The industrial revolution brought prosperity and, along with it, the use of hazardous processes and complex technologies. Growing economies and global competition has led to more complex processes involving the use of hazardous chemicals, ex- otic chemistry, and extreme operating conditions. As a result, a fundamental under- standing of the hazards and associated risks is essential. Process safety and risk management requires the application of the basic sciences and a systematic ap- proach. Recent advances, such as overpressure protection alternatives and reactive chemistry, allow safer design and operation of processes.
In the multiple-barriers concept, plants are designed with several layers, so that an accident would require the failure of several systems. Another novel approach to
process safety and risk management is to consider various actions in a descending hierarchical order. Inherently safer design consideration should be first in the hier- archy, followed by prevention systems, mitigation, and response. The success of these systems is dependent on the fundamental understanding of the process and the associated hazards. Chronic as well as catastrophic consequences resulting from toxic and flammable substances can be reduced and/or eliminated through appropriate design and operating practices.
In the end, progress toward the improvement in safety performance can be measured only by a reduction in occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. In fact, measurable progress has been made in the period 1970 to 1995, during which the rate of workplace fatalities fell by 78% and the number of workplace deaths has declined by 62%. We have also seen a 25% decline in the rate of occupational injuries and illnesses from 1973 through 1994. These reductions are the result of the combined efforts of all the partners in occupational safety and health: industry, labor, academic researchers, National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Mining Safety and Health Admin- istration, state and local agencies, and others. No single partners can claim exclu- sive credit for the progress. Thus, if further progress is to be made, all of the partners must act—from identifying the causes of disease and injury through con- trolling or eliminating the hazards or exposures at the worksite.
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M. SAM MANNAN DENNIS HENDERSHOT TREVOR A. KLETZ