INFORMATION AND DISCOVERABILITY OF INFORMATION APPROACHES
The XML Segregation of Information and Discoverability of Information approaches both require technology, including networks and software programs to prepare, securely store, effectively search and securely share appropriate information with all appropriate authorized users. The XML Segregation of Information requires a more sophisticated computer system to facilitate the actual sharing of information and protect information stored in the system. The Discoverability of Information approach requires a less sophisticated computer system with appropriate security and search capabilities, since the actual information will not be stored in the system.
Several current and developing computer systems have potential to perform the necessary functions for one or both of these approaches. The German Counter Terrorism Database described above is already designed, implemented and performing the core functions of the Discoverability of Information approach. The existing IDW system has the necessary security and robust search abilities. It currently conducts full searches and returns the full content. It may be possible to utilize a portal like the one in eGuardian to transfer information from the unclassified LEO network into the FBI Secret computer network; however, there currently is no capability to automatically return the results to the user back through a portal into the unclassified network. The FBI intends to create the capacity to transfer unclassified information from the classified FBI Guardian system on the secret network to the unclassified eGuardian system, but this capacity does not currently exist (FBI, 2008, September 19). Therefore, the current technological limitations require a manual review of the results by an authorized FBI user with access to the FBI Secret Network, who would then provide the permissible information to the outside user searching the system or at least provide a reference number (e.g., file and serial number of document). This would be a labor-intensive system that would only automate the search function and still require the involvement of a FBI entity or unit like the TSC. It may also be possible that an existing index of IDW and the IDW search capability could provide information identifying FBI document(s) (e.g., file and serial number) to allow for subsequent quick retrieval, review and sharing. This IDW search capability could be easily deployed in classified systems like SIPRNET and HSDN. Many issues need to be resolved prior to deploying any IDW-related or similar system in an unclassified computer system and network.
Of these systems, the most promising may be N-DEx, with inherent capabilities to perform the functions of both XML Segregation of Information and Discoverability of Information. This system is still under development and expected to be deployed in the Fall of 2010. N-DEx is currently intended for criminal intelligence, but the capabilities could either be expanded to address terrorism and homeland security information or as a blueprint for an identical, parallel system designed for sharing FBI terrorism and
homeland security information. The following chart, from the FBI public Internet site, illustrates the intended functioning of N-DEx for criminal intelligence (Figure 3).
Figure 3. N-DEx Concept (From FBI, n.d. (j))
N-DEx can perform the necessary security access and restrict information in the following manners:
Full Access (Green)–If the submitter of a data record (e.g., incident
report, arrest report) has designated it to be fully shared, then all N-DEx users with the appropriate access authority will have access to the full record and all data elements within the record.
Pointer-Based Access (Yellow)–If the data submitter decides that access
to a specific record, or specific data elements, should be restricted except under certain circumstances, then the data submitter can designate the
record accordingly using pointer-based sharing. With pointer-based sharing, any user that gets a “hit,” or attempts access to a record with this designation, will be provided with information on how to contact the designated record submitter (i.e., the POC for the record) only. It is then the responsibility of the data requestor to contact the data submitter who will determine whether the record can be shared. If so, N-DEx provides mechanisms so that the data submitter can make accessible that information to a specific user or group of users as applicable.
Restricted Access (Red)–There will be circumstances where a data record
or part of the record is so highly sensitive that the data contributer [sp] completely restricts access to it and to any knowledge of that record to a selected user or user group. The value of having the record in N-DEx is that the data submitter can benefit from correlations made with other N- DEx records without compromising the information contained in the sensitive record. With restricted access, any "hits" against the restricted record will be known to the submitter user/group while the submitter of the other record that it hit against will have no knowledge of the correlation. (FBI, 2007, January, Section 1(C))
The most significant obstacle to utilizing N-DEx for either of these approaches will be handling the classified information, which cannot be stored in an unclassified system. Therefore, some ability to identify this information with at least a pointer system would be critical for deploying an effective system. These issues will be examined in greater detail in the Chapter VI analysis of these approaches and systems.
Finally, these existing and developing systems could provide the foundation for creating an entirely new system to realize the requirements for the XML Segregation of Information or Discoverability of Information approaches in classified, unclassified or both environments. The FBI prefers to use these systems or other existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) alternatives with minor modifications compared to creating a new computer system. Additional detailed, operational capabilities and functions of the system or network are not necessary for the analysis of these options, and could be counterproductive for the development and deployment of either of these approaches.
VI.
ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SHARING POLICY OPTIONS
This thesis analyzes the current FBI information sharing “status quo” and the following three policy and technology options: a new homeland security “routine use” exception, a Discoverability of Information approach, and a XML Segregation of Information approach. This analysis will be conducted in two phases. The first phase examines the effectiveness of the approaches by rating them on the effectiveness factor criteria for information shared, privacy protection and security. The second phase examines the implementation of these approaches by rating the following four implementation factors: cultural resistance, fiscal performance, utilization of technology and training requirements.