The year 1948 marks the real start of the Cold W a r and the end of any serious hope by the W e s t e r n p o w e r s o f ach ie vi n g a
modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. The exte nt of Soviet control in Ea ste rn E u r o p e and the r u th l e s s n e s s o f th ei r m e t h o d s w as g r a p h i c a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e c o m m u n i s t c o u p in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a in Febr uary. In E as ter n E u r o p e g e n e r a l l y S o v i e t c o n tr o l was s t r e n g t h e n e d and the v e s t i g e s o f the o p p o s i t i o n e l i m i n a te d , while W es te rn e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s w e r e e x p r o p r i a t e d wi th o u t ef fec ti ve c o m p e n s a t io n . T h e r ig i d i t y of S talin's c o n t r o l ov er Eastern E ur op e was d e m o n s t r a t e d by the T i t o - S t a l i n split, (which resulted from Stalin's belief that the Y ug o s la v lea der was s h o w i n g too m uch i n d e p e n d e n c e ) and s u b s e q u e n t a n t i - " T i t o i s t " pu rg es in the satellites, such as the R a j k trial in H u n g a r y in 194 9 .1 ) S o v i e t a g g r e s s i v e i n t e n t i o n s t o w a r d s the W e s t w e r e indicated by the effort to secure control of the Wes tern occupation z o n e s in B er li n, and ge n e r a l s u p p o r t f o r W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i s t parties. The strength of these par tie s in, for ex am p l e, Italy and F rance posed a real da n g er that Stalin wo u ld n ot onl y d o m i n a t e in the East but in W es te rn E u r o p e as well. It s e e m e d that M o s c o w had r e t u r n e d to the p o l i c y o f p r o m o t i n g w o r l d revo lu tio n. W es ter n efforts to p r e v e n t the s p re ad of c o m m u n i s m , d em on str ate d by the Ma rshall Plan and the Berlin Air Lift (which began in 1948) reinfo rc ed Europe's divisions. So vi et acquisition o f the atomic bo m b in 1949 heightened the a t m o s p h e r e of tension as did the o ut bre ak of the Ko rean W a r in 1950, w h i c h was w i d e l y
perceived as a prelude to an attack on W es te rn Euro pe. Inside the K r em lin , S t a l i n ’s in c r e a s i n g l y o p p r e s s i v e r u le was r e f l e c t e d in m a s s a r r e s t s and the f a b r i c a t e d " D o c t o r s ' P l o t . " In s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s the prosp ects for d e v e l o p m e n t o f Br i t i sh re lat io ns with Eastern Eu ro pe an co u nt rie s w er e v er y li m it ed and re m a i n e d so until well after Stalin's death in 1953. It was only by the mid- 1950s, when Khrushchev had co ns o lid at ed his p o w e r that M o sc o w moved to greater pragmatism in its dealings with the W e s t . 2)
In terms of British-Romanian relations, the consolidation of the S o v i e t Bloc m e a n t that the p e r i o d 1948 to 19 65, f r o m the proclamation of the “ P e o p l e ’s” Republic to the death of Gheor ghiu Dej, was a far less eventful one than the p r e c e d i n g fo ur years, which had seen R o m a n i a ’s chang e of sides in the war, the military c a m p a i g n aga in st H u n g a r y and G e r m a n y , the i m p o s i t i o n o f a c o m m u n i s t d o m i n a t e d g o v e r n m e n t , th e s u p p r e s s i o n o f th e d em oc r at ic op po sition, the attack on W e s t e r n c o m m e r c i a l interests and finally the ousting o f the M o n a r c h y . By co nt ra st, this later period was a much more stable one, in whi ch R o m a n i a was firmly under the rule of the c o m m u n i s t party and, until the early 1960s, a subs erv ien t satellite of M o sc o w . The re were, there for e, at least until the 1960s, few sig nificant political d e v e l o p m e n t s for British o f f i c i a l s to r e a c t to, and the e m p h a s i s o f B r i t i s h - R o m a n i a n r el at io n s be ca m e ov er ri d i n g l y c o m m e r c i a l .
Nevertheless, Orme S a r g e n t ’s 1944 definition of British policy t o w a r d s R o m a n i a as b e i n g m e r e l y to p r o t e c t d i r e c t B r i t i s h interests (page 61) still held good. Just as in 1944-8, British policy m ake rs realised that it was futile to try to in flu en c e the political situation in the face of o v er w he lm in g So viet power. Such a policy wo u ld have been d o o m e d to fa ilure f ro m the outset, and w ou ld
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m er el y h ave m a d e re la tio n s with M o s c o w ev en w o r s e , w i t h o u t p r o d u c i n g any results. T h e r e f o r e , d e s p it e the a n t a g o n i s t i c n a t u r e of E a s t- W e s t relations, Britain was q u i c k to d i s t a n c e it s e l f f r o m the activities of emi gre groups w h o w o r k ed for the lib er a tio n o f R o m a n i a from c o m m u n i s t rule. L o n d o n t o o k e x a c t l y the s a m e a t t i t u d e as it had to th e “ h i s t o r i c ” p a r t i e s p r i o r to t h e i r s u p p r e s s i o n in 1947, n a m e l y t h a t R o m a n i a n e m i g r e s w e r e generally unrealistic, with an exagge ra ted idea of the ability o f the We st er n powers to im pro ve the R o m a n ia n poli tical sit uation and of their interest in doing so. Instead, Britain r e c o g n i s e d that the best policy which it could adopt was to try to m i n i m i s e fricti on with the new go v er n m en t in the hop e that it coul d be p r e v a i l e d u p o n to be a little m o r e p r a g m a t i c an d thus r e c o g n i s e th e po ss i b i l i t ie s for a m ut u all y be n e f ic i a l t ra d in g r e l a t io n s h i p . T h u s d e s p i t e the t e n s i o n s of the Co l d W a r , t h e r e w a s n e v e r a ny question of Britain trying to ov er th row the R o m a n i a n g o v e r n m e n t , j u s t as th ere had never been any s e ri o u s p r o s p e c t o f B r i t a i n resisting the im position of the G ro za g o v e r n m e n t in M a r c h 1945, or the consolidation of co m m un i st rule b etw een then and 1948.
Ho we v er , in the short term these efforts at d e v e l o p i n g an u n d e r s ta n d i n g with the new R o m a n i a n r e g i m e fa ile d b e c a u s e o f the h ea v y a n t i -W e s t e r n bias o f the c o m m u n i s t a u t h o r it i e s , w h o placed id eology before rational ec o n o m i c plan ni ng. T h e low p o i n t w a s th e e x p r o p r i a t i o n w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n o f B r i t i s h o i l co m p a n i e s in June 1948, and the ques tion o f how to re ac t to this was one of the first pr ob le m s w h i ch c o n f r o n t e d Br it ish of fic ia ls aft er the R o m a n i a n "People's" R ep u b l i c w a s set up. E f f o r t s to s ec ur e r e i m b u r s e m e n t for this loss, t o g e t h e r with w a r t i m e d eb t s b ec am e a key, if not dom in ant e le m en t in British p ol ic y o v e r the
next few years and the main obstacle in A n g l o - R o m a n i a n relations was this c o m m e r c i a l p ro ble m, r a t h e r than the w i d e r iss ues o f E a s t - W e s t tens io n. Ho we v er , w h i l e the r e g i m e s h o w e d e x t r e m e a n t a g o n i s m to Wes tern c o m m e r c ia l i n te r e s t s , Bri ta in was c a u g h t by the needs of its crippled pos t-w ar e c o n o m y to ma ke pur cha ses fr o m R o m a n i a . E c o n o m i c s a n c t io n s w e r e t h e r e f o r e r u l e d out. N e v e r t h e l e s s s o m e m e a n s h ad to be f o u n d f o r i n d i c a t i n g d is p l e a s u r e over the R o m a n i a n r e g i m e ’s b e h a v i o u r . Th u s Bri tai n refused to sign any trade ag r ee m en t w hi ch the Ro m an i an s wanted and was able to use this as l e v e r a g e to try to p e r s u a d e the R o m a n i a n s to be more f o rt h c o m i n g on the c o m p e n s a t i o n issue. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h r o u g h o u t the p e r i o d , th e R o m a n i a n r e g i m e rem ain ed tied to ideology and despite n eg oti at ion s taking place on a trade ag re em ent they took no steps to ad dr es s British con cer ns ab out c o m p e n s a t io n . Hen ce by 1956, w h e n the tra de and d e b t nego ti ati ons were broken off, a se tt l em en t was no ne ar er than it had been in 1948, de sp ite the m a r g i n a l l y b e t t e r a t m o s p h e r e of E a s t - W e s t r e l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h e v e n t h i s p e r i o d s a w s o m e su ccesses in Br it ish -R om ani an c o m m e r c i a l rel atio ns , officials wer e