The Subject Matter of the Agreements
Negotiation and supervision of the implementation of NAC agreements have become substantially more difficult
in the 1980s than in the '60s and '70s, when most of the agreements in Tables I and II were concluded. The change
is the outcome of vast technological advances in the field of nuclear weapons. As the result of better techniques and simplified methods, non-nuclear-weapon States have become more susceptible to horizontal proliferation. At the same time, NAC among nuclear- weapon States has vastly increased in complexity, as designs and performance of weapons have undergone successive refinements. The trend continues while a substantial portion of the world's most able physical scientists is constantly engaged in further extending and perfecting the weapons.
Nuclear weapons today can release 4,000 times the energy released by the atomic bomb that was detonated over Hiroshima. Today there is no limit to the
attainable levels of energy released by a single weapon. The explosive yield of present nuclear arsenals is about 13,000 million tons of TNT, which has been estimated to be the equivalent of about 1 million Hiroshima bombs.3
Since SSD I in 1978, it has been universally acknowledged that a full scale exchange of nuclear
weapons between the Superpowers could put an end to all human life, and would, at the least, threaten the
survival of civilisation.^ However, it is not the destructive power of nuclear weapons that makes them a technologically difficult subject for international agreement, but rather the diversity of the systems
involved and the rate of change to which they are subject.
Delivery systems are acquiring greater range, speed, accuracy, and mobility. Intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) now have a range of about 13,000 km and can reach their target within 3C minutes. Intermediate range missiles can deliver their nuclear payload within
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5-7 minutes. Over the 13,000 km range, targeting accuracy has increased about a hundred-fold during the past 25 years, bringing ICBM to an approximate accuracy of 50 metres using terminal guidance systems. No sooner were the necessarily large missiles fitted with intricate guidance mechanisms than it became possible to use
satellite navigation systems to guide smaller missiles with the aid of computer links, which are now being
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installed. Technology is believed to exist for
manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MARV), designed to evade missile defences such as anti-ballistic missiles (ABM).^
Both Superpowers have already deployed multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which can be released and targeted one by one, over an area of approximately 150 km by 500 k m . ^
There are submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM) and air to surface ballistic missiles (ASBM). The aircraft can be based on land as well as on aircraft
carriers. Technology is also available for the immediate deployment of cruise missiles, which, after launching
from land, ship or aeroplane, are internally guided winged or wingless craft, using stellar automatic data link, or terrestial mapping systems. They can take the form of high speed missiles or of low flying miniature aircraft.1
In some cases the destructiveness, range and blast, of nuclear weapons has been deliberately curtailed.
Arsenals of nuclear weapons exist that have been
miniaturised to the point where their destructiveness is similar to that of powerful conventional weapons.
Another favoured modification is a low blast weapon with enhanced radiation (ER), in which residual radiation is
increased by the use of special casings around the
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wa rhead.
Some of the most far reaching innovations are being made with respect to the command, control and
communications (C ) networks of the Superpowers. These networks, inter alia, form the nerve centre of nuclear weapons systems, by positioning potential targets, transmitting military commands, and performing weapons guidance functions. As these systems are greatly
dependent on satellite transmissions, the vulnerability of military satellites and their status in international law are directly involved. 13
The variety of functions to be performed by the present generation of nuclear weapons, makes calculation of equivalence possible only as a rough approximation, or not at all. Demarcation between the various systems of weapons is also difficult due to interlocking,
overlapping and backup systems. As demonstrated at the United States Senate hearings concerning the operation of the SALT II Treaty, substantial differences of opinion about equivalence can arise, not merely between adversary States, but also among leading experts within a S t a t e . ^ While policy differences have always existed,
uncertainties on technical grounds are a growing problem.'*'^ New time scales are also presenting difficulties.
As noted above, the delivery speed of ICBM is down to about 30 minutes, with medium and short range strikes commensurately faster, while launch times are down to a few seconds. Such speeds have made reaction times to false alarms, miscalculations and technical faults so brief that, increasingly, only automatic and pre
programmed responses could be utilised. For instance, it has been said that -
Soviet defence specialists viewed the ground-hugging Cruise missiles and the Pershing II, with its short delivery time, as so threatening that their
deployment would cause the Soviets to set their SS-20 medium-range missile force for a hair-trigger
response to an attack... b
Under these circumstances, the usefulness of the various Hot Line Agreements is greatly reduced or, in the worst case, entirely eliminated.
development, manufacture and deployment of improved
nuclear arms systems has increased to several years, and is estimated as more than a decade regarding some
anticipated developments. This means that NAC agreements have to be made in anticipation of those possible
additions to arsenals, so as to forestall them or, at least, to take them into account when striking a
bargain.
Changing Nuclear Strategies
A growing body of world opinion holds that nuclear weapons have no utility whatever. The view was cogently stated by the delegate of Sri Lanka to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, when he said -
We are up against an absolute weapon, the unleashing of which, however limited that may appear to those who advocate it, will leave neither the victor nor the vanquished and therefore does not serve any
realistic political or military purpose. '
If this were a universally held opinion, then all nuclear weapons would be dismantled. Although there is an overwhelming convergence of expert opinion about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, it does not follow that all share the view that nuclear preparedness "does not serve any realistic political or military purpose". It is necessary, therefore, to take note of the military strategies in accordance with which it has been envisaged that nuclear weapons may be employed, as well as the
political objectives that might be served by the use, or merely the threatening presence, of nuclear weapons.
The only time when the strategy for the use of
nuclear weapons was clear-cut, was when the United States had a monopoly of the weapon. With the growing threat of
retaliation to any use of nuclear weapons, the
possibility of translating their destructive potential into political advantage has become increasingly obscure. As Ambassador B.A. Nzengeya of Zaire has said -
Twenty years ago, the desire of the nuclear Powers following the cold war, to acquire a deterrent or striking force, was understandable to the peoples of the world as being aimed at the maintenance of
international peace and security. Now, however, the capacity of the new nuclear weapons to destroy all life on earth several times over no longer makes them a deterrent force and consequently no longer
corresponds to the original aims of these States.-*-® It compounds the difficulty of assessing acceptable terms in NAC agreements when the usefulness of the
various weapons systems, in policy terms, is not at all clear.
The confusion is exacerbated by the adoption of imprecise, interchangeable, and often deliberately
euphemistic terminology. For example, a strategic attack has been defined as one aiming to eliminate the adversary as a war fighting unit.20 At the same time, long range, high yield nuclear weapons are usually referred to as strategic weapons. There is no clear distinction between these and intermediate-range weapons, also known as
medium-range or theatre weapons, for use over a more limited range, as well as long-range theatre nuclear forces.
Another meaning of the terms is to refer to strategic weapons' in relation to a possible exchange between the
Superpowers, and theatre weapons in the context of a regional, such as a European, conflict. Miniaturised, namely tactical nuclear weapons are also regarded as
relevant to a European war, or they are envisaged in a Third World setting. Nuclear weapons suited for both strategic and theatre purposes are referred to as grey area weapons. 1 And yet, all of these weapons could be used in any nuclear war situation.
However, nuclear strategies can be categorized not only with respect to the location of military conflict but also regarding the targets to be sought out and the sequence of strikes to be made. Whether over
intercontinental distances or within a region, nuclear weapons could be used for counter-value strikes against troops, industrial centres and/or population centres. This could be a first strike or in retaliation.
Counterforce targeting, meaning a strike against the nuclear missile launching and communications systems of an adversary nuclear power, is another comtemplated utilisation of nuclear weapons. Despite the misleading terminology, counterforce, like counter-value, could be used in a first strike, as well as in retaliation. If counterforce were used to cripple an adversary only
partially then, like any of the other aforementioned uses of the weapons, it would invite further incalculable
retaliation.
The efficacy of a counterforce strike as a manoeuvre to disarm the enemy depends on the timing of the
warning, namely before the counterforce missiles reached their targets, then only a third strike could be
prevented, while the second strike aimed at the
instigator State could be a counter-value strike. In the view of Henry Trofimenko, Head of the Institute of United States and Canada Studies, Moscow, it would be immaterial whether the first strike were targeted as a counterforce or a counter-value strike because, in either event, it would elicit a retaliatory counter-value launch. He describes the situation in the form of a question -
The Pentagon has estimated that such a disarming strike would require the launch of more than 2,000 warheads against.the enemy targets. Tell me, who, with the exception of God himself, in the few minutes available could determine that this vast number of warheads already in mid-flight is a "limited"
counterforce rather than an all-out countervalue attack and, accordingly, give the command for an appropriate limited retaliation?
The variety of ways in which nuclear weapons may be employed is said to facilitate a flexible response to threats. Public approval of the policy was sought
pursuant to United States Directive 59 of 1980, issued by President Carter. In accordance with this policy, the development of many new types of nuclear weapons is
justified on the ground that, otherwise, the only option would be an all out strike, which would not be a credible deterrent because of the corresponding full scale
retaliation it would predictably elicit. This strategy contains two ambiguities. Firstly, it is not predictable that a relatively low level nuclear exchange could be prevented from escalating to total nuclear war.
Secondly, it has not been adequately explained why many varieties of nuclear weapons are essential to nuclear
flexibility. It would seem that flexibility could be achieved, if this were desired, by curtailing the number of weapons launched and restricting the targets chosen.
Estimation of the outcome of the abovementioned
nuclear strategies is largely guesswork. The only use of nuclear weapons with reasonable predictability of
outcome, other than total disaster, would be their use in a counterforce operation, provided the enemy could be reliably disarmed at one strike and prevented from
effecting a launch on warning. This is referred to as a first strike capability, when a State has acquired the capacity to deliver a nuclear strike against the other without risking an intolerable reprisal. Although no nuclear Power has attained this capability at present, improved positioning techniques of enemy mobile craft, combined with the present speed of launching and accuracy
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