The Capability Theory

An important theory has developed since the 1980s (Sen, 1980, 1985, 1993; Nussbaum, 1993, 2000) arguing that assessing these indicators requires analysis focused not on ‘utility’ (satisfactions), nor on ‘primary goods’ but individual’s capabilities; of what they are able to do and be in their lives. The economist Amartya Sen built on the work of Adam Smith, while the philosopher Martha Nussbaum built on the tradition of Aristotle. They distinguish between the functionings of a person which describe elementary matters such as

being nourished, or free of disease as well as more complex ‘doings’ and ‘beings’ such as having self- respect and taking part in the life of the community. Capability describes the ability of the person to

achieve various functionings as part of living.

While there is much shared understanding in the capability theories of Sen and Nussbaum, there are nevertheless significant differences which reflect their different disciplinary traditions and interpretations. These different interpretations will be discussed in turn.

37 Amartya Sen: capability as opportunity to choose possible functionings

For Sen (1987), capabilities are simply defined as abilities, those things a person can “do” for instance walk, eat, breathe or talk.

“A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings

are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what

real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead” (Sen 1987b, p. 36).

Sen however, does not presume this basic categorisation as definitive, since very basic capabilities can be viewed as mere means to a desired end. Walking is not the only resource for the achievement of mobility; people in wheelchairs can achieve the same function. In the same way, eating and breathing primarily support the function/achievement of physical health. By means of technological advances in healthcare people who do not eat or breathe can support their physical condition using medical equipment. Speech can be replaced with sign language if the communicative competence is possessed and understood and so on and so forth. Therefore, Sen’s definition of capability is expanded to include opportunities, for example access to a wheelchair, ramps, lifts or advanced medical personnel, equipment and Braille technology. Sen also incorporates another important standard in his definition of capabilities. He acknowledges the things an individual can ‘be’, for example a profession as in doctor, lawyer or politician as well as a state of mind or position – to be just, clean, fed, at peace. These beings too are expanded by means of external

opportunities and multiple sets of resources. Beings and doings are constituents of well-being and means of achieving various functionings.

David Crocker (1995) notes that Sen makes these specifications for a purpose attempting to distinguish between what a person can do or be from what they are unable to do or be. For example a blind person

38 can indeed read if Braille equipment and training are available to him. Sen also includes inclination/desires, character traits and talents in his definition of capability. In as much as the broadness of his definition permits him to term almost anything a capability, it limits the scope for describing things that are not capabilities. This is a significant bottleneck, especially because Sen prefers to allow individuals identify and refine the capabilities they value.

Sen suggests that lifestyles are defined by the array of functions a person is able to do and be. This ‘view of living as a combination of various ‘doings and beings’ is very important for Sen, (1993a:31) quality of life is therefore assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings’. Capability describes ‘a person’s ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being. The expression was picked to

represent the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or be –the various ‘functionings’ he or she can achieve’ (Sen, 1993a:30).

Sen notes that individuals are able to choose from an infinite number of possible capabilities to form a diverse but unique personal collection of capabilities. The collection of selected capabilities can be defined as a person’s ‘capability set’. The emphasis on personal selection is important for Sen because choice and agency represent freedom. Capability is thus defined in the space of functionings. If a functioning

achievement in the form of an n-tuple of functionings) is a point in that space, capability is a set of such points

(representing the alternative functioning n-tuples from which one n-tuple can be chosen’ (Sen 1993a: 38). Functionings also vary in their complexity because individuals will differ in the way they assign meaning and importance to different functionings. These preferences come about because of genetic uniqueness but more so as a result of cultural and social arrangements. Indeed an individual may be obliged to choose a functioning because it is the only means of self-preservation. On the other hand, some choose to forfeit

39 short-term goals for long-terms ones. For example university students spend a considerable length of time studying so as to gain capabilities for graduate jobs and salaries.

Human capabilities ‘constitutes an important part of individual freedom’ (Sen 1993a:33). Sen believes a person’s capability reveals the extent of their freedom: ‘the freedom to lead different types of life’. In order to evaluate these freedoms Sen (1987a; 1987b) suggests that environmental, social and cultural factors and political freedoms need to be assessed. Individuals who have the capabilities to overcome social exclusion have substantial freedoms. These freedoms are represented by the n-tuple permutations of functionings they can choose to achieve.

Martha Nussbaum: capability as potential, realising functioning

Nussbaum (2000:5) asks ‘what are the capabilities which lead to ‘truly human functioning?’ She provides an account of the most important functions and capabilities of the human being, in terms of which human life is defined. We should ask ourselves what are the characteristic

activities of the human being? What does actual or imaginable forms of life? (Nussbaum, 1999:40). Nussbaum continues the search for Aristotelian eudemonia. She makes two distinctions:

 Mere human life: level one – bare, undignified: she rejects this

 Dimensions of a good life: the functionings which societies should seek for their citizens: It is this level of quality of life that should be evaluated

“All animals nourish themselves, use their senses, move about, and so forth; what is distinctive and distinctively valuable to us about the human way of doing all this is that each and every one of these

functions is, first of all, planned and organized by practical reason and, second, done with and to

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beings can choose to regulate their nutrition and their sexual activity by their very own practical

reason; also because they do so not as solitary Cyclopes (who would eat anything at all, even their own

guests) but as beings who are bound to other human beings by ties of mutual attention and concern” (Nussbaum 1992:222-3).

Consequently, Nussbaum proposes that the human life is truly functional at a particular standard, beneath this yardstick human dignity is diminished. She draws up a list of basic capabilities that she argues are essential to human functioning:

Martha Nussbaum’s List of Basic Human capabilities (Version from Nussbaum, 1999: 41 – 42 and 2000, 417- 418)

1. Life - Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length i.e. not dying prematurely.

2. Bodily health - Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately

nourished; being able to have adequate shelter

3. Bodily integrity - Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure against violent

assault, including sexual assault; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction

4. Senses, imagination, thought - Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to

reason--and to do these things in a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education; being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing, and producing expressive works and events of one's own choice; being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of

expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain

41 5. Emotions - Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; being able to love

those who love and care for us; being able to grieve at their absence, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one's emotional developing blighted by fear or anxiety.

6. Practical reason - Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about

the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of conscience.)

7. Affiliation - Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognise and show concern for other

human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having the capability for both justice and friendship. Being treated as a dignified human being, whose worth is equal to that of others.

8. Other species - Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of

nature.

9. Play - Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

10. Control over one's environment - (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that

govern one's life; having the rights of political participation, free speech and freedom of association. (B)

Material: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment

on an equal basis with others.

Nussbaum argues that capability, not actual functioning (outcomes), should be the means of evaluating the quality of people’s lives. Anyone who lacks any one of these capabilities, no matter what else she has, will fall short of living a good human life. The list makes provisions for a more precise definition. She distinguishes her version of a good life using measures of agency and rationality. Like Sen, she is less concerned with the degree to which utilities and resources can be exploited. She lays much more emphasis on what kinds of utilities and resources are available to the individual and the degree to which choice can be exercised.

42 The capabilities which one has control over, Nussbaum refers to as internal. External capabilities are the appendages i.e. the material and social conditions that support the option of converting internal

capabilities to valued functions (Nussbaum, 1988; Alkire, 2004). This means internal capabilities of bodily, mental and social function can be supported by external capabilities such as food, purchasing power, political rights and even appreciation of friends or family. For Nussbaum these capabilities can be nurtured, acquired, developed, maintained, exercised, impeded, diminished, lost and (possibly) restored (Crocker, 1995:161). Nussbaum refers to integrated internal and external capabilities as combined capabilities, in an attempt to make evaluation less complicated. Crocker (1995) points out that Nussbaum’s use of the definition “state of readiness to choose” permits her to assign weight to capabilities. She does not make any attempts to do so by pursuing the Aristotelian essentialist vision (Chakraborty and Udaya, 2003).

Nussbaum (2000) is firmly opposed to the idea that a trade off between capabilities is possible, particularly the basic capabilities that comprise her list. She argues that “just” government and societies should make provision for external capabilities. An assessment of service provision will thus evaluate the extent to which human flourishing is made possible in societies (Cohen 1993). Accordingly, her framework attempts to characterise basic human flourishing on a universal scale using an Aristotelian account of “the good”. Nussbaum’s (2000) more recent revisions of the approach defend this Universalist framework and oppose cultural relativism. She (2000) suggests that the standards of living of people who by way of their lifestyles cannot have basic capabilities are underprivileged. Several elements and components of capability as defined by Nussbaum can therefore be measured as political and social constituents of justice and standards of well-being.

Towards a critique of Nussbaum and Sen:The contrasts between Sen and Nussbaum’s theories though not extensive have significant impact on dimensions of application. There are two main

43 areas of distinctions. The first concerns definition. Sen can lay claim to broader interpretations of plurality (functionings) than Nussbaum (Robeyns, 2000). His non-essentialist approach leans towards a more relativist position, which Nussbaum does not accommodate. Nussbaum’s

Aristotelian conception starts with the questions about what defines the human, and deductively defines what a meaningful life should comprise. In contrast, Sen’s framework is concerned with the kind of freedoms individuals can enjoy given the circumstances they face (Lessman, 2007). He is concerned with the valuable outcomes which make life meaningful for individuals. His inquiry seeks to unearth barriers which restrict freedoms to do and be. In his view, removing personal obstacles will broaden an individual’s quality of life. Because he acknowledges more distinctions in terms of the obstacles people face, his definition differs from that of Nussbaum. In a footnote to his 1993a paper, Sen acknowledges the differences in definition:

‘To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the term ‘basic capabilities’ is sometimes used in a quite different sense from the one specified above, e.g. as a person’s potential capabilities that could be developed, whether or not they are actually realised this is the sense in which

the term is used, for example, by Martha Nussbaum).’ (Sen, 1993a: 41).

Evaluative measures differ for the two thinkers only because of the distinction in definition. Sen is preoccupied with measurements of substantial freedom which he elaborates in his work

“development as freedom” (1999). This for Sen is a measure of justice and equity (1992, 1999, and 2009). Sen’s focus is on “options” as elements of capabilities. This is his justification for not pursuing a list of fundamental capabilities. Sen argues that the sets of options representing

44 n-tuple functionings are varied and expansive and will differ according to the evaluative exercise in question. Nussbaum is not convinced optional lifestyles exist below her universal account of a good life.

Nussbaum’s conceptions of capabilities appear to be one-dimensional (Lessman, 2007) more so, because she concentrates on developing the framework into a theory of justice. Instead of focusing on multidimensional indicators she pursues simple unilateral ones that are more easily measured. Nussbaum’s theory is consequently much more normative, providing unequivocal value judgements about the conditions needed for a ‘good’ quality of life. By presenting what she views as universal measures the ambiguity Sen’s theory battles with is removed.

Different strands of the framework affect the Capability Approach’s main purpose of evaluation of human well-being, but they can be seen as complementary. For Sen capable people are able to choose between a combination of functionings, i.e. they have substantial freedoms. His

horizontal perspective places emphasis on the degree and weight of freedoms in a space (capability set or n-tuple functionings). Nussbaum’s view is not mutually exclusive in the sense that she focuses on a longitudinal perspective. For her, the greater emphasis is on trajectories that tend towards fully functioning human beings. She insists on a fundamental starting point and argues that capable people need to progress by continually developing their capabilities and optimising their abilities.

Both Sen and Nussbaum turn to the concepts of agency and reason to deal with the issues raised by their positions on definitions and evaluative frameworks. Sen (1987a) points out that people can choose the capabilities they value based on what they consider reasonable. However, it is

45 possible for individuals to have limited information or lack capabilities to make rational choices.

Instead of struggling with underachievement in mainstream education, an individual can decide to avoid school. This decision means he could gain acclamation and validation from activities in gangs and on the streets though forfeiting the opportunity to gain qualifications and skills of long-term value. Nussbaum (1995) refers to these types of decision as negative capabilities because they do not support the developmental process that will make individuals more capable or more functional. Similarly Sen (1981) describes what he calls negative freedoms in the same vein. Sen and Nussbaum argue that people should have alternatives that permit a rational choice which actually expands their freedom or functionality. Both Sen (1992) and Nussbaum (1995) argue that essential external support – i.e. external capabilities such as good service delivery, government aid, etc will limit the non factual choices people are forced to make. Freedoms empower individuals to make rational choices based on sensible decision-making. Education that supports young people’s opportunities to achieve will translate to fewer disaffected pupils dropping out of school since the vulnerable ones will not need alternative forms of recognition.

The capability approach shows that people are truly functional when they have requisite

capabilities for living “the good life”. They also have options or substantial freedoms which make it possible for them to use the distinctive human features of rationality and agency to promote their functionality. Individuals with certain vulnerabilities require support to enable them to convert their resources to adequate functionings in order to achieve a decent standard of living. As Nussbaum (1993) points out external agents are an important dynamic of the process of developing combined capabilities. These could be voluntary organisations that support vulnerable young people by providing the safe environment where they can learn to develop practical skills and social capabilities or government enacting policies that ensure freedoms and flourishing. The

46 capability approach is a useful tool for evaluating the kind of lifestyles vulnerable young people

lead. Such analysis helps establish what constituent parts of a person’s lifestyle are healthy, positive and progressive. It can also show which aspects of support provided to vulnerable young people in the context of voluntary organisations are valuable to the development of their

capabilities and well-being. In this study specifically I consider the capabilities that will enhance their capacities to live and learn in a socially cohesive manner.