The problem of two iconic turns
3.3. Suggestions
3.3.1. Surface & depth is not enough
The fact that Alexander’s analytical perspective on icon draws heavily on Barthes makes him to miss some important achievements of art theory. In Alexander’s concept of icon we find an interplay of two constituents, namely of surface and depth. This ana-‐ lytical division is based on Barthes’s notion of myth, as I demonstrated above (2.4). In other words, iconic surface stands for mythical form and iconic depth for the content or meaning of the myth. Moving from the theoretical level to practical image analysis, the Barthesian form has its equivalent in the literal, denoted message, while the mes-‐ sage filling up the content is connoted. Now, translated into terms of Panofsky’s icono-‐ logical method, analyzing the denoted message corresponds to the pre-‐iconographical description on the level of phenomenal meaning, and decoding of the connoted mes-‐ sage is analogue to Panofsky’s iconographical analysis of meaning dependent on con-‐ tent, which is based on the textual knowledge (in this point we recognize the assump-‐ tion about the mutual relationship of image and word or, in other words, of surface and depth). Hence, the conceptual problem with icon becomes obvious—what has been left out is the level of intrinsic or documentary meaning that can be achieved on-‐
pressive, aesthetic entities designed by individuals and groups typically ‘reflected’ motives and struc-‐ tures of power and/or ‘mirrored’ conditions of their possibility. Put differently, the seen was constructed mostly passively. The focus was on why and what made images, not on how and what images themselves do or can generate in turn.” (2012b: 5)
ly by iconological interpretation. Although Giesen (2012) argues that the surface-‐depth division causes an immediate passage to the iconological dimension, after the compar-‐ ison of writings by Panofsky, Barthes and Alexander, a conclusion suggested by Ralf Bohnsack seems more plausible: “On the basis of Roland Barthes’ theory of semiotics, there seems to be no successful way to develop a method for the interpretation of pic-‐ tures which is relevant for the social sciences and is able to transcend the surface of iconographical or connotative meanings.” (Bohnsack 2009: 308) Bohnsack also sup-‐ ports this claim by pointing at Barthes’ notion of “obtuse” meaning that transcends the level of connotative meaning, is characteristic for images, and exists outside the lan-‐ guage and therefore remains inarticulable and inexpressive by words and interpreta-‐ tion. Analytical distinction of surface and depth does thus not go deep enough, and practically prevents us from talking about and interpreting the obtuse meaning charac-‐ teristic of images. To support this argument, I revise Alexander’s account of icons tak-‐ en from his Iconic Experience in Art and Life (2008) and Celebrity-‐Icon (2010b) using Panofsky’s terminology.
In the analysis of Giacometti’s Standing Woman, Alexander begins with an extensive description of the statue’s surface, which reminds of Panofsky’s pre-‐iconographic de-‐ scription. Afterwards he introduces Giacometti’s biography, while quoting his diary and other resources documenting changes in artist’s methods and worldview. This se-‐ cond step is thus, by its embedment in narrative, analogue to iconographical analysis based on literary knowledge. A very similar approach is used in the example with Audrey Hepburn’s Little Black Dress. Here we are offered with a collection of stories connected to the famous actress, the famous movie and the famous dress. The iconic character of the dress is illustrated by strong feelings of thrill experienced and noted by Hepburn’s fans who have encountered garments once owned and worn by the actress. The sensual surface of the icon draws us into the depth and enables us to feel the icon-‐ ic meaning. In both cases, however, the icons described by Alexander are embedded in discourse, which bestows them with deeper meaning (Binder 2012: 102). In other words, if the dress would not have starred in Breakfast at Tiffany’s, the experience of wearing it would not have been the same. The problem of this approach is that without narratives, Alexander’s icons become mere stuff. If one does not know the movie, he
can barely experience immersion when he encounters the Little Black Dress, for he will encounter a little black dress; the same applies to the statue of Standing Woman.
However, if we limit our notion of iconic experience to images and define iconicity as their unique quality, we may proceed with the analysis further, drawing on the ability of images to create visual depth on the principle of iconic difference. Only then it is possible to claim that “the emergence of iconic depth is never completely arbitrary, but rather tied to the iconic properties of the surface” (Binder 2012: 102). In other words, icons-‐images have the power to elicit emotional reactions even if the viewer does not know the context to which their surface points to (consider Binder’s example of iconic photographs from Abu Ghraib (2013), or Nick Ut’s famous Napalm Girl). But we should not stick with mere wrapping of the sensual experience of an icon into related narra-‐ tives, for this approach terminates on the iconographical level of analysis and cannot transcend it: “What we can achieve (…) is a range of colorful stories about the rise of an “icon” to fame and its impact on collective identity” (Giesen 2012: 249).