IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions including Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant,
describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble.
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification, technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation. Thus, the right to counsel does not yet apply.
However, there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of the suspect by the witness. During the proceedings in the police station, Ongue identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed by the police as the suspect. This cannot be considered as positive identification of the accused by the witness.
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights
No valid waiver.
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in the statement, the defense objected, contending that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived.
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. In this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening question, after informing the suspect that he was under investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or against him and after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes." The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant, a native of Samar, had not been shown to be fully acquainted with. The date of execution of
the statement before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of his right.
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying "surrender po kami.
Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary.
On review, it was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there.
Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived.
In another case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that, for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was willing to answer questions of the police. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made.
The truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to remain silent and to counsel.
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed before the clerk of court and contains a waiver.
HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free. VV.
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb.
2, 1987)
It is not enough that the confession is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the presence of counsel.
Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession.
Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for pictures for re-enactment as directed by the investigators.
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The
principal prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial confession of the defendant.
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog.
It was two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted through a leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel.
People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted, through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum.
HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v.
Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given, but these were not made in the presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt.
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence.
VV.
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel.
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of