Supporting Unity and Cohesion in a Developing UW Organization

In Afghanistan, PSYOP Soldiers developed a recruiting and retention video that highlighted the pain one new Afghan soldier felt when separated from his family and village support system while training with other Afghans he regarded as strangers.

The video acknowledged the new recruit’s pain but then also portrayed him speaking the words he was writing to his father—telling of his hardships in training and the loneliness he felt at times, while also feeling the tremendous pride of serving in the new Afghan National Army with his compatriots.

The video portrayed the soldier writing in the letter to his father that, despite his discomfort with his surroundings and training, he remained committed to the security and safety of his family and tribe that the new army would afford them in the coming months. He ended the letter stating that for the sake of the honor of his family and their long-term safety he remained committed to the new army and his training.

6-18. It is natural to want to design the force similar to a U.S. organization. However, this may not be the most appropriate organization to accomplish the immediate tasks facing the irregular force. Likewise, techniques taught must follow the legal guidelines that PSYOP forces follow to avoid potential legal fallout for the USG when training an irregular force. In addition, PSYOP forces can educate irregular force personnel on psychological aspects of the enemy force if they are not familiar with them. During Phase IV, PSYOP forces should support the development of the UW organization by capitalizing on U.S.

rapport-building activities and multiplying their effects. PSYOP forces should take advantage of the situation during the organization phase to capture images (whether still or video) and interview the UW force to capture information for use in future products.

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6-19. Whether members of the irregular force are dedicated specifically to a PSYOP mission or are doing so as an additional duty, lack of equipment or support in this stage may limit them to basic PSYOP media.

They may conduct what might best be termed grassroots PSYOP that utilize whatever media they can use independently (Figure 6-2, page 6-7). The inability to receive either indirect or direct support from U.S. or other allied forces may necessitate grassroots PSYOP. If executed using sound methodology and sufficient research, multiple low-cost, high-reward avenues exist to reach select TAs. When tactically feasible, face-to-face PSYOP and other in-person products, such as guerrilla theater, can resonate with TAs.

Members of the underground or auxiliaries can pursue limited-risk covert media. This media can range from graffiti to simple alternative newsletters and handbills. Recent experience has shown that some electronic media have passed into the realm of grassroots PSYOP. Various electronic formats, such as digital video discs (DVDs), can provide a degree of security for irregular personnel located in adversary-controlled areas. These formats have had significant impact. U.S. personnel supporting and advising such activities must keep an open mind on what might be an unusual form of media. However, U.S. personnel must also analyze proposed products that may be counterproductive, offensive, or may violate any of the basic tenets and historical truths of successful PSYOP.

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6-20. In the organization phase, it may prove useful and practical to encourage the formation of dedicated PSYOP cadre and to train them for later stages. The goal is to build a skeletal structure that forces can flesh out during buildup as recruitment grows. However, it can unacceptably drain limited combat power by overbuilding an indigenous PSYOP force. In addition, such a force in the underground or auxiliaries could expose it to a level of adversary scrutiny that is unacceptable. Therefore, in Phase IV (just as in Phase III) it may be necessary to limit the number of specifically tasked PSYOP personnel and continue to build databases of potential personnel with skill sets that might warrant a transfer of function at a later date.

Figure 6-2. Afghan village elder addressing population on Psychological Operations loudspeaker

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6-21. It is likely that relationships between ad hoc or dedicated PSYOP cadre will become an important consideration at this time. Organizations paralleling U.S. military and OGA structures will increasingly form in Phase IV, even if it is in embryonic form. Organizations among the guerrillas paralleling U.S.

organizations that typically would work or deconflict with DOD PSYOP personnel should begin to work with dedicated military PSYOP cadre. At this stage, military PSYOP cadre and government-in-exile or shadow-government civilian PSYOP cadre may be the same organization. It is foreseeable that this task organization may continue even through the success of the insurgency. PSYOP cadre should attempt to establish bonds, boundaries, and communications with their relevant counterparts within the armed wing of the insurgency, as well as any relevant civilian government-in-exile organizations.

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6-22. With the advent of multiple avenues of instant or near-real-time transfers of information and data, UW operator can assume that the UW operation has primarily a local or U.S. domestic audience. U.S.

PSYOP forces are always aware of the potential for any action to quickly have an impact across the region in which the UW operation is being conducted and, quite often, across the globe. Irregular forces may or may not appreciate this fact and may require training and advising from ARSOF personnel. Conversely,

efforts may only begin in later phases, only a small group of trained individuals is necessary for an irregular force to utilize the Internet and global media outlets to promote PSYOP programs. When the underground or auxiliary must emphasize concealing their involvement, the global media can sometimes provide additional anonymity because of the difficulty of tracing through multiple servers and routers. Overt supporters of either a U.S.-sponsored irregular organization or its opponents can use the reach of global media quite openly and overtly. ARSOF Soldiers must be aware of all such efforts by the U.S.-sponsored irregular, allied, competitor, or antagonistic groups. In most instances, control of these types of asymmetric approaches used by an adversary may be impossible. The focus then must switch to counterpropaganda efforts.

PHASE V: BUILDUP

6-23. During Phases IV and V, PSYOP forces may focus on recruiting and building external support for the force. Depending on the duration of Phase V, ARSOF may focus on, increase the number of, or maintain the previous level of capitulation programs during this phase. PSYOP forces may or may not begin more emphasis on preparing the populace for introduction of the UW force. In general, ARSOF must ensure that no party compromises the covert nature of the operation. All operators at every level must safeguard the force. Although it is generally easy for forces supporting or conducting tactical-level support to keep this foremost in their minds, forces conducting strategic- or operational-level PSYOP may forget or be unaware of the potential compromising effects of products on the force—whether they come unintentionally while disseminating talking points or unconsciously in a newspaper article.

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6-24. Typically during buildup, some active PSYOP programs to produce series on recruitment can be pursued. Although recruitment of members of the underground or auxiliary remains either covert or clandestine, motivating TAs susceptible to joining these organizations can be pursued by highlighting the successes of the organization. In addition, recruitment series for the armed force may have an effect on recruitment in other areas as well. No PSYOP support to recruitment should make unrealistic or unfulfillable promises. ARSOF Soldiers must caution irregular fighters and organizations from making these promises as well. Although potential recruits may be accustomed to strong-arm tactics or coercion from the government, ARSOF Soldiers should discourage this avenue in face-to-face encounters and avoid it as a PSYOP approach.

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6-25. Although not necessarily the primary effort in PSYOP programs, some PSYOP series typically target supporters of the irregular effort. The behavior desired in such groups is often to increase efforts, donations, and recruitment. In the buildup phase, this may entail attempting to move supporters from nominal agreement to active participation. During buildup, some supporters have unrealistically short time spans for success. Common themes during UW are often perseverance and the tactical necessity of a “long war.”

Themes may need to discourage abortive, disorganized efforts as well. In many UW efforts, uniting several dissimilar organizations into a single front is useful. During buildup, ARSOF advisors may frequently need to advise against COAs that might alienate supporters.

6-26. In any insurgency, even those initiated with support from a large portion of the population, sizeable portions of the population will be uncommitted to either the adversary or the forces backed in the UW effort. In a UW operation where the government maintains large blocks of tacit support through coercion, violence, or bribery, that support may disappear when the government loses power. In addition to supporting desired behaviors in committed supporters, U.S.-directed PSYOP support and irregular force PSYOP programs will typically target the uncommitted in UW efforts. An irony of UW is that every person remaining uncommitted rather than supporting the adversary is a partial success. Typically, this behavior is not actively encouraged. However, ARSOF should not ignore the reality that antiadversary PSYOP may produce this effect. In the long-term PSYOP plan, this may be a necessary stage before garnering active support for the UW effort. However, the focus of programs should usually be on moving fence-sitters into passive or active support of the irregular organization’s efforts.

6-27. Supporters of an adversary government can vary greatly in their degree of commitment. Early TAA will reveal the likelihood that government supporters will be susceptible to abandoning the government, moving against it, or metaphorically or literally “dying in place” for it. Hard-core government supporters may be unreachable no matter how impossible their tactical situation becomes. History has shown, however, that authoritarian regimes (the typical target in UW) do not enjoy deep ideological commitment beyond the upper levels of the regime and those completely dependent upon it. Even powerful backers, such as major corporations, may well be swayed if they perceive no threat from the irregular organization.

During buildup, susceptible TAs within the ranks of government supporters may be a lucrative target. In addition, inevitability and capitulation themes and symbols may be useful during buildup. However, if buildup is progressing well and OPSEC allows release of some figures, government supporters may not believe the actual level of support for the UW effort and such series may be counterproductive.

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6-28. Although not as critical to success in UW as is internal support, external support for an irregular effort is for the most part beneficial. An exception is always external support that may be viewed in a negative way by domestic TAs. For instance, the assistance of regional nations or organizations can be seen as interventionist or self-serving. ARSOF may need to downplay U.S. support for this reason as well.

Typically, the opposite is true—external support for the insurgency legitimizes it and increases the psychological effects of the irregular’s cause. U.S. PSYOP support may attempt to build greater external support for an irregular effort or leave this function to irregular PSYOP organizations. Surrogate PSYOP forces and the irregular force should be cautioned not to inflate claims of external support.

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6-29. During buildup, the security situation in limited areas may shift sufficiently to allow for committal of more U.S. PSYOP assets, as well as the operation of new types of media by the underground or the auxiliary. The projection of new media types from external sites may become practical as the irregular organization grows. In addition, more sophisticated types of media may have been deliberately held back until sufficient levels were reached during buildup. This situation can be particularly true if TAs would not find U.S.-produced media credible.

PHASE VI: EMPLOYMENT

6-30. Combat operations may not directly involve U.S. forces, but this does not preclude PSYOP forces from supporting the UW force. During the employment phase, widely varying mixtures of unilateral U.S.

combined and unilateral irregular force PSYOP are possible. In all cases, however, PSYOP forces’ primary role is not that of a shooter in direct action roles. PSYOP forces should be careful not to misuse their skills.

PSYOP forces support SFODAs by communicating messages designed to elicit desired behaviors from local people that support the activities of the SF units and the irregular organization. PSYOP programs can capitalize on the actions of the UW force to support capitulation of individuals, groups, and units. PSYOP forces continue their role as a force multiplier by eliciting support for the operation in and around combat operation areas. Sympathizers may be much more susceptible to recruitment PSYOP arguments once action has started. In addition, rewards for information programs can provide information that may prove invaluable to the operation.

6-31. Another means of bolstering the fighting spirit and morale of insurgent forces is to mitigate or minimize any tactical setbacks. Doing so may entail mitigating the mistakes of individual irregular force or shadow government leaders and stressing the competence of leadership in general. Highlighting tactical or operational successes also mitigates any failures by the irregular force. Regardless of the type of support they are providing, however, PSYOP forces must not get caught up in the excitement of long-awaited action. PSYOP forces should—

z Continue to update TAA.

z Capture and analyze feedback from ongoing and previously executed programs and series.

z Analyze government and other adversary propaganda.