Syntax and the formation of cognitive and affective states

In earlier chapters, it was suggested that the apprehension of both music and spoken language results in the formation of cognitive and affective states in the minds of competent listeners. The co-existence of a multitude of such states, elicited by virtue of the musical stimulus and conscious consideration thereof, give rise to the perception that music is somehow meaningful. When combined with semantics, the elicitation of such states is characteristic of linguistic communication via speech. In addition to a lack of semantics, it has also been suggested several times that what distinguishes music from language is the fact that it tends to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Discussion of how music can elicit cognitive states was delayed, as was a discussion of how it is possible that structural elements of music might give rise to affective states. The reader will recall that in language, structure is mostly dictated by the demands of syntax, and that syntax is a means to semantic ends. Structure in language is subservient to efficacy of communication. The structure of everyday speech has little to do with eliciting affective states. The primary purpose of the organization of words in an utterance is to convey semantic meaning reliably, and thus allow for the formation of cognitive states. We do not use linguistic structure to induce affective states – far easier would be the use of articulation, prosody, and other factors similar to those performative surface variables outlined in the previous chapter. Of course, in poetry and prose, writers often utilize linguistic structure for aesthetic means. Any person who has read or seen a play by Shakespeare will be able to attest to the fact that the manner in which language is wielded is an important conveyer of affect. Had Shakespeare preserved the semantic meaning of many of his sentences, but altered their grammatical construction, the artistic result would not have been the same.

I would like to contend that this part of the linguistic analogy does not extend to music. That is, in music, structure does in fact lead to the formation of affective states on a regular basis. Indeed, it is the presence of these affective states that have led to music often being described as an ‘aesthetic’ medium, as opposed to the largely communicative uses to which language is put. With everyday linguistic statements, one would not expect the manner in which words are combined to play a pivotal role in arousing affective states. However, with music, it seems to be the case that various structural arrangements do indeed contribute to the elicitation of affective states. It is difficult to imagine how a particular musical statement could achieve the same affective state if it has been changed in some structural way.

To return once again to our example of Tchaikovsky’s loud orchestral chord, it is hard to see how the composer could have made the music as affective without that specific musical figure. A soft but dissonant chord would simply not be a satisfactory substitute: it would not achieve the same ends. Had the loud chord been placed elsewhere (say, halfway through the next phrase), the resultant affective state in the mind of the listener would not be the same. Compare this scenario to the semantic content of a sentence informing you of something. The semantic content of a linguistic utterance can result in an affective state, by triggering a cognitive state that then results in an affect. The listener apprehends the actual semantic meaning that constitutes the cognitive state, and then realises the implication of that meaning. This realisation can trigger an affective state (e.g., of alarm or sadness). Let us say that John has just received a telephone call. The lady on the other end of the line stated: “Congratulations, you have just won the lottery draw”. Now, the resultant affective state was not achieved by directly causal means. Rather, in John’s mind, a cognitive state is constituted by the apprehension of a proposition. This cognitive state relating to winning the lottery may be something like John’s belief that he has just won the lottery. Now, John is an excitable fellow, and having achieved the belief that he has won the lottery, is subject to an affective state that we can call ‘delight’. Where does this affective state of delight come from? It is not the result of any performative aspect of the caller’s voice. Rather, it results from the cognitive state of believing that he has won the lottery. Furthermore, that affective state in the mind of John would not be different had the structure of the sentence changed: “The lottery draw has been won by you, congratulations”. Thus, it is the semantics and not the structure of the sentence that has, via a chain from cognitive to affective states, resulted in the affect of

delight.90 Now consider something analogous in the case of music. If we had changed the order (that is, the structure) of the notes in a piece of music, such as placing Tchaikovsky’s loud chord at the end of the phrase instead of the beginning, or swapping the V and I chords at the end of a Bach chorale, we would not arrive at the same affective state had we not made a change. Reflection on such an elementary example shows how important structure is to affect in music. In everyday language, affective states arise regularly from semantics, but only in exceptional circumstances from the structure of the sentence involved. In music, structure is vital to affect. The basis on which a piece of music is constructed is important and holds consequences for the resultant affective states in the mind of the listener.

Above, it was mentioned that with language, semantics can lead to affective states by virtue of a chain starting with a cognitive state. We will examine such a chain below, and consider the difference in the nature of the causality of affective states that are the result of chains of other states, and those that are caused by properties of the sounds themselves as they are immediately represented in the mind, in a manner similar to automatic reaction. Thereafter, the discussion will turn to the structure of music and its ability to elicit affective states. At this point, I would once again like to emphasise that I am not able to offer a complete account of syntax in music. To do so is not only beyond the scope of this study, but is also a daunting task for any musicologist. What would be required would be an immense amount of ethnomusicological and ethnographic evidence, tied to data from cognitive musicology in a theoretically meaningful manner. When one considers that debates about the fundamental nature and theoretical description of linguistic grammar are still lively some five decades since modern linguistics took off, the task for musicology seems to be imposing. However, it is a task that evolutionary musicology in particular will have to face up to in the future, and I think that it is not beyond reasonable expectation that fundamental theories can be forwarded already. Nonetheless, we will step off from the premise stated above, namely, that music can indeed be said to have a syntactical dimension.

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Let us ignore, at present, the deep structure of these two sentences, as posited by theories in transformational grammar. In such theories, the two sentences would indeed be seen as identical in deep structure. The fact that these two sentences share a deep structure explains why they mean the same thing.