The goal in this chapter was to explain how we might understand cases in which people conclude that the “can’t” act in a given manner and so “must” do something else can be understood on their own terms as a unique kind of case.
Unlike a conclusion that one morally or otherwise "ought" to or "ought not" act in a certain way, the conclusion that one "must" or "can't" do something might reveal a fact about oneself and what one will do, other conditions in the world permitting. Williams
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The "repeatedly" is important. If there are simply occasional clashes between our deep commitments on account of bad luck we might not have good reason to change gradually over time but only to hope that such rare clashes will never happen again.
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Michael Bratman also argues that the anchors that structure our deliberations are stable, rather than fixed or necessary. See his "Anchors for Deliberation," in Intentionality, Deliberation, Autonomy, Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini, eds. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2007) and "A Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability," in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right, Debra Satz, ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). Also see Jeffrey Seidman, "Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3(1) (2008).
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and Frankfurt are right to think that the source of these facts about what one can or cannot do ultimately rests in a person's character -- the deep desires, cares, projects, and commitments with which that person is identified. Furthermore, Williams does well to draw attention to the ways in which our deep desires, cares, projects and commitments, our characters, structure our deliberations. Given my character, I am disposed to take notice of certain features of my situation rather than others. I am disposed to seriously consider only some of the infinite possibilities for action, rather than others. I am also disposed to give certain considerations rather than others priority in my deliberations and even to take some of them as absolutely decisive. Furthermore, the actions I am capable of intentionally performing is dependent upon these deliberations. We have also seen that there is a way of understanding how what it is possible for a given person to do intentionally does not require us to understand ourselves to have "essential desires" which they "cannot help but have" that do not allow them to act in certain ways. The result is that we need not think that these kinds of necessities and incapacities interfere with our powers as agents. They seem to be compatible with our acting as full-blooded, morally responsible agents in these circumstances.
However, if what it is possible and rational for fully-functioning, morally responsible agents to do intentionally in a given set of circumstances depends on their individual characters and commitments in this way, we might begin to worry that it isn’t the case that it is always possible and overridingly rational for fully functioning agents to do as morality requires of them, as Kant thought. It does not seem to be the case that what an agent perceives to be moral required in the circumstances is always among her live options, nor is it always given priority in her deliberations. For example, the soldier
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discussed in section IV above might sincerely judge that he morally ought to shoot the naked enemy soldier. He might think that naked or not, the man in his sights is an enemy solder. He has a duty to his superiors to faithfully carry out the task assigned to him. Furthermore, he might sincerely judge his country to be engaged in a just war. Nevertheless he just can’t bring himself to pull the trigger, even though that is what he sincerely judges to be morally required. This is not simply because he has an uncontrollable aversion, but because he can’t escape the sense that it would be dishonorable and no amount of reiterating the moral argument in favor of shooting can shake how he sees this consideration as – for him -- decisive.
Chapter 2
Practical Necessities and Moral Requirements
I.) Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that we have good reason to admit there are possible cases in which a person might recognize that as a matter of fact, given what she cares most deeply about and which considerations she, in these circumstances takes to be absolutely decisive, she simply "can't" or "must" act in a certain manner. I also argued that cases like these do not remove her powers as an agent, nor remove her moral responsibility for her actions, even though she may have no real live (practical) alternative. It is now time to investigate the implications these phenomena have for morality. In particular, these phenomena seem to suggest that what it is possible for an agent to do (in the sense of "practically possible" discussed in the last chapter) and what it is overridingly rational for her to do cannot be determined independently of the personal features that constitute her character. If this is the case, we have reason to question whether it is always possible and whether it is overridingly rational for fully functioning agents to do as morality requires of them in all possible circumstances. Of course these were some of the major theses of Kant’s moral theory.
One philosopher who thought these phenomena had important implications for the tenability of Kant's moral theory was Bernard Williams. A central theme in Williams' critique of Kant's ethics is that Kant distorted the experience of practical necessity, the
39 "central experience of ethical life."1
I will begin this chapter by briefly summarizing Williams' critique of Kant's ethics and the ways in which it makes use of the phenomenon of practical necessity in some detail. I will focus, in particular, on the criticism that the demands of morality do not necessarily rationally override our personal projects and commitments and the related criticism that Kant's ethics demands too much from agents, largely as a result of Kant's flawed conception of human agency. I will then separate the three main challenges in this critique, the analysis of which will structure the present and the following chapter.
Kant, according to Williams, explained our experience of practical necessity in terms of a confrontation with a Fact of Reason, which revealed that objective, universal, impartial moral requirements were not simply phantoms of the brain, and that reason could discover the fact of what it is we ought to do -- what is morally and practically necessary. Rather than recognizing a Fact of Reason that holds for all rational beings, Williams argues that what is discovered in these experiences is a fact about the particular person in question-- a fact about the boundaries and limitations of her character. This phenomenon, rather than revealing the objective basis of morality, instead reveals how one's individual character provides the source of one's practical reasons for action as well as limits what it is possible for her to do.
There are a number of reasons for focusing on Williams' use of practical necessities in his critique of Kantian ethics. First, the role of this phenomenon in Williams' critique of Kant and Kantian ethics has, to my knowledge at least, never been discussed in any detail and is interesting in its own right. Second, I focus on Williams' criticisms of the historic Kant rather than on contemporary Kantians because Williams
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"Ethics and the Fabric of the World," in Making Sense of Humanity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 171.
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himself aims his criticisms at Kant and they have been very influential in how some read and understand Kant's works. Nevertheless, Williams occasionally misrepresents or oversimplifies Kant's own positions, and it is well worth making clear in which ways he does so. If we are to find fault with Kant we should find fault with Kant and not a caricature of Kant. Third, once it is clarified how and in which ways Williams oversimplifies or misrepresents Kant's own positions, it will be much easier to see how and in which ways this phenomenon does present a challenge to Kant's ethics and to see what a successful Kantian response might look like.
After summarizing Williams' critique, this chapter will focus on Williams' criticism that Kant misunderstood the source of practical necessities and as a result mischaracterized them as a strictly moral experience -- the experience we have when we recognize that it is our duty to perform a given action and as a result feel compelled to perform it. Williams argues that this experience does not result because agents recognize they are morally obliged to perform the action. Instead this experience reveals their own personal commitments. As a result, instead of showing that it is always possible and rational for us to do as morality requires of us, the experience of practical necessities reveals that it is not.
In response to Williams, I will argue that because Kant's conception of moral duty differs markedly from Williams' conception of moral obligation, it is not as implausible to regard many cases of practical necessities as moral experiences as it may at first seem. Furthermore, Kant’s distinction between imperfect and perfect duties allows for Kant to account for many of the cases which Williams’ found to be problematic. Nevertheless, though this blunts the force of Williams' criticism, there are still instances of practical
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necessities -- necessities of character – for which Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties cannot account. Such cases still may potentially conflict with moral requirements, even as Kant understood them. They give us reason to question whether it is always unconditionally good and rational for people to follow moral requirements. These cases will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
II.) A Brief Overview of the Role of Practical Necessities in Williams' Critique of Kant