Technologies of Human Pedigree: Some Are More Equal than Others

The primacy of defending society from undesirable immigrants goes further. Market veridiction is employed in many ways to discipline immigration. If we look back at the visa regime that had strongly racialised bases, it also contained financial considerations that were used as technologies of segregation. The cross-tabulation of Gross National Income with Schengen visa requirements in Chart G shows that a low income level has a clear impact on the visa requirements:

Chart G. Visa requirement according to GNI per capita with categories based on an equal number of countries in each category.

The correlation between poverty and visa requirements is clear. 96% of the countries with GNI under

$9.999 per annum fall under the visa requirement. The relation between wealth and visa requirements, on the other hand is not as clear. Of those countries with the GNI over $25.000 in 2008, some 19% (=

37 countries) were under visa requirement—and they were all non-Christian and phenotypically ‘darker’.

The countries that have a GNI under $9.999 and that do not require visas were all Christian countries with ‘mixed brown’ populations (more on this in Appendix 2). Nevertheless, the intersectionality of race and class is evident here: the richer and the ‘whiter’, the more equal your opportunities are. This can be seen in below Chart H that examines the culturalised categories of ‘race’ and how it impacts the

visa-Visa requirement according to GNI per

The Chart H shows that Christian countries are more likely to have a visa-free status than ‘Asian’, i.e.

Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian etc., or Islamic countries. Likewise, the ‘darker’ the phenotype of the majority population, less likely is visa-freedom. Here we can clearly see how market veridiction is extended to govern migration. When liberal governmentality employs the market to produce truth about and judge the value of people and countries, the income level of countries is bound to have an impact on the visa system also. It is rather impossible to think that it would not. Society needs to be defended from the poor. When combined with the socio-evolutionary discourses of culture, inside which also religion came to be judged, the intersectionality of class and ‘race-ethnicity’ can be seen: It is not only the poor, but also the ‘culturally less progressive’ that society needs to defends itself against.

Chart H. Visa requirement for countries with a per capita GNI (PPP) of $0-19.999 in 2009 according to categories of racialisation (n=148 countries).

The technologies of excluding and thereby preventing the poor from gaining chances do not stop here.

As has been seen, the potential travellers from those countries that are under visa requirements are judged according to their financial assets when applying for a visa: their funds for travel and return are considered, as is their motivation to return in terms of a steady income from a job. In Finland 37% of all refusals of entry at the border are based on the assessment of the person having insufficient funds, the second highest percentage among EEA countries—this may, however, in principle apply also to those from non-visa-requiring TCNs (see Appendix 2 for more information). The ‘without recourse to public funds’ clauses are used in many countries and tied to the residence permit status or obtaining long-term residence permits (Morris 1998). An additional technology of segregating the poor is contained in the regulation allowing a person who has ‘rendered himself unable to care for oneself’ to be removed and

0%

deported (Aliens Act 1.5.2004 148 §). As Tim Bale notes, “immigrants are rarely the poorest of the poor”, because gaining (legal or illegal) access to the Schengen area already requires funds (Bale 2005, 230). Immigration policy, for better or worse, judges the worth of individuals according to the assets that they have been able to gain in the market, instituting market veridiction into immigration policy.

Personal wealth is not only relevant for the visa policy, but also residence permit decisions reflect this logic. The power/knowledge constellation around migration acknowledges the right of migration of the well-off and the skilled. Money in itself is a sufficient ground for gaining entry and residence. A “proof of sizeable fortune in the bank can be used to override national and racial quotas” also elsewhere (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992/1993, 32). The discourses of capitalist elitism subjectify the migrant based on his/her financial worth:

This section [of the Aliens Act] enables the granting of residence permit to a person who based on his/her financial assets has the ability to reside in Finland. (Finnish Government 13.06.2003) The discursive order deduced is one in which the financial worth of the person overrides questions of ties (family, ‘cultural race’) to the country and the purpose of residence (job, study, refuge) (Finnish State Aliens Act 301/2004, 39 §). “Class difference, therefore, can sometimes override ethnic and racial difference” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992/1993, 32). The governmentality of immigration embodies the discourse of capitalist elitism that asserts the naturalness of the fact that the rich should have more opportunities than the poor.

The power/knowledge constellation around migration acknowledges the right of migration of the well-off and the skilled. Investigating the financial worth of travellers is not the only technology of market veridiction, but also labour migrants and their families are evaluated through assets. Imposing income level requirements on residence permit applications is a major technology of preventing the relatively poor from immigrating. However, racialised and culturalised discourses exempt people from income requirements: Finnish and Nordic citizens have a right to enter and bring in their (foreign) spouses without sufficient levels of income. Also those of Finnish ancestry⁶⁷ are able to enter and stay without income requirements. Beyond these racialising exemptions, the technological power games of segregating the poor are complex.

EU citizens as well as TCNs, however, are subject to income requirements. The income requirement is not high enough to have a significant impact on the immigration of those who apply for residence

permits based on employment, but it does have a significant impact on their family reunification rights.

For TCNs and EU citizens, the specific income level requirements are rather high: well-above average incomes are required before gaining family reunification rights for ‘a spouse plus two children’ family.⁶⁸ In practice, thus, it is difficult for a TCN with a below average skills and work experience to have family reunification rights. This discourages settlement by lower-skilled workers from outside the EU or EEA and maintains a ‘guest worker’ scheme of immigration typical of early immigration policies in Europe.

These high income level requirements were applied to EU citizens and their families until 2007, when it became clear that EU law prevents the specification of exact income requirements and rather requires governments to respect family reunification—also for TCNs and refugees, thus, affirming the truthfulness of liberal human rights discourses. The situation of an EU citizen, whose family members are TCNs, was more complex until 2010. A racialising logic was used to segregate EU migrants’ TCN spouses so that when an EU citizen migrated from outside the EU, then EU citizens’ family regulations were not applied to TCN family members, but the stricter family definition (to be discussed later) and stricter income requirements were applied instead. The same applied, if the family had been formed between an EU citizen and a TCN who was already present in Finland. The impetus of defending the nation from foreign immigrants was evident in the Finnish government’s discussion about the 2007 amendment on the EU citizen’s family definition. The discussions stressed that the extension of the family definition needed only to be applied to EU citizens’ families who had lived together legally and permanently inside the EU and were moving to Finland from inside the EU (Finnish Government

68 The required income level after taxes for a single person is 10.800 €. If the person wants to bring in a spouse, the family gatherer’s income level needs to be 18.360 € (+7.560 €, i.e. before taxes approx. 23.000 € pa). If the family has one child then the income requirement is 23.760 € or two children then 29.160 € (+ 5.400 € for each child, approx. 30.000 € and 42.000 € respectively after taxes). These income level requirements for normal families are quite high: the average Finn’s salary before taxes is approx. 31.800 € and the average salary approx. 35.400 €. However, the income levels are proportionate to levels after which means-tested social benefits cannot be gained, thus they are there to prevent TCN immigrants from gaining access to benefits. That is, those liable to become public charges, i.e. needing help from public funds, are excluded based on these income requirements. These required income levels were increased by 11% in 2013.

According to current conversion rates, the income level in UK pounds for a single immigrant is some £9.330, for bringing in a spouse the person’s income needs to be £19.000, for first child £25.900 and further children £36.000. In comparison with contemporary UK immigration law, there is an income requirement of at least £18,600 for bringing in a spouse. If they are applying for family reunification for a child as well as a partner they are required to have an income of at least £22,400. For each additional child, an additional income of £2,400 is required bringing the salary requirement of bringing in a spouse and two children up to £24,800. Thus, whilst the right to family reunification with a spouse for those with lower salaries is not disciplined as strictly in Finland as it is in the UK, the practices of allowing the family reunification of children are less discriminatory in the UK. Yet, the major difference is that this income requirement in the UK applies to British citizens’

families as well as to any other settled person or refugee (except EU citizens whose families are not required to have specific amounts of income). The same applies to Denmark where strict age, salary and other requirements are also imposed on family reunification of Danish citizens.

19.10.2006b). After 2010 the family reunification rights of an EU citizen cannot be disciplined based on where the family or the TCN spouse come from.⁶⁹

The impetus of defending the nation is more prevalent when it comes to TCNs entering based on their individual applications (i.e. when not family members of Finnish or EU citizens or persons of Finnish ancestry). As said, the individual income level applied to the work-based residence permit applicants from third countries is rather low and it is not a critical obstacle for a single poor or low-skilled immigrant.

The technologies of segregation are nevertheless affirmed through the discourses of national interest as the TCNs’ work-based residence permits are subject to labour market considerations of nationally needed skill-sets. However, most employment permits, are actually granted for low-skilled jobs, and in this sense, lower class-status is not utilised as a technology of exclusion.

However, in terms of family reunification rights (whether the TCN has a EU long-term residence permit or not) the specific and rather high income level requirements are effective as a technology of segregation and are such that in practice lower-skilled people with larger families are not allowed in—a fact that has not gone without critique.⁷⁰ To bring in a spouse and one child a TCN must earn an average Finn’s salary. A certain high-level ability to financially care for the self is in practice a precondition for the TCN’s right to family reunification. However, in comparison to some other EU countries, such as Denmark and the UK that have opted out of the common immigration policy, similar income level requirements are imposed on their own nationals, if they want to bring in their TCN spouses, thus disciplining also native ‘lower class’ individuals from bringing in TCN spouses. As we saw, in Finland, Finnish and Nordic nationals can bring their families without income requirements.

The state imposes a separation of the family for TCNs, not only through these income level requirements, but we need to remember also the racialised categories used in determining permit application countries and entry rights: Unlike the family members of Finnish or EU citizens’ or persons of Finnish ancestry, the TCN and his/her family members are normally required to wait outside Finland for

69 This power game of segregation that divided EU citizens’ family reunification rights based on movement between countries was finished in 2010 by two verdicts of the European Court of Justice (these regulations were applied like this also in some other EU countries). The 2010 rulings affirmed that EU citizens residing in another EU country had the right to family reunification with TCNs no matter how, where from, with whom, and based on what condition the EU citizen or the TCN arrived to that member state (HE 77/2009 refers to two cases, C-127/08 Metock and C-551/07 Sahin).

70 Some Finnish MPs and the European Commission have drawn attention to the high levels of income required for bringing in children. Consequently, the Immigration Services have opted for not demanding increased income levels for the third or further children at least in situations in which both parents are working (Finnish Immigration Service 3.4.2009). In 2013 this system was amended so that it will be only in case of a sixth child that additional income is not required. The additional income required diminishes by 100€ a month/1200€ a year after each child, the entry of the first child requiring an

a family reunification decision. Family reunification application can be made only after the sponsor has commenced work and completed the normally four-month probationary period, as only after passing the probation period is the immigrant regarded as having a stable income (unless there are other riches than employment income available) (Finnish State 1.5.2004; Finnish Immigration Service 3.4.2009).

As we have seen, the entry for those intending to apply for asylum through ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ means of travel has already been made dependent on wealth. The less wealthy potential refugee—whose claim for asylum may be equally legitimate, i.e. based on persecution due to race, ethnicity, religion, political opinion etc.—is judged according to his/her financial ability to attract or procure finances for his/her person. Of course, in the letter of the law, an asylum application is not tied to a person’s financial worth;

this is done through the technology of building financial barriers against logging asylum applications, as many have noted. The subjectification of the legitimate refugee is in practice, if not in theory, decided through the truth game between discourses of human pedigree and human rights: The asylum seeker needs to be wealthy enough to buy an international long-distance fare and a visa, to be ‘credible enough’ to qualify for a tourist visa, for example, through having the ‘excuse’ of visiting a relative already living in Finland, and needs to be able to demonstrate finances for sustenance and for a return ticket. Or alternatively, the poor asylum seeker is forced to procure often even more money for hazardous illegal transit. This leaves the poor refugee often with little choice. Hence, 90% of the world’s refugees, some 36 million, reside outside the West (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010), often living their life in camps surviving on food provision for years if not decades.

In the long run, the destitution and desperation required from a ‘true refugee’ can be evidenced by a long-term stay in UNHCR refugee camps. As was discussed, Finland is one of the dozen countries in the world who annually accept UNHCR ‘quota refugees’, which we shall discuss more in detail shortly.

In this power game of truth liberal discourses of human rights overrun the discourses of preventing the poor from immigrating. Finland takes on average 700 quota refugees per annum on top of the independently arriving asylum seekers granted refugee status. We shall return to this topic of quota refugees and the role of the human pedigree in their selection shortly.

But aside from this initial hurdle, which makes most refugees in the West relatively wealthy, liberal discourses in fact discipline the application of this human pedigree of wealth and social status on refugees. If wealth is used as a technology of governing the immigration of TCNs (and EU citizens) and their families, this technology did not extend to refugees’ and protected persons’ family reunification.

Rather Finland uniformly exempts refugees from income requirements. In this sense, the liberal discourses of human rights around asylum win the truth game. Yet, in 2010 this power/knowledge

constellation changed and various wealth-related disciplinary technologies were introduced: The financial support for asylum seekers and temporarily protected persons was geared down and given only after their own assets are used. In the same amendment, paying for the family reunification travel costs for other than quota refugees ceased, thus practically complicating family reunification and making it dependent on assets also for those receiving international protection:

Previous speeches on the floor have drawn attention to how many we can really integrate. It is self-evident that resources have to go hand in hand with the need. There is also a very good point in this report on integration implementation; now that we stop paying for travel expenses [related to refugees’ and protected persons’ family reunification], this is very positive, because it in practice reduces the amount of the people…most difficult to integrate. Myself I would want that we went further than this and learned from Denmark and placed income and residence requirements on those coming to the country for humanitarian reasons and applying for family reunification. After this we could trust that their integration possibilities would be ameliorated.

(Finnish Parliament 19.10.2010, National Coalition MP)

Here we can see market veridiction is used to discipline family reunification rights. At the same time, the refugee’s and protected person’s family reunification right without income level considerations is disciplined by applying this right only to families formed before coming to Finland—a practice, and a new distinction, that, according to the Finnish government, is already prevalent in other EU countries (Finnish Government 13.11.2009a). That is, before a refugee or a protected person is able to gain citizenship, which grants family reunification without income requirements, the refugee’s ability to reunite with his/her family (because of the technology of ceased compensation for family reunification) and to reunite with a new family (through the technology of making a distinction between old and new families the latter being now under income requirements) is disciplined complicating the ability of refugees without sturdy assets to reunite swiftly with their families. And if this reunification is not swift enough, the Immigration Services have the option of denying later family reunification claims, by claiming that the family ties are ‘not active and strong enough’ due to long-term ‘voluntary’ separation. The wealthier refugee has a better chance of practising his/her rights than the poor one.

In the above statement, wealth is clearly designated as reflecting ‘integration ability’. In the case of UNHCR quota refugees, integration ability is defined as individual human capital and made to function as a technology of human pedigree. The Aliens Act requires that the ‘integration possibilities’ of quota refugees are assessed (i.e. language skills, education and work experience (Finnish Immigration Service 9.10.2009b)) and in 2011 the Ministry of Employment and the Economy was (again) given a say in choosing the country focus in selecting quota refugees. This speaks of a rationality in which employment based considerations can be considered more important than the need for protection as