts 2001a: 34). Hoye (1997: 53) stresses that objectification always takes place within a subjective modal framework, and amounts to asserting or highlighting particular modal meanings (with the purpose of being formal or non-straightfor- ward) rather than referring to any truly objective data. Thus, in Hoye’s view, subjectivity remains the defining property of epistemic modality.
Views on the relation between dynamic and deontic modality and subjectivity also differ among scholars. Lyons (1977) and Coates (1983) consider both types to have subjective and objective uses, but most schol- ars seem to agree that deontic modality is associated with both subjectiv- ity and objectivity, while dynamic modality has an essentially objective reading (Halliday 1970; Hoye 1997; Nuyts 2001a; Verstraete 2001). Ver- straete (2001) notes that in the case of deontic modality, it is sometimes the speaker who is committed “to the necessity/permissibility of an ac- tion”, and sometimes necessity is said to exist without “the speaker’s com- mitment to it” (Verstraete 2001: 1525). Dynamic modality is associated with objectivity because “[f]unctionally, dynamic modals do not serve to
position the speaker with respect to the propositional content of the ut- terance, but belong themselves to that propositional content” (Verstraete 2001: 1525). As Hoye puts it, in the case of dynamic modality, “the sub- ject’s ability or willingness is at issue, not the speaker’s attitudes or opin- ions” (Hoye 1997: 44).
Recognition of the importance of modality in the speaker/hearer in- teraction has brought increased interest in the notion of intersubjectivity. The concept has already been referred to by Benveniste (1966), but with- out a definition, and in his use it seems to reflect the conviction that the speaker’s self is “to a large degree constituted through language” (Narrog 2012: 14) and intersubjective communication. Ädel (2014: 102) under- stands intersubjectivity as the speaker’s awareness of the addressee. This perspective is close to Traugott’s view of intersubjectification as involving the development of markers which signal attention to the stances of the ad- dressee. A different approach has been proposed by Nuyts (2001a, 2006), who views intersubjectivity as sharing responsibility for the truth value of a claim with the receiver (Nuyts 2001a, 2006, 2015). Nuyts suggests that “an evaluation is subjective if the issuer presents it as being strictly his/her own responsibility; it is intersubjective if (s)he indicates that (s)he shares it with a wider group of people, possibly including the hearer” (Nuyts 2006: 14). In this view, subjectivity involves personal responsibility for the truth value of the proposition, while intersubjectivity involves shared responsibility (cf. also Marín-Arrese 2009). Nuyts’s concept of intersub- jectivity was developed specifically for the study of modal markers, and, as stressed by the author himself (e.g. Nuyts 2015), its application outside the domain of modality is rather limited.
Different types of modal markers (mental state verbs, modal auxilia- ries, adverbs and adjectives) have been argued to show different degrees of subjectivity (for an overview of approaches see Narrog 2012). Modal adjectives are usually said to represent a low level of subjectivity because of their association with the content of the proposition (content-related functions are associated with objectivity, cf. Verstraete 2001: 1506); first person mental verbs (e.g. I think), in contrast, are considered to be highly subjective because of their association with the speaker (cf. e.g. Perkins 1983; Hengeveld 1988; Wierzbicka 2006). Modal adverbs are sometimes
situated in the middle field between adjectives and verbs (e.g. Wierzbicka 2006), while modal auxiliaries are said to be neutral with respect to sub- jectivity (Perkins 1983; Nuyts 2001a).
This interpretation is not, however, shared by all scholars. In the con- ceptualist approach, represented by Langacker (e.g. 1985, 1990, 2002), and Radden and Dirven (2007), modal auxiliaries are seen as highly sub- jective, while mental state verbs are considered to represent a low level of subjectivity. Perkins (1983), in contrast, links the low level of subjectivity with both modal adverbs and modal adjectives, while Watts (1984), and Hengeveld (1988) consider modal adverbs to show a high degree of sub- jectivity. Hoye, whose scepticism towards discussing epistemic meanings with reference to objectivity has already been noted (cf. section 2.5.), ar- gues that “the adverb alone is a signal of the speaker’s presence and an indicator of his commitment or attitude to propositional content” (Hoye 1997: 53). Nuyts (2001a: 64) adopts yet a different position, and claims that modal adverbs are intersubjective because they express commitment shared by other people (general knowledge). Danielewiczowa (2008b: 50, 2012: 57), in her study of Polish epistemic adverbs, argues that all three notions, i.e. subjectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity, can be identified in the semantics of modal adverbs (she does not, however, use the term intersubjectivity, but refers to the ability of epistemic adverbs to establish a common cognitive ground between the speaker and the addressee, thus encouraging the addressee to agree with the speaker).
The common ground component is also present in Wierzbicka’s (2006) explications of the meanings of epistemic adverbs, which stress “the place of other people” in their semantics. She writes: “if I say I presume, I am pre- senting my own personal stance and nobody else’s, buy if I say presumably, I am, as it were, supporting my stance with an appeal to some expected general consensus” (Wierzbicka 2006: 259). Wierzbicka’s (2006) account seems to partly mirror the concerns expressed by Nuyts (2001a) in his de- scription of the concept of intersubjectivity. Nuyts (2001a: 64) claims that modal adverbs cannot be considered as purely subjective because they ex- press commitment shared by other people (general knowledge), i.e. they are intersubjective. In fact, the identification of the common ground has also been suggested as a property of modal adjectives, such as apparent,
clear, evident, and obvious, when these are used in phrases such it is clear that or it is obvious that, functioning as modifiers of entire propositions (Tarano 2008). Tarano argues that such “discourse adjectives provide in- terlocutors with a way to talk about their conversation rather than their world” (Tarano 2008: 305), and their use allows “speakers to synchronize their common ground”.
The notions of subjectivity and objectivity have also been associated with specific adverbs. Ernst (2009: 515-516) considers evidential adverbs, such as obviously and clearly, to be objective because they rely on evi- dence. Epistemic adverbs can, in his view, have both subjective and ob- jective readings. For instance, he argues that perhaps is usually subjective, while possibly and probably may be interpreted as objective if the context suggests logical inference. The emphasis on the role of the context in the perception of specific items as subjective, objective or intersubjective is also shared by Nuyts (2001a).
2.8. Epistemic modality, evidentiality, and the socio-cultural