The picture that has emerged in this chapter is of the perceived risks and routes into misconduct developing and interacting at a range of levels from individual to institutional.
Some have concerned structural factors such as the responsibilities of, and demands on, chief officers, the way processes operate, and changing levels of scrutiny, accountability and
transparency. Others have concerned more fundamental questions about the values that are brought to bear on decision-making in police forces, and the way these values are shaped by wider political and cultural processes.
Arguably, three findings are of particular concern:
26 ‘Notifiable associations’ are those that may impact on the operations or reputation of a force. Forces have their own ‘notifiable association’ policies (e.g. Merseyside Police 2012).
The accounts of our interviewees about the barriers to challenging misconduct by chief officers and, in particular, the way challenge was widely viewed as career-limiting.
The values brought to bear on selection and recruitment processes that, it was claimed, did not value difference in policing.
The way misconduct has been tolerated in a small number of cases, reflected in officers reportedly being promoted despite concerns around their behaviour.
However, we also heard that tolerance for misconduct was falling, there was an increasing willingness to challenge misconduct, and there were excellent examples of progressive chief officers promoting transparent and accountable styles of leadership.
4. Investigating misconduct
Key findings:
The boundaries between ethically dubious conduct, misconduct, gross misconduct and criminal conduct are often blurred. The severity assessment of each individual case, is a matter of negotiation between the Appropriate Authority and the investigating agency, and often involves the IPCC.
The decision about who is best suited to investigate these cases is also a matter of choice. There appeared to be no transparent rules governing how this choice is or should be made.
Investigations are complicated by the sensitive nature of the case and limited by technical competence of the investigator, organisational capacity, and wider ‘political’
factors.
The S/IO has a great deal of flexibility to negotiate the terms of reference and also to shape the investigation in particular directions.
Finally, there is little or no oversight of the decision-making process of the Appropriate Authority.
What is known about chief officer misconduct in the public domain is shaped by decisions made to report, record and investigate it. The discretionary nature of these processes has seldom been explored, yet has the potential to inflate or diminish the seriousness of allegations, and how they are dealt with. This chapter presents interviewees’ views on the investigation of allegations of chief officer misconduct. The material in the chapter bears only indirectly on the risk factors associated with chief officers, though it can be assumed the ethical climate of the service and individual forces is, to some extent, shaped by the perceived effectiveness and fairness of the investigative process.
The investigative process is both complex and dependent on the nature of the allegation under investigation, and whether the person under investigation is a chief police office or member of police staff (for further details, see Appendix B). Investigations may be conducted by investigators in force or from other forces, or independently by the IPCC. There are
several crucial decisions points:
Establishing whether there is prima facie evidence of misconduct.
Assessing its severity.
Allocating an SIO who in turn appoints an IO.
Assessing whether the evidence supports a ‘case to answer’ and appointing members and a chair of a misconduct panel where necessary.
Approving or rejecting any sanctions recommended by the misconduct panel.
These decisions are made variously by the Appropriate Authority, the SIO or IO, and, in some cases, by the IPCC. The Appropriate Authority for investigating misconduct by a chief
constable is the PCC, while the chief constable is the Appropriate Authority for misconduct by other chief officers in the same force. The Appropriate Authority will, depending on the
allegation, consult with the IPCC, which may take over investigations, manage them, or simply refer the complaint back to the Appropriate Authority to manage locally.
The investigation process, like the investigation of crime, is highly discretionary. As the investigation shares many characteristics with other police investigations, Carson’s (2007) critique of traditional police investigation is relevant. He argued that various factors affect the
quality of police investigations, such as:
Discretion in deciding which matters get investigated.
The cost of investigations.
The competence and expertise of those who investigate.
The purpose of the investigation.
Reaching premature conclusions.
What distinguishes misconduct investigations from other investigations, of course, is that police, largely, investigate themselves. As Punch (2003) has highlighted, however:
[Third party investigations] have been conducted in a vigorous and highly professional manner and have led to the unearthing of serious deviance. Yet there always remains a doubt when an agency investigates itself and where there is no truly independent institution that can conduct what needs to be seen as totally impartial inquiries. (2003: page 8)
One of the overarching themes to emerge from the interviews was that the highly
discretionary nature of the investigative process, and the distributed responsibility for it, which seems to create a system that often lacks transparency and accountability. As one investigator put it:
Our investigation can still be steered [by the investigator] in a particular
direction. And a recommendation by us is made because of the evidence that we have found. So the witnesses we choose to interview, the evidence we choose to look at and to assess whether it is relevant or not, it will become a very
suggestive investigation. Someone else might do it differently. (IO)
This chapter, first, considers the definitions of misconduct, gross misconduct and criminal conduct and how each of these are perceived by the various actors involved in the
investigation process. The chapter, then, focuses on some of the difficulties encountered by investigators in the course of conducting their investigations. Finally, the chapter traces how these issues can influence the final outcomes of the investigation. The discussion is not exhaustive but gives a flavour of the complexities reportedly involved in the process of investigating alleged chief officer misconduct.