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“It was terrible”

In document Burke_unc_0153D_19007.pdf (Page 160-164)

CHAPTER III: “NO TROOPS THAT CAN BE MADE TO ASSAULT”:

II. “It was terrible”

The dense woods and thickets that hampered the advance of the 3rd Missouri and 31st Iowa stopped abruptly before the enemy trench, where Rebel infantry had “felled all the big trees and thrown them helter skelter in front of their rifle pits,” John Buegel, the 3rd Missouri color bearer later observed.321 Sewall Farwell also remembered how, in this no man's land between the trees and the enemy trenches, though the ground was “tolerably level,” the Rebels “had cut the thick grass in such a way as to impede our march all that was possible.”322 Prior to the assault, one of Hovey’s aides instructed the column to “advance as close as it was practicable to be before the charge was made,” using the woods to shroud their movements while the

skirmishers held the harassing Rebels on the opposite bank of the bayou at bay.323

As elsewhere along the line, the nasty terrain made it difficult for any regiment to maintain its formational cohesion. Following behind the Missourians, Iowan officers and

sergeants worked at “preserving as good a line as was possible under the circumstances,” Farwell recalled. The column had not moved very far, however, when Rebel gunners sensed its approach and began blindly shelling the trees. As shells whirred and cracked through the limbs, the two regiments quickly halted and laid down. After the rounds detonated, the line arose again and

320 Woods's OR Report, 769.

321 Buegel [3 MO] Diary [Memoirs], SHSM Columbia, 23-24. 322 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

rushed forward until the guns again were heard.324 “We lay down on the ground and continued to advanced and drop down when they would shell us untill [sic] we got within a short distance of their works,” one of the Hawkeyes explained.325 Looking around during one of these tactical pauses, Farwell “noticed trees and stumps were much sought for and those who had been in service before and honored for their bravery were among the first to seek them.”326 The inexperienced were happy to follow the lead of the few scattered veterans among them. When the Missourians finally debouched from the trees into the open, the column charged at the double quick “with loud cheers and the usual war cries,” Farwell wrote.327 As along Woods's front, the protected Rebels held their fire as they approached. Maneuvering the line through therude abatis proved challenging, but a single “large open gap” beckoned to the Missourians.328 Carrying the regimental colors as a marker of the column's forward progress, Buegel entered this gap. Watching as the flag neared the parapet, Hovey “confidently expected they would enter the works,” he later admitted.329 At that moment, however, within about “one hundred paces,” Buegel recalled, the Rebels opened fire. “The blue beans [bullets] flew into our ranks, bringing death and destruction,” he wrote.330 The Missourians were cut down not only by fire from the Arkansans in the trenches to their front, but also from the right – “a quarter

324 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

325 E. Burke Wylie [31 IA] to Mother, Jan. 13, 1863, E. Burke Wylie Letters, SHSI Iowa City. 326 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

327 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

328 Buegel [ 3 MO] Diary [Memoirs], SHSM Columbia, 23-24. 329 Hovey's OR Report, 766-767.

unexpected and therefore not guarded,” Hovey lamented.331 As they struggled to climb over the obstacles and force themselves through the gap, the 3rd Missouri disintegrated under fire. “It was impossible to get over the barricade,” Buegel remembered. “We were all crowded into a trap, and our boys fell like flies. It was terrible.”332 Behind them, the neophyte Iowans watched in horror as the “old” soldiers they counted on to steel them fell apart. Farwell watched as the Missourians “staggered and fell to the ground … when someone in their line cried that the order was to retreat.” Accordingly, the regiment “sprang to their feet and with the rapidity of lightning dashed back upon us.”333 The result was chaos. “Whoever was still able to walk, ran back but most of them were killed or wounded,” Buegel observed.334

Their veteran anchor now in full rout, the Iowans acted instinctively. “Someone in the rear called out to retreat,” Farwell remembered, unsure as to the identity of the voice. “I saw that the right wing of the regiment was retreating and I also gave the order which the men were not slow to execute,” he shamefully added.335 In a desperate attempt to stem the flight of his new regiment, Smyth personally “dashed forward and called the men to rally.” Farwell, realizing at once that the order to retreat had not originated with the regiment's commander, set himself to aiding the Colonel in salvaging the shattered unit. As one Iowan color bearer had been struck down by canister, and another cowered behind a nearby tree, the regiment lacked an obvious rallying point amid the smoky chaos. To solve this, Smyth and his adjutant seized the colors

331 Hovey's OR Report, 766-767.

332 John T. Buegel [3 MO] Diary [Memoirs], SHSM Columbia, 24. 333 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

334 John T. Buegel [3 MO] Diary [Memoirs], SHSM, 24. 335 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

themselves. Farwell cried for his company to form on the standards and “almost alone, to her honor,” it began to do so.336

“As soon as we rallied we commenced firing,” Farwell wrote, “and it seemed to have excellent effect upon the spirits of the men.” As along Woods's front, the green Iowans quickly learned the psychological empowerment inherent in returning fire. “I felt afraid until I fired my gun the first time and after that I felt no fear at all,” E. Burke Wylie remembered.337 “All became cool and went to work in earnest,” Farwell explained. “The balls whirred by us but no one seemed to mind them very much.” Still, a few of the junior officers “were unable to hide their trepidation,” Farwell remarked in disgust, “and two had to be severely reproved for setting a bad example before their men, or rather behind them.” Pushed back toward the tree line but still in the open, the men used what scant cover they could find. Even Smyth and his adjutant “were posted behind a tree when a ball came and struck the tree about fifteen feet above their heads,” Farwell observed, “letting heavy chunks fall on and around them.” Such destruction of cover could have even more dangerous effects. Farwell watched one private be “seriously lamed from a limb which was cut off by a ball.” While a few of the Hawkeye casualties were helped from the field by their comrades against orders, many self-evacuated. “William Gardner received a ball shot through the arm,” Farwell noted, “but went from the field without taking anyone with him.” Another man “limped from the field with a buckshot in his leg.”338

As casualties mounted, with at least a fragment of the regiment now under relative control and the other half beginning to rally in the safety of a small ravine a short distance to the

336 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863. 337 E. Burke Wylie [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863. 338 Farwell [31 IA] to Brother, Jan. 13, 1863.

rear, Smyth tried to reconsolidate his command. “An order finally came that we should retreat to [the ravine] and reform the regiment,” Farwell wrote. “This was done in good order, the

stragglers from most of the companies falling into their places.”339 A short distance away the shattered 3rd Missouri also collected itself and caught its breath. Finding a bleeding and exhausted Buegel, the executive officer “congratulated me, [and] gave me a good sip from his canteen,” he remembered, “and I was again all right.”340 The 3rd Missouri had suffered a

tremendous blow. Over the course of a single day, the Missourians had taken 75 casualties, 14 of whom were laying dead on the field. The rapid retreat of half of Smyth's Iowans preserved them from a similar fate. Only 14 Hawkeyes were wounded in the attack, none killed.341

In document Burke_unc_0153D_19007.pdf (Page 160-164)