The contextual selection constraint model

Context selection is a gradual process that permits the inclusion of different sets of contextual assumptions, provided that the level of optimal relevance is not reached (Maillat & Oswald, 2009). Certain contextual assumptions, as Maillat and Oswald (2009, 2011) argue, will be selected if these are made more accessible, i.e. they are less effortful to activate. Accessibility is one dimension that ensures the inclusion of certain

assumptions in the addressee’s cognitive environment.45 _{The second criterion which} might guarantee the inclusion of contextual assumptions is related to the epistemic strength of a representation (Oswald, 2014; Oswald & Hart, 2013). Epistemic strength indicates that the stronger the assumption or representation, the more chances it has to be selected, and hence it becomes part of the addressee’s cognitive environment. Therefore, accessibility and epistemic strength define the dimensions according to which the

dynamics of the Contextual Selection Constraint (henceforth, CSC) model are described.

The function of these inclusion rules is to ensure that an utterance is interpreted within a limited subset of contextual assumptions. Therefore, a manipulative move tends to be successful if:

On the one hand, it tries to make sure that every information set that is mobilised in the process is compatible and coherent with the target deceptive utterance, while on the other it strives to keep critical information sets that would defeat the deceptive attempt concealed (i.e. so as to leave them

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unprocessed or to get the cognitive system of the addressee to dismiss them). (Oswald et al., 2016, p. 523)

In this view, successful attempts at manipulation or deception, as Oswald (2014) elaborates, necessitate that critical or contradictory information that would lead the addressee to question the veracity of the message or the speaker’s motives and intentions must not be accessed during processing.46 This is because mobilisation of these critical information sets would yield a different cognitive effect or a different modification to the hearer’s cognitive environment (Ozols et al., 2015).

From a different perspective, constraining information selection is influenced by cognitive shortcuts or heuristics that affect judgement and therefore lead to biased processing (Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011; Oswald & Hart, 2013; Hart 2013). Cognitive heuristics are rules of thumb that help us take decisions and make judgements in a cost- effective way (Hart, 2013; Oswald & Lewinski, 2104). Fallibility is a core feature of cognitive heuristics, due to the fast and frugal way in which information is processed, i.e. yielding results with the minimal allocation of cognitive resources (Oswald & Lewinski, 2014). Building on findings from evolutionary psychology, which claims that under the constraints of efficiency some cognitive processes involved in thinking, memory, perception, decision-making and judgement are subject to errors, Maillat and Oswald (2009, 2011) suggest that the activation of shortcuts and heuristics during processing

46 _{More recently, the term deception has replaced manipulation (Oswald, 2014; Ozols et al., 2015) for fear}

that the latter could be taken for its literal meaning – operating or using an object (Oswald, 2014). However, for the sake of being consistent with the terminology used by the main theoretical frameworks adopted in this research, the DHA and pragma-dialectics, I prefer to retain the term manipulation when analysing and discussing the results of the analysis.

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deviates addressees’ attention from selecting relevant and critical information and thus leads to judgemental errors. Cognitive shortcuts and heuristics, as Oswald and Hart (2013) argue, lead to errors at the level of epistemic judgement.

Cognitive biases play a pivotal role in making certain contextual assumptions more salient than others; and by virtue of the dynamics of optimal relevance, they eventually become part of the limited subset against which an argument is interpreted and evaluated (Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011; Oswald & Hart, 2013). Fallacies, as Oswald and

Lewinski (2014) maintain, “block access to critical resources” (p. 326) because of their ability to trigger cognitive biases and heuristics, making some representations cognitively inescapable from being selected. The information contained in these representations is devoid of any critical and relevant information to evaluate the argument (Maillat & Oswald, 2011). Consequently, the fallaciousness of the argument is unnoticed. For example, the ad populum fallacy exploits the strategy of strengthening-by-repetition (Maillat, 2013) or the validity effect.47 This cognitive bias means that validity and

epistemic strength are a function of repetition. The more a representation is repeated, the more valid it becomes, which in turn increases its cognitive strength. Therefore, it becomes more salient, gets selected during processing and eventually prevents the addressee from questioning the validity of the assertions attributed to the majority (Maillat & Oswald, 2011). In this sense, the ad populum fallacy exploits two forms of cognitive bias: the validity effect which correlates validity with frequency, and the

47_{The ad populum fallacy, as suggested by Oswald and Hart (2013), operates in relation to a conformity}

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mechanism of optimal relevance which tends to select the most salient representations (ibid.).

The Contextual Selection Constraint (CSC) is one mechanism that manipulative

communicators can exploit, namely, the dynamics of the comprehension module, which is geared to maximise relevance. Moving from comprehension to believability, i.e. how addressees accept incoming representations as true, is a process governed by another cognitive mechanism: epistemic vigilance (or the logico-rhetorical module).