Knowledge, which was formally only possessed by nation-states, is no longer exclusive, and now a growing number of non-state actors have access to sensitive materials and technologies. The information revolution and the impacts of globalization are felt on open and black markets leading some terrorist groups that lacked the global reach of a pre-9/11, including Al Qaeda, which has been able to form regional alliances, to share knowledge and technologies. The Kahn network was able to exploit loopholes in the export control system. The diffusion of manufacturing capability made activity difficult to detect. It also meant that countries may not have had adequate knowledge of nuclear technology or expert controls to detect illicit activity and were induced to either knowingly or unknowingly assist in the manufacture and distribution process.540
In the post-Cold War environment, national security, economic interests and technology relate to one another in complex and cross-cutting ways. One reason for the biggest changes in WMD proliferation is technology. Weapons formally restricted to the arsenals of large industrialized nation-states are now within reach of small states and some non-state actors.541 The biggest danger may be that due to technology, that now
539 Phil Williams, Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks, Presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 1, 2005.
540 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, 119–121.
allows small, non-state actors to threaten virtually any state—including a superpower like the United States. The disruption of the A.Q. Kahn network certainly showed that nuclear technology transfers were easier than anticipated.542
The starting point is an appreciation that technology consists of more than just physical “things.” Harvey Brooks has defined technology as “knowledge of how to fulfill certain human purposes in a specific and reproducible way.” He continues to argue that technology “does not consist of artifacts but of the …knowledge that underlies the artifacts and the way they can be used in society.”543 In terms of WMD technology, it means possessing the human technical capital necessary to develop WMD capability.
The knowledge and machinery for legitimate enterprise can often be hijacked for dangerous ends. In the nuclear realm, states still retain a heavy degree of control but in the chemical and biological world, much of the expertise and equipment is readily available in the private sector. However, even in this instance, the network of suppliers that collaborated with A.Q. Kahn indicates that significant nuclear-relevant technologies could be acquired from non-state entities whether they are willing proliferators or unwitting collaborators. In fact, “nuclear components designed in one country could be manufactured in another, shipped through a third, assembled in a fourth, and designated for eventual turnkey use in a fifth.”544 The experience seems to indicate that it is not a geographically bounded problem. This diffusion of science and technology will only continue.545
Now, technology diffusion is available via the Internet. The forces of globalization make it easier for anyone to acquire nuclear technology. Indeed, even
542 Benoit Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading That Limits Policy Innovation,” Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (March 2011, 298); see also Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q.
Khan Network.
543 Harvey Brooks, “Technology: Evolution and Purpose,” in “Modern Technology Problems or Opportunity,” Daedalus 109 (Winter 1980).
544 Mohamed ElBaradei, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly Changing World, (Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC: June 21, 2004),
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conferece/speeches/ElBaradei.doc.
545 Russell and Clary, Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks: Challenges to U.S. Security, 6–8.
before the advent of the Internet, “nuclear secrets” were released publicly. For instance, in 1964, the Los Alamos Primer revealed many of the technical details of atomic weapons designs. Then, Progressive did the same for hydrogen weapons in the November 1979 and January 1980 editions.546 Now, the Internet revolution makes it even easier to acquire key technical information.
Technology certainly plays a role in recruiting new jihadists and in disseminating information. It is well documented that the Internet is used to recruit and to radicalize individuals and train them to execute terrorist acts.547 In part, thanks to the Internet,
according to military and counterterrorism experts testifying on Capitol Hill.548 The
Internet plays an important role in contemporary terrorism, as jihadists have effectively demonstrated. It allows global communications, which is critical to a movement determined to build an army of believers. It facilitates recruiting. It is accessible to seekers to reinforce and channel their anger. It creates online communities of like-minded extremists and engages them in constant activity. It is a source of instruction. It facilitates clandestine communication.549
In summary, the information revolution has made critical technological information available to an increasing number of less capable states and some non-state actors. The significant barriers to entry that remain should not be minimized, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons, but it does mean that analysts and policymakers must
546 Reiss, “Foreword” in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of Nonproliferation
Policy, xiii.
547 See Brian Michael Jenkins, Is Al Qaeda’s Internet Strategy Working? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT371; Eben Kaplan, “Terrorists and the Internet,” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, January 8, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and- technology/terrorists-internet/p1000; Jarret M. Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 149–164; Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, no. 8, Spring 2005.
548 Gordon Lubold, “Internet Aids Terrorist Recruiting, Radicalization, Pentagon Say,” CSM, March 2010.
549 Brian Michael Jenkins, “No Path to Glory” Testimony presented before the House Homeland
Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
consider an environment characterized by the seemingly irreversible diffusion of technology.550
In the face of these dynamics, the international community confronts a major challenge in managing global technology diffusion in a way that achieves international security goals while promoting commercial and other objectives.
In the new security era, the problem extends well beyond weapons as they relate to proliferation. The problem facing the international community is “not about weapons systems but about the diffusion of technology—some advanced, some simple. All potentially lethal.”551
F. DETERRENCE MAY NOT BE AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR NON-