TABLE THIRTY EIGHT: COST PER TEACHER
TABLE FORTY:
C OMPARATIVE SALARY TABLE: 1950 to 1985 EXPRESSED IN 1967 $
Title 1950 1985 Percent Change
Super i n tendent $10,056 $24,053 +139.2%
A d m i n . Secretary $ 4,897 $ 9,303 + 90.1%
Maintenance Director $ 5,825 $15,740 +170.2%
A s s t . Super i ntendent $ 6,053 $19,125 +216.0%
High School Principal $ 7,365 $15,962 +116.7%
Beginning Teacher $ 3,960 $ 4,805 + 21.3%
Senior Teacher $ 6,207 $ 7,627 + 22.9%
Custodian $ 3,336 $ 5,183 + 55.7%
NOTE: When considering the above table, recall that revenue to the district as expressed in 1967 dollars and in
M aintenance Director $15,612 $15,740 + . 8%
Asst. Superintendent $19,000 $19,124 + . 6%
High School Principal $15,860 $15,962 + . 3%
During this period the teacher/pupil ratio increased.
During this period the teacher/support staff ratio decreased.
That bureaucratic organization tend to promote
interests other than those expressed by the purpose of the organization is clearly expressed in the funds allocated for school books. Funds made available for student textbooks, library books and instructional supplies also declined
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because, according to the economic theory submitted in support of this paper, district administrators are not interested in promoting another department's (i.e. a
school's) budget. (To suggest otherwise, is to suggest that school district's central office administrators have ignored state and national standards, and have deliberately withheld books from c h i l d r e n . )
The 1385 Nevada State Legislature recognizing this failure of the new organizational structure of Nevada's public schools, (the bureaucratic system), mandated that state funds be expended for textbooks. However, if the legislature were to carry this practice to its logical conclusion, it would attempt to construct the entire school budget. This practice would remove the allocation of funds even farther from those whose primary interest is the
instruction of children.
Personal Adaptations to Bureaucratic Public Schools
The three major groups which impact upon the bureau's environment are present in public education. The school administration must contend with a sponsor (the school b o a r d ) , suppliers of labor and material (teachers,
classified support staff, and vendors of supplies), and clients (students and their p a r e n t s ) . If administrators maximize personal interest beyond the scope of purpose of the school, what do the sponsors, suppliers, and clients of the bureau maximize?
The school board (the sponsor) relies upon the school
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administrative staff for information about the school and grants the bureau a monopoly to supply service for the board. In a process called entropy, or control loss, the administrative staff may withhold or tailor information in order to influence the board's decisions. In response to the bureau's reports, the board may accept the information, or it may, in an expression of dissatifaction with some
aspect of the schools operation, vote to withdraw funds from some part of the bureau or simply replace its chief
executive officer. Elected school board members tend to take a public position on those issues that will enhance their likelihood of reelection, or meet some other special interest. Otherwise, given the size and scope of the
school, the board members do not have time to give full attention to all aspects of the school's operation and must rely upon the guidance of the bureau.
Teachers and nonadministrative staff members (the suppliers of labor for the bureau), tend to maximize their interest in a variety of ways. If the teacher is fortunate to work in a school w here ’ch=» principal allows sufficient latitude and protection from the central office
interference, the teacher may elect to react professionally to his client's needs. However, teachers are not expected to do so because they are considered to be employees, who are expected to follow instructions, rather than
p rofessionals who meet the needs of individual
client/students. Teachers are not allowed to participate in
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most school decisions since most of these matters are considered by the school bureaucracy to be nonnegotiable.
Even so the teacher has a variety of options available to him to maximize his professional interest. He can try to become a "professional" teacher, ignore the school
administration as much as possible, and devote his full attention to the instruction of his students. The teacher may also work to change the system (usually through a union or professional association), so that it will become more responsive to client needs. He may elect to overtly
challenge bureaucratic interference through union negotiations and through the legal grievance process.
This choice is hazardous for the individual but it has, over time, won a degree of protection for the teachers as a
group. For example, the concept of the right of due process was unknown in education prior to the mid 1960's.
The career teacher more often will choose a covert course of action. He may elect to purchase part of his own instructional materials if the system can not meet his
needs. He may give the appearance of compliance with policy and mandated instructional programs, doing his best to meet the needs of his clients by working around the system. But if the teacher is lazy or overburdened with administrative interference, he may elect to become passive toward the needs of his students and administrative demands and
maximize his interest in an area of his life away from the school. In any event, within ten years, two thirds of the
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teachers will decide their interests lie beyond the classroom and leave the field.
The teacher, should he choose to continue working for the district, can also maximize his interest by attempting to find a sponsor and become part of a bureaucratic network.
If successful, he will, at a minimum, receive preferential treatment as a classroom teacher and may nurture the hope of finding a position as a minor bureaucrat. The teacher may choose some combination of the above choices, but if his survival strategies are not successful, he will follow the majority of his colleagues and leave public education.
One socially accepted method of m a x i m i z i n g personal interest is in salary earned by the individual. Although it is not understood by most educators, salaries for teachers and administrators are not determined by m a rket forces, but rather are administrated prices e stablished by the monopsony power of the school administration (King, 1979).
Consequently, salaries are frequently set below market
levels. Typically of a bureaucratic system, public schools do not equate salary earned with any m e a s u r a b l e system of production or client satisfaction. W i t h o u t a measurable system upon which to compensate the teacher for his
services, public schools rely upon a static salary schedule.
The salary schedule is based on two considerations. The first assumes that advanced education and experience are the hallmarks of a superior teacher, although teaching
assignments are not based on this assumption. Consequently,
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teachers m a ximize their interest by working to amass sufficient college "credits," frequently at the lowest
possible price in both money and effort, in order to advance on the salary schedule. However, it can not be a positive influence upon the school program to equate "education" with
"credits earned".
The second c o n sideration addressed by the traditional teacher salary schedule is an effort to maintain a stable teaching staff. Teachers, so long as they choose to remain in the "profession" are discouraged from exercising their right of contract by refusing the bureau's salary offer and accep t i n g a compe t i n g o f fer from another district. Frequent m oves to other school d i s t ricts may cost the career teacher as much as ten thousand dollars a year because teachers are not allowed "credit" for mo r e than four years previous
experience. Te a c h e r s are thus heavily penalized by the structure of the salary schedule for seeking employment in ne ighboring school districts. (See Appendix C . >
Because tea c h e r s are discouraged by the system from m a x i m i z i n g t heir interest either as a professional, or by determining income through personal effort, the system
contributes to a h e m orrhage of teachers from the profession.
The true cost of teacher leaving has not been determined by this research. But public education's inability to retain qualified t eachers has been well documented (U.S. DOE, 1983 p. 203). Consid e r i n g that the majority of public school teachers are educated at state expense, that less than a
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third of qualified graduates even attempt to teach, and that m o s t of these people abandon the classroom as soon as
possible, the cost to the taxpayer must be exorbitant. The taxpayer must pay for the cost of educating nine teachers for every three teachers induced into a classroom, and then see two thirds of these teachers quit the field.
One consequence of the administrators monopsony power to set salaries below market rates, is that in time, market forces prevail, and a shortage of teachers develops. When this occurs, school administrators react, as they did in Los Angeles in the fall of 1985, by lowering the standards for teacher licensing, thus increasing the pool of available, though less qualified teachers (Education Week, Sept 4, 1985 p. 1). Secretary of Education William J. Bennett said in March of 1986 regarding the shortage of teachers: "I believe that, generally, the key to bringing more and better
teachers to our schools is to open up the profession." "We should not bar capable men and women from our schools
because they do not possess this paper credential or that"
(Las V e gas Sun March 14, 1986, p. 8 A ) . Bennett's remark ignores the simple economic fact that if a "certified"
teacher can significantly increase his pay by leaving the career of his choice, a capable individual with similar qualifications, and no interest in teaching, has little incentive to enter the field.
The public school's clients, students and their parents tend to take advantage of whatever service the school
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provides that meets their individual needs. Some ten percent of the students work to become part of an elite corps of students who are admitted to various honors programs and special classes. But because the school's clients are denied any effective voice in determining school services, the majority of the student body becomes passive toward the school and all other school offerings or
requirements are given minimal attention.
The current Clark County School District high school attendance policy constitutes a good example of the client's ability to maximize their own interest, albeit in a manner which may seem at first consideration to be self defeating.
The attendance policy clearly expresses that instruction is measured in time in attendance and not in skill or knowledge gained. The student is allowed to be absent eighteen days each semester. On the nineteenth day, (unless the student's parents are skillful n e g o t i a t o r s ) , the student is expelled without credit for the remainder of the semester. The students react economically, and "purchase" their
"schooling" at the lowest possible price, the least number of days in attendance required by the system. Consequently, on any given day, Clark County High Schools have more
students absent than at a time prior to the enactment of the policy (Las Vegas Review Journal, February 11,1985 p.2B).
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other Consequences of a Bureaus Impact Upon Public S c h o o l s .
As students and parents are not allowed a choice of school, teacher, or in most cases, program, school
administrators are denied a reliable method of evaluating teachers or programs. Administrators then rely upon staff networks, or observable policy compliance when writing evaluations. Consequently, programs, such as career education, academically talented programs, or a new
mathematics program come and go without noticeable effect upon the school. Merit pay proposals are regarded with suspicion by teachers because of this lack of measurable evaluation in a bureaucracy, and are soon discarded for the same reasons that curricular reforms are short lived.
Except for the classroom teacher's ability to ignore the school bureaucracy, and continue to meet his client's
(students and their parents) instructional needs in a
"professional" way, regardless of the level of
administrative support or interference he receives, it seems clear that the structure of the public school meets
Niskanen's definition of a bureaucracy and that it conforms to the expected performance of a bureau. Therefore, this system of organization which does not function according to public expectations, is characterized by rising costs which exceed inflation, and is politically and economically
inconsistent with the philosophical principles upon which the United States was founded, constitutes a danger to public education by it's continued existence.
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A f t e r Word
Another economic theory developed by the Austrian
School of Economics seems pertinent at this point to explain the failure of bureaucratic organizations to perform as
desired. Sven Rydenfelt explains;
A fundamental idea (developed by) F.A. H a y e k , is that economic realities are sufficiently complex to make our knowledge of them bound to be limited.
Because of these inevitable limitations, our opportunities for intervening in the market and directing economic development also are limited.
Very often the results of intervention will be quite other than the results aimed for: (Rydenfelt, 1983 p. 21).
Education is, of course, a complex endeavor and is one of the major industries in any m o dern community. It is also one of the major tools of economic development. Therefore
"socialist central planning" in this field is no more successful than it is in any other complex economic endeavor.
This research demonstrates that bureaucratic controlled public schools are a new phenomenon in Clark County.
Following the predicted outcomes of a bureaucratic
organization, public schools then mus t become increasingly costly and less responsive to expressed or implied public or individual needs for educational services. The bureaucratic structure of the public school has stymied the numerous
efforts to reform or restructure the public schools in the last thirty five years. In that these efforts have been, in Myron Lieberman's words, "Dead on Arrival," it is unlikely
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that the public school can be changed within the context of a b u r e aucratic structure. It seems likely that the
continued growth of the bureaucracy will force the cost of public schools to rise faster than the cost of providing educational services for the community until either the public forces the public school to reorganize back into its t raditional nonbureaucratic, market responsive system, or it concludes that public education is costly luxury that can not deliver expected educational services, and votes to put an end to this public expense.
END
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