I
t i s extremely rare to come across chess players with a universal style, who perform with identical success in any type of position . One such player was Bobby Fischer, and - in his best years - Boris Spassky. Normally all players, including outstanding grandmasters, have various playing defects. It is very important to try and eliminate them in good time, to 'tighten up' the backward aspects of your play, without, of course, abandoning your natural style.Players are trad itionally divided into combi native and positional . At one time it was comparatively simple to distinguish players by this criterion , but now things are different - hardly any purely positional or purely combinative players remain. Besides, such a division talks only about the manner of play, and not about thinking peculiarities. It is insufficiently informative as regards choos ing the direction and content of training required by a player.
To me it seems more productive to distinguish a player by the type of thinking which dominates in his ap proach to the taking of decisions - intuitive or logical.
Grandmasters with an intuitive approach , such as Jose Raul Capablanca, M ikhail Tal ,
Tigran Petrosian a n d Anatoly Karpov, have a keen feeling for the slightest nuances of a position and possess sharp combinative vision. They are weaker in the planning of a game, in strategy, they do not especially like calculating variations, and they make mis takes in calculation .
At the opposite extreme we find, for exam ple, Akiba Rubinstein, Mikhail Botvinnik, Lajos Portisch and Garry Kasparov. They find deep plans in the opening and the subsequent stages, their thinking is disci plined , and they calculate variations accu rately. But occasionally they miss unex pected tactical ideas, sometimes they are excessively direct, and they sense insuffi ciently keenly the turning-points of a game. Of cou rse, all this is merely an approximate scheme. Usually the 'diagnosis' I give to a player with whom I am working (irrespective of whether it is a candidate master or a grandmaster) includes many more different parameters. Even so, from the methodologi cal point of view this classification seems to me to be very useful.
For a chess player it is a great stroke of fortune to possess a naturally well-devel oped intuition . But, as Alexander Alekhine pointed out, this can also harbour a serious psychological danger.
The Development of Chess I ntuition
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41Along with the obvious advantages given by a quick grasp of situation, the ability to see almost simultaneously the whole array of tactical features contained in any compli cated position (economy of thinking and, as a consequence, self-belief), almost insepa rably linked are temptations: a player may easily arrive at the faulty opinion that those good moves, which on acquaintance with the position he sees immediately - or almost immediately - are definitely the best, and as a result of this his play loses just as much in depth as it gains in ease. This gradual rejection of seeking the absolute best, and being satisfied only with good moves, is unfortunately (for the art of chess) characteristic of the present phase of Capablanca 's career. (From a famous arti cle by Alekh ine 'The 1 927 New York tournament as a prologue to the battle in Buenos Aires for the world championship' . ) For players with an intuitive type of th inking it is advisable to do training in the solving of strategic problems (for example, involving choice of plan at the transition from opening to middlegame). It is useful for them to test their strength in exercises with the compli cated calculation of variations, demanding perseverance and concentration. At one time I suggested that Alexander Chernin should work in this direction. Soon he made significant progress, quickly progressing from an ordinary master to a strong grand master, and a participant in a Candidates tournament for the world championship. Things are more complicated with the development of intuition . Sometimes play ers and even their trainers do not know how to approach this problem. In this lecture I will share certain thoughts, based on my train ing experience.
Chess intuition is the abil ity easily and quickly - and sometimes immediately - to grasp the essence of a position, the most important ideas contained in it, and to
assess the promise of particular continua tions. I ntuitive insight enables the lengthy and complicated calculation of variations to be avoided , makes our searches easier, and suggests where the solution may be hidden .
A serious study of chess, of its playing methods, and a thoughtful analysis of various specific situations significantly develops and enriches our intuition. I will not attempt to demonstrate this argument - it is illustrated in the first part of my book School of Chess Excellence 1 - Endgame Analysis, in the chapter "The benefit of 'abstract' knowledge". I also recommend that you read the article by Eduard Gufeld 'How to develop intuition' from his book My Life in Chess.
Throughout a game we rely (to a greater or lesser extent, and with varying degrees of success) on our intuition. It d isplays itself in the most varied forms. Think of certain concepts which we constantly use: 'positional feeling', 'spirit of the position' , 'combinative vision', 'sense of danger' , 'feeling for the initiative' - even from their verbal expres sion it is obvious that these are different manifestations of the intuitive perception of the game. I n principle, it would be useful to discuss each of these separately, but this is a topic for a special investigation.
Strangely enough , in chess l iterature intui tion is often simply taken to mean the ability to decide on a sacrifice of material that does not lend itself to exact calculation . Essen tially this confuses the concepts of risk, because of the impossibility of calculating the variations to the end, and intuition .
Suetin - Bagirov
3 1 st USSR Championship, Leningrad 1 963
Vladimir Bagirov has just played 1 7 ... il.e7- d6! . 'Normal' continuations lead to piece exchanges and Black obtains an excellent position. Neither 1 8 il.xd6 l1xd6 ( 1 9 'iVxd6?? il.xg2+) nor 1 8 lIxf6 il.xe5 1 9 .:txc6 'iVxb2! is dangerous for him. Alexey Suetin writes: 'What was I to do ? I did not wish to go in for simplification. It was here that I was at tracted and as though entranced by a queen sacrifice. I feverishly calculated the varia tions. The hands on my clock inexorably advanced, but the calculations became more and more complicated. I had to reconcile myself to a draw, or, relying on my intuition, take a risk. '
From the commentary it is clear that Suetin spent a long time trying to calculate the sacrifice exactly, but he was unable to do so. Of course, his bold decision contains an element of intuitive assessment, but only an element. I n principle, he acted not intui tively, but by calculation . And this was probably correct - Black obtains too great a material advantage (queen for just one minor piece). Any unforeseen defensive resource, enabling the immediate threats to be parried , may immediately decide the outcome in Black's favour.
But some players would probably have approached the problem differently, indeed intuitively. For example, Mikhail Tal , after assessing a few variations, would almost certainly have quickly decided : the sacrifice was promising (not correct, but promising) and decided to go in for it. Or, on the contrary, he would have judged its conse quences to be in Black's favour and played differently.
1 8 'ii'xg7+!? �xg7 1 9 il.xf6+
'Now came the turn for my opponent to think. As was later discovered, this was perhaps the decisive point of the game. Where should the king move to: h6 or g6? 8agirov thought for a whole hour, and also played most probably by intuition. '
A strange conclusion, wouldn't you agree: 'thought for a whole hour, and played by intuition'?! In fact Black tried to calculate everything exactly, but he was unable to do so and he made a mistake. Where does intuition come in here? We see that Suetin talks about it, clearly having no idea what it means.
I n cidentally, as was shown by Andre Lilienthal, the sacrifice was incorrect and would have been refuted by 1 9 .. . �g6!' If 20 il.d3 there is the strong reply 20 ... il.e7! , attacking the bishop on d3. For example, 2 1 il.xe7 ':xd3 2 2 :g5+ � h 6 2 3 cxd3 ':e8! 24 il.f6 ':'e6 (or 24 .. . 'iVf2).
The main variation is 20 l:1af1 'ife3! 2 1 il.d3 �h6 ! ' If White now follows Tal's recommen dation 22 ltJd 1 'iVd2 23 .:t5f2 (23 ltJf2 ':g8), then 23 .. . 'iVxf2! 24 .:txf2 .:tde8 25 il.c3 f5! with advantage to Black.
22 il.xd8 ':xd8 23 ':xf7 (23 l:tf6+ �g7 24 l1xf7+ �g8 25 il.xh7+ �h8, and the attack is parried) 23 .. Jtd7 24 ltJd5!? (24 : 1 f6+ �g5 25 .:tf5+ �h4!) 24 . . . il.xd5! 25 l:txd7 il.xg2+! 26 �xg2 'ifg5+ 27 �f3 'iff4+ 28 �e2 'ifg4+ , or 25 l:t 1 f6+ 'iti>g5 26 l:1f5+ 'iti>h4
The Development of Chess I ntuition
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4327 l:[xd7 'ii'c1 + 28 �f1 (28 :tf1 �xg2+ 29 �xg2 'iVg5+) 28 .. . �xg2+! 29 �xg2 'ii'xc2+, and Black wins.
1 9 . . . �h6? 20 l:taf1 !
White intends 2 1 l:[h5+ �g6 22 l:[h4 with the threats of 23 �d3+ and 23 �h5+.
20 . . . 'ii'e3? A further mistake, after which Black's posi tion becomes anxious. In the event of 20 . . . .te7 White could either force a draw by 24 l:th5+ �g6 25 l:tg5+, or play on with 2 1 i.xe7 f6 (2 1 . . . :tg8!?) 2 2 i.xf6 l:[xf6 23 l:txf6+ �g7 24 1tf7+ �h8 25 �d3 'iVxb2 with chances for both sides.
The sharp battle would quickly have ended peacefully after 20 .. . .txg2+!? 21 �xg2 1:g8+ 22 �h 1 l:tde8 23 :h5+ (23 .tf3 'ii'a6) 23 ... �g6 24 :tg5+ �h6. The immediate 20 .. . :tde8!? was also possible.
21 l:th5+ �g6 22 l:th4! .tf4! The only defence.
23 llhxf4
23 l:tfxf4 'iVc1 + 24 i.f1 did not work because of 24 . . . h5! 25 lDe2 'iVxc2.
23 . . . h5 23 .. :ifh3 24 lDe4!
24 �xd8 l:[xd8
25 .td3+ l::txd3?! In time-trouble Vladimir Bagirov hurries to simplify the position. A quite understandable decision , although by no means forced. Suetin gives the variation 25 ... �g7 26 ':xf7+ �g8 27 .tc4 �h8 28 l:.7f5 .te8 29 lDd5 with dangerous threats, but instead of 28 .. . .te8? Black has the stronger 28 .. . h4 or 28 .. . l:ld2.
26 cxd3?
I nterposing the check 26 l1f6+! would have placed Black in a difficult position. He would have had to allow the capture on f7 with check, since after 26 .. . �g5?! 27 :t 1 f5+ �g4 28 cxd3 he cannot play 28 .. :iixd3? 29 ':f4+ 'it>g5 30 h4 mate. 26 . . . 27 1:.f6+ 28 ltxf7 29 �g1 30 l:l7f2 30 . . . 'ii'xd3 �g5 h4 'iVe3+
Now White gains a decisive advantage. It was essential to open up the position of the enemy king by 30 .. . h3! 31 gxh3 i.f3 or 31 . . . �h4 with a probable draw.
31 lDe2! �h6 32 lDf4 a5 33 l:[d1 a4 34 h3 �h7 35 lDd5? (35 lDh5) 35 ... 'ii'c5? (35 .. . i.xd5 3 6 l:[xd5 'iVc1 + 3 7 l:tf1 'ii'xb2) 36
liJf6+ �g7 37 a3 �g6 3S liJg4 �h7 39 :e1 'ii'd6 40 liJe3 �g6 41 liJf5 "dS 42 %1e6+ (in Suetin's opinion , 42 liJe7+ �g7 43 :e6 was even stronger) 42 ... �f7 43 liJd4+ 'it>g7 44 :1e4 �d7 45 liJf3 �f5 46 l:td4 'ili'eS 47 ':xh4, and White gradually converted his material advantage.
Let us return to the problem that Wh ite faced. Deliberating over this type of irrational problem is one way of develop ing intuition. Think a little about the position and try to 'guess' whether or not the sacrifice is correct, and whether it should be made. Clearly, here you can't get by without calculating some variations. When training your intuition, you should aim not to calculate everything 'to the end', but, after checking some minimum number of variations, come to a definite conclusion as soon as possible. After then checking you opinion with the 'answer', you will see whether you were searching in the right direction, and whether or not at the very start you missed some ideas impor tant for the taking of the decision - evaluative or specifically tactical. I n just this way you can try to choose the correct square for the black king on the 1 9th move.
You will find several examples of this type (with the help of the index of themes) in the afore-mentioned series School of Chess Excellence.
The success of White's attack in this example was mainly based not on purely chess factors (objectively the queen sacri fice was incorrect), but psychological fac tors, which must be taken into account when you intuitively assess how promising a problematic decision is. What told was the surprise effect (Bagirov had studied the position after 1 7 .. . �d6 in his home prepara tions, but had not noticed the queen sacrifice). But the main thing was Bagirov's style of play. He was a strong positional
player, but in complicated tactical situations he was usually much weaker.
I was once able to exploit this factor. Dvoretsky - Bagirov USSR Championship, First League,
Tbilisi 1 973 Alekhine Defence 1 e4 liJf6 2 e5 liJd5 3 d4 d6 4 c4 liJb6 5 exd6 6 liJc3 7 h3 S liJf3 9 �e2 1 0 0-0 1 1 �e3 12 c5 1 3 �xc4 14 'ili'a4 cxd6 g6 �g7 0-0 liJc6 �f5 d5 liJc4 dxc4 �d3
This is one of the well-known variations of the Alekhine Defence, on which Bagirov was an expert. Later games convinced me that Black achieves equality by 14 . . . e51.
1 5 l:[fd 1 'ili'a5!
Now if 1 5 .. . e5? there follows 16 d5 liJd4? ! 1 7 liJe 1
I .
Bad is 1 5 .. .f5? 1 6 d5 liJe5 1 7 liJg5! (or 1 7 liJe 1 ! ) 1 7 .. .f4 1 8 �d4! (but not 1 8 �xf4 l:txf4 1 9 liJe6 'iVb8 20 liJxf4 liJf3+ 2 1 gxf3 'iVxf4). 1 6 .. .f4 (instead of 1 6 .. . liJe5) also does not help: 1 7 .l:lxd3!! cxd3 1 8 dxc6 fxe3 1 9 cxb7 exf2+ 20 'it>f1 (now it is clear why the exchange was given up) 20 .. . l:tb8 2 1 'iVc4+ �h8 2 2 c6. 1 6 'iVxa5 1 7 liJe1 1 S l:r.ac1 liJxa5 �f51 8 d5! is stronger, as I later played against W. Martz (Wijk aan Zee 1 975).
The Development of Chess I ntuition
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451 9 g4 20 dS
iLd7 lLlb4
If 21 a3, then 2 1 . . . lLla6 followed by 22 .. . l:tac8, and the c5-pawn is very weak. Generally speaking, now Black is excellently placed . Taking account of this factor, and also my opponent's style of play, I decided to go in for great complications, by provoking Bagirov into making a piece sacrifice.
21 b31 ? lLlxa2 ! ? 21 . . . cxb3 2 2 axb3 e 6 ! was simpler, with a roughly equal game, but the temptation proved too strong .
22 lLlxa2 exb3 23 lLle3 lIfeS?! My reckoning proves justified - Black immediately commits a serious inaccuracy. Bagirov was hoping to prevent 24 iLd4, but he fails to achieve this aim. Stronger was 23 .. . a5 24 iLd4 a4 (24 .. . e5 25 dxe6 iLxe6 is also possible) 25 iLxg7 'iti>xg7 26 ':'b1 l:tfc8 27 lLld3 :a5! (intending . . . .:.xc5 or . . . iLb5) with chances for both sides.
24 iLd41 iLxd4 2S :xd4
26 l:tb4
':xeS 26 lLld3 seemed less accurate to me on account of 26 .. . b2! 27 lLlxb2 l:tac8.
26 . . . :aeS
26 .. . b5 27 ':'xb3 a5? 28 lLld3, and after the rook moves - 29 lLlxb5. 27 nxb3 2s lLld3 29 na3 bS l:tSe7 hS 29 .. . a5 30 lLla2 l:txc1 + 3 1 lLldxc1 a4 came into consideration . The pawns are block aded , but at least they would have advanced a little further.
30 gxhS
30 f3 was safer, or even 30 lLle2!? hxg4 3 1 hxg4 iLxg4 3 2 l:txc7 ':xc7 3 3 lLld4 iL d 7 34 ':a5.
30 . . . 31 h4
gxhS Here too 31 lLle2 or 31 lLla2 came into consideration .
31 . . . iLfS?! It is not clear why Black avoids 3 1 . . . a5! 32 lLla2 ':'xc1 + 33 lLldxc1 a4 (with the threat of 34 . . . .:tc4) 34 lLld3 iLf5 (34 . . J�c4? 35 lLle5). By playing 35 lLle5! White retains some winning chances, but no more than that. We see that in a complicated position Bagirov acts unsurely. Usually he avoids situations of this type, he has insufficient experience in them, and so here his intuition lets him down .
32 lLle2 lIxe1 +? Now Black's position becomes hopeless. 32 . . . iLxd3 33 ':xc7 l:txc7 34 l:[xd3 a5 suggests itself. I n the endgame, passed pawns should be advanced!
33 lLldxe1 l:te7 34 lLlb3 iLe4 3s lLlbd4 iLxdS 36 lLlxbS lle4 37 lLlbd4! :e7 37 .. . e5 38 l:ta51 . 3S 'iti>h2 eS?! 39 l:taS! exd4 40 ':'xdS l:te2
41 tDxd4 lIxf2+ 42 'oii>g3 1:td2 43 llg5+ 'oii>fS 44 tDf5 a5 45 l:txh5 'oii>gS 46 l:tg5+
The sealed move. This was an appropriate moment to adjourn the game: White's position is certainly won . but now he needs to decide on a plan for converting his advantage. and this is best done in home analysis.
46 . . . 'oii>fS
47 llh5
I n itially it seemed to me that 47 h5 would decide matters more simply. for example: 47 .. . l:.d 1 48 'oii>g2 .l:td2+ 49 'oii>h3 lId1 50 tDg3 (the a5-pawn is attacked ) 50 .. . a4 51 h6 l:td6 52 h7. But then I discovered that after 47 .. .1ld 1 48 'oii>g2 Black has 48 .. .f6! 49 l:tg6 (49 h6 l:td7! ) 49 .. . .l:td7! (but not 49 .. . 'oii>f7? 50 1:[g7+ 'oii>e6 51 h6!). The exchange of rooks after 50 .l:txf6+ .l:.f7 leads to a draw. but otherwise. by playing 50 .. . .l:ta7. Black gains counter-chances. I ncidentally. Black needs to interpose 47 .. . .l:.d 1 ! . since after the immediate 47 .. .f6 48 l::tg6 l::td7 White wins easily by 49 l:txf6+ :If7 50 :Ixf7+ 'oii>xf7 5 1 tDd4 (or 5 1 tDd6+) 5 1 . . . a 4 5 2 tDb5 'oii>f6 53 'oii>g4. 47 . . . 'oii>gS 4S l::th6 a4 49 .l:ta6 .l:.a2 50 'oii>g4 a3 51 'oii>h5 f6
5 1 . . . :a1 52 'oii>h6 would have come to the same thing . 51 . . . 'oii>h7 52 .l:ta7 l::tf2! was the most tenacious. but even then White would have won by 53 .l:.xf7+ 'oii>h8 54 'oii>g6 (54 'oii>h6!? 'oii>g8 55 'oii>g6 :g2+ 56 'oii>f6 with the threat of 57 tDe7+) 54 . . .1lg2+ 55 'oii>h6 'oii>g8 56 :a7 a2 57 h5 1:tb2 58 tD h4 'oii>f8 59 tDg6+ 'oii>e8 60 tDe5! (preparing 61 'oii>g5) 60 .. . .l:.g2 61 tDd3 and 62 tDb4 . 52 l:ta7! 53 'oii>g6 54 'oii>xf6 55 tDh6+ 56 tDf7+ Black resigned . l::ta1 :g 1 + 1:ta1 'oii>hS
I rrational problems. with which you can check and sharpen your intuition . do not necessarily involve material sacrifices.
Kasparov - Karpov
World Championship Match . Moscow 1 984/5. 6th Game
The Development of Chess I ntuition
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47Black is a pawn up, but the activity of the white pieces more than compensates for this small material deficit. It is clear that now the knight must be advanced . But where to: f5 or c6?
On c6 the knight attacks the a7-pawn , restricting the black rook's mobility. From f5, on the other hand, it controls the d6-square and prepares the advance of the passed pawn . Which is more important? To calcu late the variations at the board is completely impossible - after some approximate esti mations you have to trust your intuition. In his book The Test of Time Garry Kasparov several times draws the attention of the readers to the fact that in complicated situations his intuitive perception of the position proved correct. He is obviously proud of his own intuition, and considers it one of his strong points. But it is clear that any top player can boast of numerous examples of the correct solving of d ifficult problems. In order to make an objective judgement about the degree to which intuition is developed , it is more important to follow how often it lets a player down . For example, in sharp positions the young Mikhail Tal nearly always acted in the strongest way, finding the attacking re sources that were most dangerous for his opponent. Whereas, as a careful study of Kasparov's play revealed to me, his intuition is far from faultless. Even in his best games, at some point he often 'miscued' and gave his opponents additional chances (which , however, they did not always exploit). That was also what happened in thi
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example. Kasparov 'guessed wrong' and missed a win . Later he did not sense the moment when it was now time to force a draw, and in the end he lost. You will find the game in an addendum to the lecture. A correct intuitive perception of the situation helps a player to spend his time rationally,and suggests when he needs to concen trate and carefully check variations, or where, on the contrary, for one reason or another there is no point in delving into a detailed calculation .
Tal -Dvoretsky
42nd USSR Championship, Leningrad 1 974
21 ... .tfS ! ?
'The move in the game involves a clever trap ' (Tal). I was very much hoping that the ex-world champion would be tempted by the possibility of beginning an offensive against my king by 22 .txe5 .txa2 23 .ta1 ! (threatening not only the capture of the bishop, but also the deadly 24 'iVc3) 23 .. . 'iVb3 (the only defence) 24 'iVd2. The variations would appear to be in his favour. Such an attack would have been fully in keeping with Tal's style.
'After some hesitation, I decided not to open the sluices for the black pieces', writes Tal . 'And I acted correctly: after 2 2 .txe5 Black had prepared 22 . . . .tb3!!, not only securing
opposite-colour bishops, but also regaining the pawn!'
22 llb1 ! 'iVd7 23 l:ed1 .txd6
24 cxd61
Subsequently White methodically converted his positional advantage.
Many years later I returned to the analysis of the position and came to the conclusion that 22 .. . �b3 (in reply to 22 �xe5) was not as strong as I thought. The pawn is indeed regained , but White still retains the advan tage in the middlegame with opposite colour bishops, by continuing 23 axb3 ':'xe5 24 f4 ':'xc5 (or 24 . . . :ee8 25 e5) 25 �c4. On the other hand, in the variation 22 . . .