CHAPTER FOUR
4.2 Sunna and its Modes of Transmission !
implausible to suggest that the whole discourse of legal epistemology within the folds of Shiite jurisprudence has evolved in order to establish the epistemic validity of the ẓann created by the isolated report.
4.2 Sunna and its Modes of Transmission !
Owing to the fact that the majority of Sharīʿa precepts are inferred or derived from textual evidence, there exists no doubt that the reported sunna of the
maʿṣūm is singlehandedly one of the most important sources of legal knowledge within the Uṣūlī, if not the Muslim, jurisprudential discourse. There is a general consensus that the number of legal verses in the Qurʾān amount to approximately 500 verses, signifying that despite the Qurʾān being the primary textual source of legal knowledge, it alone is not sufficient in indicating comprehensive knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Accordingly, alongside the Qurʾān, the sunna is independently utilised in the juristic process of deriving Sharīʿa precepts, as it provides access to a broad range of Sharīʿa precepts that are not holistically detailed in the Qurʾān.
In the Muslim jurisprudential tradition, the sunna is defined as “the word of the Prophet, his action, and his tacit endorsement202.” This understanding of sunna
is universal for both the Shiites and the Sunnis, as it is theologically accepted by all Muslims that the Prophet Mohammad is the source of Sharīʿa, inasmuch as he has been divinely appointed by God as His representative and as a lawgiver. Therefore, the epistemic validity of the sunna as an independent source of Sharīʿa precepts is undisputedly accepted within the Muslim jurisprudential discourse. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the main argument used to establish this is that God – or the Divine Lawgiver – Himself establishes this in numerous verses of the Qurʾān. For instance, the Qurʾān categorically states that: “Nor does he [the Prophet] speak from [his own] desires203”, or: “Indeed the messenger of Allah is an excellent example to follow for anyone whose hope is Allah, and the last day, and [remembers] Allah often204.” Since God Himself claims that the Prophet is the best example of all, and that he only says that which God wishes, this signifies that He wants Muslims to follow and act in accordance with the sunna or the words, actions and tacit endorsements of the Prophet.
However, the Shiite thought differs to the Sunnis in that it does not only accept the epistemic validity of the sunna of the Prophet, but it also consents to the epistemic validity of the sunna of the impeccable Shiite Imams. In Shiite
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202 See Muẓaffar, Uṣūl al-fiqh vol. 2, p. 55; Faḍlī, Durūs fi uṣūl fiqh al-Imāmiyya vol. 1, p. 167;
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, p. 10
203 Qurʾān, 53:3 204 Qurʾān, 33:21
theology, the impeccable (maʿṣūm) Imams are not merely recognised as narrators or interpreters of the sunna of the Prophet, rather they are accepted as the divinely appointed successors of the Prophet, and thus succeed him in every aspect, which includes being the source of knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts. Therefore, in the Shiite tradition, the sunna of the impeccable Imams possesses the same value as the sunna of the Prophet205.
The sunna of the maʿṣūm – whether the Prophet or the Imams – is transmitted in the form of a statement or report that is commonly termed as either ‘ḥadīth’ (plural ‘aḥādīth’) or ‘khabar’ (plural akhbār)206, and the science that is specifically dedicated to discussing the authenticity of the transmitted reports is known as ʿilm al-ḥadīth. In one of the earliest Shiite works entitled Dirāyat al-
Ḥadīth, Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī defines ʿilm al-ḥadīth as:
A science in which the text of the ḥadīth is investigated, with its chain of transmission, from the authentic to the faulty to the weak, along with all that is needed to distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable207.
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205 See Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, pp. 179-188
206 It must be noted that the term ḥadīth is often referred to as “tradition”, whereas the term
khabar is often referred to as “report”. However, it is found that in the context of hadith studies, both these terms are usually used interchangeably and technically refer to “a statement carrying the speech, action or tacit approval of an impeccable [maʿṣūm]” see Faḍlī, ʿAbd al- Hādī. Introduction to Ḥadīth including Dirāyat al-Ḥadīth by al-Shahīd al-Thānī. Trans. Nazmina A. Virjee (London: ICAS, 2002), p. 19.
It becomes apparent from this that the study or the purpose of ʿilm al-ḥadīth is to classify the authenticity of a transmitted report, by determining whether it is authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), good (ḥasan), dependable (muwaththaq), or weak (ḍaʿīf)208, and based on its classification, it is determined whether the report can be accepted or not as a source of knowledge. One of the chief requirements of a
mujtahid is that he not only has knowledge of other disciplines such as logic, theology and linguistics, but also has a thorough understanding of ʿilm al-
ḥadīth. Indeed, since knowledge of a significant proportion of Sharīʿa precepts is inferred or derived from the reported tradition of the maʿṣūm, a mujtahid
must possess an acute awareness of being able to determine the authenticity of a transmitted report.
However, the authenticity of the transmitted reports of the sunna has been severely criticised in Western Orientalist literature, with the most profound criticism being provided by Ignaz Goldziher (d.1921), who inducted a critical study on the authenticity of the transmitted reports in his analysis of the evolution of Muslim theology and dogmatic beliefs. His analysis led him to conclude that a great majority of reports that claim to be from the time of the Prophet were in fact inaugurated in a much later period, and thus he claimed
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208 It must be noted that a ṣaḥīḥ report is one in which all the narrators in its chain of
transmission are Shiite and are trustworthy. All scholars consider a ṣaḥīḥ report to be valid. A ḥasan report is where at least one of the narrators in the chain is not known to be trustworthy, however has been praised by the biographers of narrators –or experts in al-rijāl). Many scholars consider this type of report to be valid. A muwaththaq report is one in which all reporters in a chain of transmission are trustworthy, but are not necessarily Shiite. Most of the scholars consider this type of report to be valid. Lastly, a ḍaʿīf report is one in which it is known that at least one of the narrators in the chain of transmission is not trustworthy or is unknown. According to many scholars, a weak tradition can only be relied upon if mujtahids of the past have acted in accordance with it. See Faḍlī, Mabādī al-uṣūl, pp. 29-30.
that they were spurious209. Goldziher’s study was further developed by Joseph
Schacht (d.1969), who insisted that as far as the transmitted reports that reveal knowledge of Sharīʿa precepts are concerned, they must be considered fictitious until they are proven to be authentic210. In essence, the main criticism from the Orientalists towards the mainstream Muslim scholarship was that it was wrong to consider transmitted reports as being a true representation of the actual words of the Prophet regarding dogmatic and legal precepts. Therefore, the Orientalists uphold that the epistemological yardstick instilled by Western scholarship for assessing the authenticity of the transmitted reports is far more critical than the measure that is offered within the mainstream Muslim scholarship.
However, the Orientalist argument is completely disregarded by Hallaq, who views the Orientalist discourse concerning the non-authenticity of transmitted reports as “pointless” 211. Hallaq argues that a critical epistemological appreciation considering the authenticity of transmitted reports was actually first discovered in the Muslim jurisprudential discourse of legal theory, which he claims has escaped the attention of modern hadith scholarship. Muslim legal theory principally classifies transmitted reports into two epistemological categories, namely mutawātir (widely narrated report) and khabar al-wāḥid !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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209 See Goldziher, Ignac et al. Muslim Studies (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971) For a
summary of Goldziher’s position see Robson, James. “Muslim Tradition: The Question of Authenticity,” Memoirs and Proceedings, Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, (1951) pp. 84-102
210 See Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) 211 See Hallaq, Wael B. “The Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadīth: a Pseudo-problem” Studia
(the isolated report). The former is accepted as a transmitted report that has the capacity of providing certain knowledge (qaṭʿ), whereas the latter is accepted as a transmitted report that is merely capable of providing conjectural knowledge (ẓann). Hallaq thus concludes his critique of the Orientalist position by stating that:
To sum up, Western scholarship has concentrated its attention upon an area of traditional Muslim discourse that is not particularly instructive. The traditionalist discourse is stated in terms that are largely incongruent with the epistemic evaluation of ḥadīth, and evaluation that is directly relevant and indeed central to the Islamicist paradigm of historical research. If minimal traces of this epistemic interest are to be found in the traditionalist discourse, it is because legal theory commended a measure of attention from the traditionalists. The epistemic evaluation of ḥadīth was finally articulated and elaborated by the legal theoreticians and jurists, and it is in this area of traditional discourse that Western scholars should have begun their enquiry – if such an enquired need at all be embarked upon212.
In light of the epistemological categorisation of transmitted reports into
mutawātir and khabar al-wāḥid, Hallaq accurately argues that the mainstream Muslim scholarship within legal circles already accepted that a large number of
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the transmitted reports gave rise to mere ẓann, and hence it was a futile effort by the Orientalists to suggest something that was already clearly explicated within the Muslim jurisprudential discourse.
Although Hallaq’s study primarily focuses on the mainstream Sunni jurisprudential discourse, it can convincingly be argued that his understanding can be extended to the Shiite jurisprudential discourse, as the origin and development of Shiite legal theory was largely inspired by the Sunni discourse213, and the Shiite jurisprudential discourse too maintains a two-fold distinction of the different modes from which the reports of the maʿṣūm are transmitted. In essence, the Shiites, like the Sunnis, accept the epistemological categorisation of transmitted reports into mutawātir and khabar al-wāḥid.
4.2.1 Mutawātir: The Qaṭʿī Mode of Transmission
In the discourse of ʿilm al-ḥadīth, every transmitted report has two components, namely sanad and matan. The former refers to the ‘chain’ of narrators or reporters who have transmitted a particular report over generations from the time of the maʿṣūm, whilst the latter refers to the actual “content” of the report, which indicates the sunna, i.e. the actual word, action or tacit approval of the maʿṣūm. In legal theory, a transmitted report is deemed as a
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qaṭʿī evidence if its sanad (chain of transmission) reaches the level of
mutawātir. Ibn Shahīd al-Thānī expresses:
A mutawātir is a report that has so many narrators that it is conventionally impossible for them to all have agreed upon its fabrication. This multitude must be fulfilled on all the levels or generations of reporters, in such a way that the beginning of the chain is the same as its end, and the middle of the chain is congruous with the two ends. The number of reporters has not been stipulated or restricted to an exact figure, as some people believe, but rather it serves to generate certitude214.
Thus, a mutawātir is a report that is so widely narrated that it produces
qaṭʿ/ʿilm that it has not been fabricated or misunderstood by any of the reporters in its chain of transmission over the generations.Ghazālī classifies knowledge provided by a mutawātir report as necessary knowledge (al-ʿilm al-
ḍarūrī) as opposed to acquired conjectural knowledge (al-ʿilm al-naẓarī). The former type of knowledge is akin to ʿilm al-ḥuḍurī, inasmuch as it is defined as knowledge that “naturally imposes itself upon the intellect.” Meanwhile, the latter type refers to knowledge that is attained through the process of deductive reasoning, and since it involves the process of deduction, it is described as knowledge that is prone to error. In contrast, the knowledge that is attained
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through mutawātir reports is knowledge that is necessary, in that it cannot be prone to error. Moreover, since it “necessarily” gives knowledge, Ghazālī expounds that it can be used as a source from which other knowledge can be derived215.
Muẓaffar, who in his al-Manṭiq categorises mutawātir reports under the title of
al-yaqīniyāt, also maintains a similar distinction to Ghazālī. By classifying a
mutawātir report as having the capability of providing yaqīn, Muẓaffar expounds that it can never be erroneous, as its indication – as with the indication of anything that has the ability of providing yaqīn – in actuality always accurately corresponds to the objective reality (wāqiʿī). In his discourse of both logic and legal theory, Muẓaffar defines mutawātir reports as:
Propositions that the soul [or the self] (nafs) is at peace (sukūn) with, and doubt (shakk) is alleviated with them, and a psychological state of
jazm is acquired for the one who possesses them with qaṭʿ. This is because [regarding a] widely narrated report, it is impossible for a group to concur on a fabrication, and it is [also] impossible for it to coincide on making a mistake in reporting. Like we know of the remote countries that exist although we have not seen them, and that the Noble
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215 See Weiss, Bernard G. “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of “Tawātur” According to