Supporting organizational structure & processes

8.5.1 Cincinnati

Within all of the organizations examined for the research reported in this thesis, there was a structure which, it was suggested, supported the creation of Team Learning.

Cincinnati felt that its position as a JV allowed it to bring learning and perspectives from two separate parent organizations which was seen to be advantageous over its singular entity peer group, in line with Inkpen & Currall (2004). Inkpen & Currall found that learning processes are central to alliance development dynamics.

Cincinnati’s leader noted the distinction between the two parent organizations and how the two perspectives worked so well:

“The [parent organization] side of things, which is heavily biased towards the engineering. And the [parent organization] side, which is more the construction [side]”

Having two diverse parents allowed it to pool viewpoints on problems from both sides.

Cincinnati had found this situation particularly useful in developing its leaders’

perspectives on engineering, construction and project management. In addition, Cincinnati was being increasingly proactive in getting structure in place before changes in workload with its customer which improved its reaction ability. It accepted that there were disadvantages to be managed in the form of allocating individuals to roles. Where it might be simpler in an individual organization, there was the issue of trying to achieve the correct management and reporting lines when dealing with individuals from two different parent organizations, as noted by Beamish & Lupton (2009).

In addition, Cincinnati felt that its parent companies’ approach of housing centralized teams in the same locations further supported Team Learning. One of its parent companies operated. Cincinnati’s leader advised:

“…the EFQM model which is the European Foundation Quality Management, or something like that, which includes Continuous Improvement.”

which fed into Cincinnati’s learning processes. Cincinnati had an improvement team which visited the sites specifically in order to transfer improvement ideas. The tool used by the team was a simple improvement log which it maintained and distributed accordingly.

At a project level, those who delivered Cincinnati’s projects were made to go through the lessons learned from other projects before they started a new one. This approach to learning suggested that there was not yet the culture to ensure that they carried out lessons learned voluntarily; nor was it obvious how Cincinnati used those lessons learned to improve the next project. A member of the focus group stated:

“…we're trying to put things in place where you have to go through the lessons learned from previous jobs to get to do a job.”

Although the focus group stated that the process was not perhaps as successful as it might be, with one member commenting:

“…we have formal lessons learned things, but in real truth it comes down to somebody saying "That's not the best way to do it."

These quotes suggested that best practice models such as those presented by Jeon (2009), which included a model for knowledge acquisition, storing, evaluation and dissemination, had not infiltrated Cincinnati’s processes.

8.5.2 Tennessee

Tennessee’s MD stated that its uniqueness was that it structured itself so that it operated on a national and regional basis. It achieved this through ‘…complete self-contained units to some fair extent…” which allowed Tennessee to interact with its local customer base on a more personal basis. It also enabled regional offices to refer back to the national business when needed in terms of interaction with larger customers or reliance on central services.

Tennessee’s setup helped it to avoid doubling up efforts in terms of project and customer bids. Each regional office bid only in its own region, but national clients were managed by a central champion. The structure could therefore be described as a conglomerate of regional businesses with a strong overlay which stitched it all together. Tennessee suggested that each unit traded almost as an independent organization which motivated learning at the business unit level.

BS5750 was the catalyst for Tennessee to create the best practice processes that supported its Team Learning. BS5750 was a quality standard applied to business processes under which Tennessee would have set quality targets and monitored performance against target. It was once acknowledged as the construction industry standard in the UK but was now almost entirely superseded by ISO 9000, the international equivalent (Moatazed-Keivani et al, 1999).

Tennessee postulated that, unlike other organizations, it looked to the BS5750 standard to help improve its organization rather than just to obtain a plaque on the wall and a logo on its documents. One of the directors noted:

“We very much decided that we would not do it to get a badge on the wall.

We would do it as a business improvement exercise and that is what we did.”.

Tennessee felt that the best way to use this would be to attempt to align its processes to the best practice principles of those of the manufacturing industry. It made the clear distinction of not aligning exactly with the manufacturing industry’s processes themselves as it suggested that such processes do not translate exactly to construction. Manufacturing was viewed simply as a source of learning.

Tennessee took a similar approach when achieving ISO14001 and ISO18001 which are European environmental and safety standards respectively. It combined these in a way that supported the business so that it learned to examine both factors when planning ways of working on site. This approach had spawned an integrated management system which was industry recognized, as one of their directors noted:

“…we were actually the first company in the country – construction company in the country – to gain registration from BSI for an integrated management system…”

Tennessee opined that this was a huge driving force around which its organization had grown.

Tennessee used its integrated management system to help apply all business improvements in a common way. Such application had been a fundamental part of the business culture – the understanding and acceptance that improvement is sought and then applied in a consistent manner across the entire business. Tennessee’s MD asserted

“…when there is an improvement identified, you can apply that improvement very easily across the whole company in all it’s geographic parts because you’re always moving from the same common base…”

Tennessee genuinely believed that the system made it one of the best practiced contractors in the industry. Zeng et al (2005) set out the benefits of implementing such an integrated system as “avoidance duplication of procedures”, “reduced conflict of procedures”, and “reduced requirements for resources”.

IT support was another key to Tennessee’s process support to learning. It felt that its use of Lotus Notes over the Microsoft system enabled it to be more intelligent in its collection, management and distribution of soft knowledge. One of the directors stated:

“…what I would describe as ‘soft knowledge’ more than the hard knowledge is actually in Lotus Notes, in databases. And the advantage of that is that Lotus Notes databases replicate in all the servers around the country and can replicate on to your own C drive….”

Due to its replication, manipulation and retrieval, Tennessee felt the system took care of the ‘mechanics’ side of Team Learning. It allowed people to access information about a customer project in another part of the country to utilize on their projects.

The ability to simply demonstrate a high sophistication of internal knowledge management by talking knowledgeably with a customer about projects in other regions was seen as a key benefit of the system.

8.5.3 Indianapolis

Indianapolis had divided itself up into customer service streams, but beyond that it prided itself in having little formal structure or processes. It was able to do this successfully because it was a small enough organization to still be contained completely within only two offices across the UK. It suggested that these streams’

close knitted makeup and its open forum meetings aided communication and the exchange of knowledge. Indianapolis director for the Miami commission revealed:

“…we have a team working for Miami, a team working for [another customer]. So again you generate that; you've got to generate that to familiarity. So even with the director, they're always working for the same people and they tend to be very close knit sort of teams…”

In addition, Indianapolis suggested that it had made its structure as flat as possible to enable communication, an approach which was seen to be in line with Claver-Cortes et al (2007). Indianapolis was entirely owned by its directors and as soon as someone was promoted to director, they became part of the ownership structure. The feeling was that this aspirational driver had helped retain key staff with knowledge within the business. How this reflected against flat structure potentially causing a de-motivational effect of slow career progress was not discussed.

One interesting comment from Indianapolis’s MD was that the ‘all directors own a share of the business’ model was developed when the business was worth nothing.

He questioned whether the business founders would have decided on the same model if the business had already been the size it was now. This finding raises a philosophical point about the commitment to the ideal LO structure over personal

gain, which was seen to be a key omission from Senge et al’s (1990, 1994) model. It remains an interesting question, the answer for which is beyond the scope of this thesis. This ownership model did, in Indianapolis’ opinion, give it a perceived advantage of not being ‘faceless’ as opposed to those contractors owned by remote shareholders.

The flat organizational structure which Indianapolis had actually came about due to the removal of almost an entire tier of middle management during the recession. This was the same process by which many other organizations had achieved such a structure (Claver-Cortes et al, 2007). One of the directors pointed out:

“The middle manager is gone, the people that [were] looking over people that are doing.”

The feeling in Indianapolis was that the removal of this layer would actually improve the business as it was stifling ideas, ambition and empowerment. Indianapolis’

directors had put out the message that this was an opportunity for those who were once below this level to develop their careers. There may be the ironic observation that the opportunity for promotion into a level which had previously been made redundant and that therefore such opportunities may not be motivators. This was not explored during the case study research.

Supporting the Indianapolis business further was its intranet system, ‘Word Up’, which was designed to allow employees to exchange knowledge, post good ideas and to celebrate success. This system was necessary due to the largely site based nature of its workforce and the fact that it encouraged ideas from those who were executing the physical works on site. Members of the focus group were trying to raise the quality and quantity of ideas and feedback through having a “…subject for the week…” which individuals were encouraged to feed back on. In addition, sending idea updates and organizational news assisted Indianapolis in keeping those remote from the office in touch. Jeon (2009) noted the necessity of a well programmed intranet system for enabling knowledge exchange.

8.5.4 Chicago

Chicago’s support was provided through its open plan office setup which it suggested improved informal communication. Given that informal communication was its primary source of knowledge exchange, this setup was seen to be a key element.

Chicago enjoyed the similar ‘flat’ structure seen at Indianapolis (Claver-Cortes et al, 2007). In terms of systems support, one of the directors noted that Chicago had a

“…large relational database that tracks every single project and every single person that's involved with every single project, both inside and outside the organization…”

The database can be used to establish where knowledge was held within the business. Whether it was used proactively to exchange knowledge was, however, not assessed. All knowledge that was disseminated onto its intranet went through a working group and then the directors to ensure accuracy and relevance.

In addition, Chicago’s intranet database could list each person by what formal training they had received and by the projects on which they had worked. This database would theoretically allow the business to select exactly the right person for a project (Jeon, 2009). In reality, such an outcome rarely happened as the mobilization process tended to dictate taking the next available person for the next upcoming project.

Where the database system was very useful was during team meetings when project information could be called up instantly and live. The system sped up these meetings and knowledge exchange during their duration – the focus group suggested that the system had made a real improvement to how Chicago operated per se, with one focus group member commenting:

“…we go through that regularly in our regular sort of team meetings and that has a log of basically every job that you know are coming up - the sort of pre-site, then sales, on-site, what’s been finished - and just having a chat round the table you can learn a few lessons…”

In addition, there was an organizational newsletter which was distributed on this system for further information flow (following Jeon, 2009).

Chicago’s current structure had grown out of its culture, although this had not always been the case. In its infancy, Chicago was a hierarchically structured organization.

This culture was described variously by participants as “…friendly…” and

“…inclusive…” in terms of internal culture and “…non-contractual…” in terms of customer relationships. New individuals to the organization tended to be hired to fit in

with this culture rather than solely on technical skills. Jashapara (2003) noted the requirement for a supportive culture to enable the shift to being a LO.

Additionally, the focus group members talked at length about anyone within Chicago being able to talk to anyone else regardless of title. In addition, the social scene at Chicago was enthusiastically embraced by all employees. This scene in itself was considered to help build the culture and promote communication. A member of the focus group commented:

“…you have got formal structure to the business and formal organization to the business but you know it blends really well into the informal sort of situation as well...”

8.5.5 Dallas

Dallas’ structure did not appear at first discussion with the directors to be truly supportive of free knowledge exchange. One of the directors revealed:

“…we’re quite hierarchical from that construction level down but we believe that you have to be and that is how you run a tight ship and a construction project. That’s how you achieve your quality and your times through very clear rule definition…”

Dallas also suggested that its structure was relatively flat which enabled an easy flow of information from top to bottom and vice versa. Dallas suggested that its approach was different from other organizations as employees still have relative access to the decision makers which was not the case in more deeply layered organizations. Dallas’

hierarchical approach appeared to work for them, but such an approach has been specifically noted as a barrier to learning (Matzdorf et al, 1999).

In terms of processes, again Dallas was relatively informal. Key knowledge and learning was generally circulated, with Dallas’ director for the Washington commission advising that:

“…most of the time because of the way we work with Washington everything’s sent by email. So people would get a document, a brochure or something sent through via email…”

What was not clear was how the retention and utilization of that knowledge was measured, evidenced and managed, as e-mail can be a ‘fire and forget’ method of

distributing knowledge. Kane & Alavi (2007) noted that e-mail is best used for the unstructured exchange of tacit knowledge. Dallas did have a huge process manual, but most participants confessed that they could not recall the last time they looked at it. The written processes were viewed as more use as guidance for new employees rather than processes to follow in project delivery.

The main process mentioned by Dallas for supporting knowledge exchange was the risk process. This, it was suggested, was the best supporting process to enable employees to learn about what needs to be managed closely on a construction project. One of the directors noted:

“…taking implied tacit knowledge and making it into explicit knowledge the risk register is a very good way of giving someone a good signpost at the start of their part in a process as to where the rest of the people were involved prior…”

Dallas’ supporting standard risk meeting agendas ensured that risks were not forgotten during the management and delivery process. Risk was the only arena where individual project managers did not have the autonomy to depart from prescribed procedure. Dallas’ use of the risk register for learning appeared unique and was a clear departure from current LO literature, none of which already referenced herein appeared to mention such an approach.

Something that Dallas’ directors had promoted was a lack of meeting minutes, with one director stating:

“[We] try never to keep Minutes anymore. Minutes are cumbersome, wastes time we just have next steps. We just come up with an action plan following the meeting with people allocated with the next steps…”

This meant that only issues which required action came from meetings rather than all items discussed. The lack of minutes was, however, inconsistently applied, as Dallas operated a monthly review which was meant to pick up all issues on sites for discussion. However, this had become an obsolete process as issues tended to be dealt with long before they reached the meeting date. This process appeared to be obsolete and of little value, but appeared still to be operated. The absence of obsolete meetings is a central tenet of the LO (Senge et al; 1990, 1994) in that Senge et al suggests they ought to be reviewed, challenged and minimized.

Additionally, there was a regular, informal staff meeting which Dallas had instigated which the director responsible for each customer account attended. This meeting allowed anyone to raise any issues which the directors needed to action. The meeting was seen as important as it removed the opportunity for individuals to say they did not have a chance to speak to their director about an issue. The necessity of such a meeting suggested Dallas did not have a culture where individuals spoke to their directors as a matter of course.

The main specific learning exchange meeting at Dallas was usually held in December when there was little work happening in the retail sector due to Christmas trade. A member of the focus group noted:

“…Christmas it is a quieter period for us. That's when we tend to have a meeting which is about the most formal sort of meeting we get to. All set out, and the whole team comes round and we’ll have an agenda just to go

“…Christmas it is a quieter period for us. That's when we tend to have a meeting which is about the most formal sort of meeting we get to. All set out, and the whole team comes round and we’ll have an agenda just to go