Subtle realist commitments

The polarization of philosophical perspectives, and ultimately of methodology, has been subjected to extensive critique (ie, Kirk & Miller, 1986; Murphy, et al., 1998). Proposed by ethnographer Martyn Hammersley (1992), a subtle realist approach is an example of a so-called ‘third-way’ philosophical stance (Murphy, et al., 1998). Hammersley (1993) argues that adopting a naïve realist or naïve interpretivist approach is problematic. On the one hand, there is no basis which is beyond all reasonable doubt to check the correspondence between an account of reality and reality itself – the ‘criterion problem’, and on the other hand, Hammersley (1992) begs the question that if the job of social science is to produce multiple accounts on the basis of a similar research experience, what value can it have? Hammersley (1992) adopts a position that neither naïve realism nor naïve interpretivism offer a sound philosophical basis for the social sciences.

This research study adopts a ‘subtle realist’ perspective as proposed by Hammersley (1992).

Subtle realism rejects the ‘naïve realist’ perspective that maintains a correspondence theory of truth. Subtle realism concedes that it is impossible to have certainty about knowledge claims as researchers inhabit the social and cultural world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995), and, as such, researchers can never be absolutely certain about, or stand apart from, the validity of any knowledge claim. However, Hammersley (1992) argues that it is possible to be reasonably confident about them, and knowledge claims will usually be based around judgements of their plausibility or credibility. Subtle realism argues that there are knowable, independent phenomena, but it departs from naïve realism by acknowledging that knowledge relies on social and cultural assumptions. It is always possible that cultural or social factors may play a role in either leading us towards or away from the truth (Hammersley, 1992).

Subtle realists, then, aim to represent reality, rather than reproduce it (Hammersley, 1992).

This approach, Hammersley argues, allows us to accommodate some elements of an interpretivist approach, without abandoning a commitment to a knowable truth.

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Following on from this distinction, subtle realism suggests that reality can be represented from a range of perspectives, which may be treated as either true or false. Murphy, et al., (1998:69) point out that within a subtle realist approach there is the possibility of “multiple, non-competing valid descriptions and explanations of the same phenomena, however, it excludes the possibility of multiple, competing valid descriptions or explanations of the same phenomena”. Subtle realism, then, offers a middle position between the polar extremes of naïve realism and naïve interpretivism, but importantly “subtle realism is distinct…in its rejection of the notion that knowledge must be defined as beliefs whose validity is known with certainty” (Hammersley, 1992:52). Subtle realism accepts that phenomena can be represented from multiple perspectives, which is not the same as saying that there are multiple realities. Murphy, et al., (1998:70) conclude that subtle realism is “an altern^{ative to} the ontological and epistemological dichotomies”. Although Hammersley (1992) was writing in the context of ethnography, Seale (2002:107) points out that it is “capable of application to others forms of qualitative research”, and Hammersley (1992:53) also suggests that subtle realism is a useful perspective from which to elicit accounts to “provide us with information about events that we could not ourselves witness (for example that happened in the past or in settings to which we do not have access)”. In terms of its application in research settings, Murphy, et al., (1998), Duncan & Nicol (2004), and Lewis (2015) commented upon the value and usefulness of the approach in health care and social research.

A subtle realist perspective is, of course, not without its critics. In general terms, the combination of epistemological perspectives is highlighted as unsustainable by scholars such as Hill Bailey (1997), quoted in Duncan and Nicol (2004). Furthermore, Seale (1999) argues that subtle realism has no true ontological basis, an observation elaborated upon by Banfield (2004). Banfield argues that subtle realist is ‘ontologically-shy’ because it fails to explain why we understand certain descriptions or representations as more valid than others and becomes

“a kind of smorgasboard approach to the production of theory”. Moreover, Banfield describes subtle realism as a flat ontology which collapses ontology and epistemology to the extent that all knowledge claims are treated equally. Ultimately, however, Banfield proposes a critical realist perspective in order to overcome, what he suggest as, subtle realism collapsing posivitism and interpretivism and structure and agency, and ignorance of a Marxist view of history.

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Banfield also raises concerns with the problem of relevance. Hammersley’s idea of an adequate explanation of a phenomenon is one that “depends on the particular purposes for which and context in which the explanation is being developed” (Hammersley, 1992:39), which according to Banfield, offers nothing but “ambiguity with endless possibilities for the epistemological shopper who is free to select abstractions and generate explanations of the social world to fit fashionable or practical purposes” (Banfield, 2004:57). In other words, according to Banfield, subtle realism is ‘conflationist’ and vague.

Despite these criticisms, I believe that my subtle realist commitments are appropriate for this research study. For one, the research study has been structured so as to illicit knowledge claims that we can be reasonably confident about. As such, I believe that it is possible to

“combine a commitment to the social construction of reality with a concern for truth as a regulatory ideal, through studying the different constructions people make of reality, without accepting that particulars beliefs are true” (Murphy, et al., 1998:69). Moreover, the aim of the research study is neither to adopt a critical Marxist perspective nor to generate

‘fashionable’ explanations, but rather than to generate multiple, valid descriptions and explanations of events and processes across time.

There are a number of reasons for adopting a subtle realist perspective in this research study.

Firstly, one of the fundamental implications of subtle realism is that it is well-suited as a potential companion for research that focuses on phenomena in context using techniques such as ethnography or semi-structured interviews (Hammersley, 1992). Therefore, a subtle realist approach is well-suited to studying complex relationships and heterogeneous knowledge claims. Secondly, a subtle realist approach is well-suited to a longitudinal or retrospective research study across time, as the history of events lead to the possibility of heterogeneous knowledge claims. Thirdly, I intend the research outputs to be relevant to practitioners and policy-makers alike. In my opinion, practitioners and policy-makers are unlikely to consider an interpretivist research study as credible due to its ontological and epistemological commitments to competing multiple realities.

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Fourthly, I have had a prior professional involvement in the research setting which may exert a level of unintentional influence on the research; therefore, a naïve realist perspective associated with the notion of objectivity would be problematic (a discussion of researcher positionality is discussed in Section 3.7). Overall, I have sought to achieve ‘epistemological integrity’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2006) throughout the research design.

Section 3.4 illuminates my decisions in terms of sampling, data collection, data analysis methods, quality criteria and how they resonate with a subtle realist perspective. Firstly, however, I turn to the logic of enquiry.