Suspended in an (information) web

MEPs secondly, over time, develop a network from which to acquire knowledge. Once elected, they become positioned and suspended within a particular social web. However individuals have a high degree of agency to move around the web and extract knowledge from the sources they choose. MEPs, notably rapporteurs, are free to choose their sources, unlike national ministers who must co-operate with civil servants (Neunreither:2003:49).

Perhaps a metaphor of a spider suspended on a delicate but intricately ordered web but moving across this structure at their will, is appropriate.

Legislators’ need for ‘accurate and timely information’ has grown with the increasing complexity of government, nationally and supranationally (Marcella et al:1999). The EP’s recent empowerment by The Lisbon Treaty raises the question of how it will adapt to fulfil its legislative role, a pertinent issue being where MEPs will get information required for policy-making (Neuhold&Dobbels:2011). Wodak (2009) explores the relationship between information, knowledge, and power in the EP. She argues (complex) organisations depend on CoPs because of the expert knowledge fostered within them (2009:14-15). The possession of expert knowledge gives actors access to the political process. Wodak’s work

shows understanding knowledge management processes is an important part of understanding how institutions work: ‘the distribution of knowledge is, of course, a question of hierarchy and power, of access, in organisations’ (2009:26).

Examining knowledge management and acquisition strategies (e.g. who is sought out, who is disregarded, and how this process is practiced) can help us grasp the constellation of actors routinely involved in EP politics⁵⁷. Throughout this thesis, exploring knowledge management strategies helps us to further understand MEPs’ everyday practice of politics.

Exploring MEPs’ acquisition of expert knowledge further problematises the notions of

“expertise” and “specialists” used regularly by participants:

‘Rapporteurs study hard, but they aren’t specialists their whole lives, so they ask NGOs, industry in other groups, and there’s lots of informal “finding out the answers from people” - what are the implications of the legislation, can it work – liaise with the shadows, and all that work which is part of the process of creating something’ (Interview-3)

‘A lot can depend on your reputation ... ultimately some politicians can very quickly change their minds. So if you submit something to them and they think it’s not very good, then you’re no longer the experts!’ (Interview-51).

An array of actors regularly vies for the MEP’s attention in Brussels and routinely (try to) supply him with knowledge and, for many, their vision or position (Appendices 9-10).

Figure 5.1 (below) has been constructed from participant observation and with data from Appendix 10 in mind. It illustrates the constellation of actors routinely demanding the MEP’s attention. The web indicates potential sources of knowledge available to MEPs;

committee, delegation, and EP officials can supply organisational and often expert knowledge; group policy advisors and officials and national parties political (and expert) knowledge; and interest groups and inter-groups expert (and political) knowledge.

The diagram firstly conveys an understanding of MEPs as active agents suspended within a particular social web but able to move freely and choose their own priorities. Secondly it illustrates that actors tug with varying degrees of strength and urgency during different weeks. MEPs exchange knowledge routinely with committee colleagues and interest groups during committee weeks and with their group and NPD during group weeks: the group contacted the office 23 times in plenary week, 11 in group, and 10 in committee week, whilst the committee contacted the office 21 times in committee week, 12 in plenary, and

57 See also Jensen and Winzen’s (2012) work on social network analysis in the EP.

11 in group week (Appendix-10). However as the structure implies, whilst interaction might be concentrated within particular weeks, MEPs can choose to meet and acquire knowledge from any of these actors any time and they may overlap into different phases of the calendar, so the web is fluid rather than rigid.

Figure 5.1: Suspended in a web

(Source: author’s own illustrative diagram).

Over time, MEPs weave a network from which they routinely acquire knowledge. The MEP had identified particular individuals within the EP secretariat to deal with administrative issues more efficiently (organisational knowledge). There were also particular officials from his committee and delegation secretariats who he met regularly. The size of NPDs is taken into account when group officials are employed and this may affect the officials an MEP routinely contacts – perhaps because of language skills – for political knowledge. The MEP regularly met with a selection of group officials to discuss reports and administrative issues, particularly the relevant policy advisor for his committee, the press officer occasionally, and administrative officials to deal with events management.

The MEP has also woven a network of interest groups he regularly works with and often individuals within them. Information was provided regularly by email and individuals would visit when organising events together which the MEP was sponsoring and the office facilitating. These interactions were more informal with the individuals strolling in, chatting

with the assistants, joking, and sometimes they would go for coffee with the MEP. The assistants more often paid attention to information provided by them. Interactions with less and un-familiar actors were more formal with the individual being met at reception, them waiting patiently for the MEP to emerge, held in the meeting room, shaking hands, dressed more formally, and usually with them giving a pre-prepared show.

MEPs gave different views on how useful different (knowledge) sources are and how they use them, and they use different actors in different combinations. Hix and Høyland (2011:183) found MEPs are more likely to interact with interest groups who share their preferences; environmental groups were mostly likely to be in contact with Green/EFA MEPs, trade unions with socialists, and industry groups with the EPP and ALDE (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: MEPs’ contact with interest groups

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(Source: Hix&Høyland:2011:184, from Rasmussen:2013, Table 1.2)

Interviews and the survey suggested that the constellation of interest groups MEPs interact with also depends on their committee; e.g. ENVI MEPs meet (more) routinely with environmental interest groups, AFET MEPs with ambassadors, and EMPL MEPs with business and employers’ groups (see Rasmussen:2013). However, as Appendix C (Q11-12) shows, many offices also routinely interact with committee and group secretariats. As an official explained, there is a lot of space for external experts in the EP because of the highly technical nature of EU legislation and lack of time to find and prepare digestible expert knowledge. Officials play a key role because they possess varying amounts of expert knowledge, but also organisational knowledge and are (more) aware of procedures, remits, and cultures. An interest group had advised the EP to hold a debate on an issue which is not in-keeping with its working culture because they lacked sufficient knowledge of the EP’s scope and practices (Interview-23). Again, all three types of knowledge (organisational, expert, and political) are required for an MEP to play the game successfully.