Law enforcement within nation Effects on timber trafficking
Enforcement/Rule of law Illegal logging is minimal in nations where the rule of law operates in concert with a strong and transparent national enforcement mechanism. However, such nations may nevertheless be susceptible to importation of timber that was obtained illegally within other countries.
Enforcement/No rule of law Illegal timbering is significant in nations where the rule of law is inoperable, but there exists a strong national enforcement mechanism (akin to a dictatorship), which has the power and the will to facilitate grand corruption. Some enforcement/No rule of law Illegal timbering is significant in nations where the rule of
law is inoperable and there exists appreciable local enforcement. This model describes nations whose policies are vulnerable to the effects of petty corruption,
insurgencies and organised crime.
No enforcement/No rule of law Illegal timbering is appreciable in nations where the rule of law is inoperable and there exists neither local nor national enforcement. This scenario creates an environment that stimulates an unfettered marketplace, although production may be limited by the absence of effective infrastructure for harvesting forests.
Source: Abt Associates Inc. (2006: 7)
Throughout the Asia–Pacific region, there is no shortage of extensive and comprehensive regulation of the forestry sector, but there are major shortcomings in their implementation and enforcement. While some nations, such as Indonesia, lack the resources to thoroughly implement ambitious policies, other countries such as Papua New Guinea, have been found ignoring their own policies and laws for short-term financial benefit, thus contributing to unsustainable levels of logging.
However, even countries with tough laws and policies, and stringent enforcement, such as China, Thailand and Australia, contribute to illegal logging in the region. As these and other nations have placed much of their timber resources under protection and thus effectively reduced or eliminated domestic logging, they now rely more heavily on imported timber, thereby further fuelling the demand for cheap logs. Seneca Creek remarked that:
Reports and allegations of illegal forest activity or wood trade in industrialised countries have surfaced from time to time, but are generally not of a nature or degree that rises to a level of international significance as described earlier. Nevertheless, industrialised countries are engaged in wood products trade with countries where the issue is significant and relevant (Seneca Creek 2004: 6). The relatively low price of illegally felled logs – in simple terms: the fact that illegal wood is cheaper – crystallises as the principal reason for illegal logging in the region. The common
reason to engage in any of the illegal logging activities described in ‘What is illegal logging?’ (above) is that they represent a much cheaper way to obtain timber than through licit sources. The costs of purchasing licences, complying with harvesting and reporting requirements, and paying levies and taxes add significantly to costs of the raw product and eventually to the wholesale and retail price (Abt Associates Inc. 2006: 16). Illegal activities, in comparison, are much less expensive, especially if risks of detection, arrest and seizure are low. Seneca Creek remarked that:
[T]hose that engage in illegal forest activity do so largely because of the higher profit potential and/or shortages of legal material. Typically, higher returns are possible because illegal timber is presumably obtained at a lower cost than otherwise would be the case if legal. The lower cost also includes a premium associated with the risk of penalties for being caught (Seneca Creek 2004: 28). The examples of Indonesia and China have shown that high taxes, duties and other fees involved in the licit timber industry create incentives to look for other, inexpensive ways of ‘doing business’ to avoid government charges and undercut competitors’ prices. The opportunities and profits offered by illegal activities are particularly obvious in areas where levels on control and enforcement are low.
For local people involved, illegal logging often represents an easy, and sometimes the only avenue to earning sufficient income (Seneca Creek 2004: 6). Research has shown that, from one perspective, entrepreneurial amateurs who see the opportunities offered by the ‘black market’ in illegal timber and timber products carry on some illegal logging operations; and from another perspective, in some places (for example, PNG and the Solomon Islands), illegal logging is carried out by large multinational companies that deliberately or negligently ignore relevant laws and policies or exercise influence over administrative branches of government.
A particular problem that emerges in determining the patterns and criminology of illegal logging is that generalisations about perpetrators are almost impossible to make. From the available information, it seems that illegal logging and the associated activities are carried out by small, local groups as well as international corporations, and by legal as well as illicit enterprises. In particular, it is difficult to clearly separate so-called white-collar crime from organised crime; that is, separating licit operators engaging in illicit business practices from criminal organisations seeking to make profits from trading illicitly sourced commodities. Other research published in 2006 confirms that it is not possible to ‘distinguish between aggressive, legitimate business people who operate in an ambiguous and uncertain business environment, and aggressive, illegitimate business people who wilfully breach national and international laws’ (Abt Associates Inc. 2006: 23).
In summary, illegal logging – that is, the felling of protected trees, logging in protected areas or outside concession boundaries, logging without licences, or with fake or fraudulently obtained licences, and other associated activities – are caused by a myriad of factors that
are linked to governance, enforcement, legislation and, in particular, economic opportunities. A recent report published by the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry accurately summarised ‘the causes of illegal logging and associated trade’ in four categories:
governance, legislative and policy, market capacity and technical ability (Watson 2006: 18) (Table 14).
At the centre of the difficulties in preventing and suppressing illegal logging and the associated trade are two conflicting interests: one is to protect existing timber resources, national parks, endangered species, etc. and the other is the need for economic development. Two commentators observed that:
In some instances, the need for development conflicts with the protection of forests and species. In other cases sustaining local habitats conflicts with the interests of foreign investors or international companies and the local population must live with the environmental consequences of foreign
development decisions over which they have no control (Michalowski & Bitten 2005: 142–143).
The solution to this problem is seen in the concept that is generally referred to as ‘sustainable development’ that attempts to reconcile environmental considerations with economic development. Sustainable development also recognises that the two apparently conflicting and competing concerns do indeed share a common goal; that is, to secure and improve the livelihoods of present and future generations. These livelihoods are put at risk by illegal logging and the associated activities identified in this chapter.