It is not difficult to see why Kenya was so concerned with the problem of the Northeastern Province. The dismemberment of that region would not only have undermined its territorial integrity, but it would 85 also have set in motion other disintegrative forces in the country. If all the Somalis had broken away at that time, other ethnic groups in the country would have been encouraged to also seek secession or other forms of autonomy.
3.2 Coping With Rapid Change
The rapid increase in oil prices in the wake of the Arab-Israeli
war of October 197 3 threatened to slow down the pace of Kenya's
development. The rising oil bill in the mid-1970s also dictated a diversification of the Western sources of assistance. Britain was the main aid donor, but during the 1970s, Kenya started getting increased aid from the United States and West Germany.
After the October 1973 Middle East war, Kenya, like all OAU member states, severed diplomatic relations with Israel and made efforts to
84
Hoskyns, The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya Dispute, pp 18-89. 85
Okumu, 'Kenya's Foreign Policy', pp 138-43. See also Saadia
Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972).
improve relations with some Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The break with Israel meant the loss of technical and security assistance which Kenya had been getting from
that country, and greater reliance on Britain, which was already
Kenya's biggest donor.
Just as the Middle East war was beginning to have its effect on Kenya's economy, differences among the East African Community partners
sharpened. Kenya and its two partners kept trading insults in the
mid-1970s. By 1975, the three partners had lost the spirit of
comradeship and when the Community finally collapsed in 1977, most of the multilateral corporations like the railways, the postal services,
the airways and the harbour services had already broken up into
national corporations. The demise of the East African Community came
shortly after the Kenya-Tanzanian border had been closed. By that time, Kenya was at loggerheads with all its neighbours, except Ethiopia and
Sudan. This meant that Kenya's industries, which had been established
for the wider East African market, would not operate at full capacity, forcing Kenya to look for alternative markets in Ethiopia, Sudan and
the Middle East. But by that time also, Ethiopia was increasingly
coming under Soviet influence.
86
Jay Hakes, 'Diverging Paths in East Africa', Current History, May
1975, pp 202-205* See also R.H. Green, 'The East African Community:
death, funeral and inheritance', Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78, pp A125-37.
3.3 Testing Russophobia
Russophobia is here defined as a fear and dislike for the Soviet Union and its influence. In Kenya, Russophobia has persisted since the
colonial period. During the struggle for independence, the liberation
fighters were depicted as Soviet-inspired communist agitators although
they had no connection with Moscow. When some of those former
fighters, including former President Jomo Kenyatta, took over the
leadership of the country in the 1960s, they also developed a fear and dislike of Soviet influence, and since then Kenya's leaders have been associating most of the criticism of the country's policies with Soviet
or communist influence. Russophobia has thus been an entrenched
phenomenon in Kenya's ruling circles.
There was also a strong anti-Soviet feeling in Ethiopia's ruling circles before the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974. Thus apart from the common Somali threat to Kenya and Ethiopia, Russophobia was another
issue that brought these two neighbours politically closer. The
feeling of Russophobia was apparently strengthened by Somalia's
association with the Soviet Union. There was, therefore, a curious
coincidence of not only Kenya and Ethiopia forming an alliance against
Somalia; the two were friends of the United States while their
adversary was a friend of the USSR.
Kenya had established close ties with Ethiopia in the 1960s, based on their common fear of the Somali threat, their pro-Western policies and their hate for Soviet influence in the region. In the mid-1970s, when Haile Selassie was replaced by a socialist-leaning military junta,
there was speculation, especially in the Western media, that Kenya
Contrary to those expectations, Kenya did not withdraw, for a
number of reasons. As long as the Somali threat to both Ethiopia and
Kenya remained, Kenya did not see any compelling reason for withdrawal. Kenya also appeared to consider the Somali threat to be more serious
and immediate than socialism or Soviet influence in Ethiopia. Finally,
until late in 1977, there was still a Soviet military presence in Somalia. The Kenya government feared that its abandonment of Ethiopia could lead to a rapprochement between Ethiopia, which was moving politically closer to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet-backed Somalia,
0 7
resulting in an isolated Kenya more vulnerable to Somali attacks.
It was also largely because of the close Kenya-Ethiopian
co-operation and the mutual fear of Somalia's intentions that Kenya
vigorously opposed Somalia during the 1977 Ogaden war. What major
contribution Kenya made to Ethiopia's war efforts was not disclosed, but Kenya's former Foreign Minister, Munyua Waiyaki, said in March 1978 that his country had given material support to Ethiopia, and promised 'Kenya will give total support to Ethiopians in their struggle to
protect their independence, integrity and unity'.
Most of that support was given shortly after the Somali-Ethiopian war in the Ogaden region had spilled over into northeastern Kenya. A heightened sense of crisis had developed in that part of Kenya when about 3,000 Somali troops attacked a Kenyan border police post in July
87
Fidel Castro's abortive efforts early in 1977 to persuade Somalia, Ethiopia and South Yemen to form a confederation of socialist states in the region would, for instance, have resulted in the isolation of Kenya.
88
1977. At that time, the Kenyan government radio service, the Voice of Kenya, expressed Kenya's concern when it said:
Somalia's expansionism is unacceptable. Somalia is an
aggressor both in word and deed. It has invaded Ethiopia
militarily and lays claim to large chunks of Kenyan territory. Her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they will set the continent and the world aflame.
At the diplomatic level, Kenya played a significant role in explaining to many countries why Somalia should not be provided with
arms before it had renounced claims on neighbouring states. In 1977
and 1978, Kenya made representations to Britain, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States with a view to persuading them to stop arming Somalia while its troops were still in occupation of Ethiopia's territory. Britain and the United States agreed to maintain an arms
embargo on Somalia as long as its troops remained in the Ogaden
90
region, but the other three countries went ahead and provided Somalia
with some arms, apparently with the encouragement of the United
91 States.
Even after the Ogaden war, Kenya and Ethiopia remained politically
close. Their intimacy was demonstrated in January 1979 when Kenya's
President Daniel arap Moi, four months after acceding to the
presidency, made his first state visit to Ethiopia and signed a
ten-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation. Having Somalia's
89
Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78, p B273. 9D
Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78, p B274. 91
Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at one time said that Saudi Arabia was involved in the Ogaden war on Somalia's side 'partly at our urging' . See Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78, p A73. But these were few weapons in comparison with the USSR's supplies to Ethiopia.
territorial ambitions in the background, the treaty stressed the
determination of the two countries to ensure their independence,
territorial integrity, and the inviolability of their borders. In
fact, Article 5 of the treaty clearly stated: 'The contracting parties reaffirm their unswerving opposition to expansionist policies pursued
92