4. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION IN INCOME, ASSETS AND SOCIAL
4.4. Objective measurement of relative deprivation and subjective well-being
4.4.3. The Empirical Framework and estimation strategy
Objective measurement of relative deprivation
The theoretical foundation of this chapter bases on the concept of relative deprivation put forward by Runciman (1969) and operationalized by Yitzhaki (1979) and Stark and Yitzhaki (1988). As stated earlier, the notion of relative deprivation is that even if I can be satisfied in absolute terms, our level of satisfaction depends on what I see around us. In this study also I conceptualize that youth satisfaction in life depends on absolute and relative income (or wealth) of their own or parents, their social capital and the social capital of their peer groups.
As stated earlier, I decompose βobjectiveβ measures of relative deprivation (RD) along three different dimensions: income, non-income, and social capital. Relative income deprivation (RD) (which is commonly based on income and computed using Yitzhaki index) is defined as the gaps between the individualβs (or householdβs) income (or wealth) and the incomes (or wealth) of all individuals or households richer than their within a reference group. According to this measure, individuals or households within the same reference group and with identical income, Y, all experience the same level of relative deprivation. The same is true with other dimensions of relative deprivation such as social
0 .1 .2 .3 0 .1 .2 .3 0 .1 .2 .3 0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 D e n si ty SWB across woredas
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capital deprivation (SD) and non-monetary relative deprivation (NID) (i.e. deprivation in material assets). With some extension of Stark and Zawojska (2015), I model the link between relative deprivation of the different dimensions and youth well-being using objective measures of RD in the following way. Consider a youth population of n in which every member of n has a positive level of income, Yi. Income distribution of youth (or households) are given by π1< π2 < β― < ππ; where ππ
denotes the income of the household to which youth i belong. In the same manner, the social score distribution like the income distribution are given by π1< π2< β― < ππ; where Si denotes the social
score (or capital) of the ith youth. Like-wise, the non-income items or material possessions that display oneβs social status compared to those generally owned in his or her reference groups are also given by ππΌ1< ππΌ2, β¦ < ππΌπ; where ππΌπ denotes the non-income items (or patterns) of the ith youth belonging
to a household.
Thus, I define the utility (or well-being) function, Ui, of youth i belonging to population n as follows:
ππ(π1, β¦ , ππ) = π½πππ+ (1 β π½π)π π·ππ(π1, β¦ , ππ)
+ ππππ + (1 β ππ)ππ·ππ(π1, β¦ , ππ)
+ πΏπππΌπ + (1 β πΏπ)ππΌπ·ππ((ππΌ1, β¦ , ππΌπ) (4.1)
Where π π·ππ(. ) is a measure of relative income deprivation; π½πΟΎ (0,1) expresses the weight accorded by
youth i to ther parentsβ incomes; (1-π½π) expresses the intensity of concerns that youth i attach to relative
income; ππ·ππ (.) and ππΌπ·ππ (.) are measures of relative social deprivation and relative non-monetary deprivation, respectively; ΞΈi ΟΎ (0,1) is the weight accorded by youth i to their social capital; (1 β ππ) and (1-Ξ΄i ) denote the intensity of concern that youth i attach to relative social capital and relative non- monetary income, respectively; r denotes types of self-identified reference groups presented in Table 4.3. Relative income, relative non-income and relative social deprivations of youth i, who are members of a reference group of n individuals (i.e. the subpopulation of all individuals belonging to the same reference group (r) such that i=1, 2,β¦, n), are defined as the weighted sum of the excesses of incomes, non-incomes and social capitals higher than Yi, Si, NIi such that the excesses are weighted by their relative incidence, respectively.
To operationalize objective measures of relative deprivation, I calculated relative deprivation for each youth within identified reference group using the Yitzhaki index (Yitzhaki, 1979). For instance, the relative income deprivation function of youth i with household income, Yi, who is a member of a self- identified reference group (r) of n individuals, is given as follows:
π π·ππ(π1, β¦ , ππ) = 1
πβ (ππ
π
π=π+1 β ππ) (4.2)
Where ππ>ππ; noting that for any jβ€i, max {ππβππ, 0} = 0; j is individuals whose income are greater than
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number of individuals who are in the r reference group. Note that n varies with the kinds of reference groups used. With this measure of relative income deprivation, an individual (or household) i with say income Y is deprived of all income above Y (Stark and Taylor, 1991), i.e., RDi=RDi (RIi), where RI denotes relative income in comparison to the reference group. Therefore, individuals within the same reference group and with identical income Y all experience the same level of relative income deprivation. The Yitzhaki index is an βupward lookingβ index of deprivation by construction. Based on this construction, I model and calculate βr=12β estimates of RD for each youth i. One of the prominent findings in this study that deserves special attention is the direction of the effect of relative income deprivation on SWB. If the economic success (income in this case) of other individuals or households in the reference groups depresses youth welfare, it means that the coefficient of RD (1 β π½π) is negative
and interpreted as ββstatus effectββ. On the other hand, youth well-being can be positively affected by the income of the relevant peer groups. Under such conditions, I expect that the coefficient of RD (1 β π½π) is positive and can be an indication of a ββsignal effect or positive source of informationββ- higher
income of others in the reference group indicate higher prospects for youth, that shapes future expectations and decisions. It means also that youth build aspirations based on the achievements of other peers such as based on the standard of living of other youth of similar age, occupation, etc. Positive effect of relative deprivation on SWB could be also related to pure ββeconomic externalitiesββ, where relative income (deprivation) act as a proxy for the benefits of living with rich(er) people or wealthy neighbourhoods (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Itβs possible that the two effects could exist simultaneously. In this case, when the status effect dominate the signal effect, the coefficient of relative deprivation is negative, whereas the effect is positive when vice-versa.
Similarly, I compute social relative deprivation obtained from social capital indicators, as the weighted sum of the excess of social scores higher than ππ such that the excess is weighted by its relative
incidence: ππ·ππ(π1, β¦ , ππ) = 1 πβ (ππβ ππ) π π=π+1 (4.3)
Where ππ> ππ; noting that jβ€i, max {ππβππ, 0} = 0.
A similar approach is used in Elgar et al. (2016). Mathematically, the same approach is also employed to compute relative non-income (non-monetary) deprivation (NID) from the non-income scores/items (NI) as follows: ππΌπ·ππ(ππΌ1, β¦ , ππΌπ) = 1 πβ (ππΌπβ ππΌπ) π π=π+1 (4.4)
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Though I cannot determine a priori, I expect that relative social deprivation and non-monetary relative deprivation are negatively associated with youth well-being. However, large social networks improve well-being significantly (Akay et al., 2012).
Generally, a utility function encompassing the three dimensions of relative deprivations and other related factors, important for well-being can be expressed in the following relation:
π(π, β) = πππ΅(π π·ππ, ππ·ππ, ππΌπ·ππ, ππ, ππ, ππΌπ) (4.5)
Alternatively, the above relationship can be expressed as follows where the different dimensions of relative deprivation are the function of the respective income, social capital, and non-income of the reference groups:
π(π, β) = πππ΅(π π·ππ(ππ, ππ), ππ·ππ(ππ, ππ), ππΌπ·ππ(ππΌπ, ππΌπ), ππ, ππ, ππΌπ ) (4.6)
Where r, i, j, and h as defined earlier.
Estimation strategy
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, SWB, the ordered probit specification would be an appropriate method employed in regression. In order to make full use of the panel nature of our data and controlling for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics and potentially different use of the underlying satisfaction scale across individuals, an ideal approach would be to employ a fixed effects estimator. Unfortunately, such a fixed-effects ordered probit estimator does not exist in standard statistical software packages. As an approximation, I use linear fixed-effects regression models, in addition to the use of random-effects ordered logistic regression models. The first alternative approximation has been commonly used in literature (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; DβAmbrosio and Frick, 2006; for instance).
Our default model specification considers SWB as latent:
πππ΅ππ‘β = π½πππ πππ’π‘πlog(πππ‘,β) + πΎ πππ‘+ ππ+ π’ππ‘ (4.7)
Where πππ΅πβ is the self-reported SWB of youth i on a subjective scale ranging from 1 to 9; ππ is absolute
per capita income (PCI) of youth i that belongs to household h in year t (in log form); Zi is a vector of observable individual, household and community characteristics which affect wellbeing; ππ is district
and other individual level fixed effects (unobservable time invariant) that captures unobservable differences, and π’π is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
variance one. I compare our results using multiple reference groups against this benchmark model. To test the impacts of the different dimensions of relative deprivation on the well-being of youth, I extend our specification in (4.7) above as follows:
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+ ππππ πππ’π‘ππππ‘+ ππππππ‘ππ£π ππ·π(πππ‘)
+ πΏπππ πππ’π‘πππΌππ‘+ πΏπππππ‘ππ£π ππΌπ·π(ππ‘) + πππ‘β²πΎ + ππ+ π’ππ‘ (4.8)
Where π π·π(ππ) is the income relative deprivation of youth i with respect to the reference group, r; ππ
is an index constructed from different indicators of social capital-different indicators used to compute social index is presented in appendix; ππ·π(ππ) is social relative deprivation of youth i in the reference
group, r, defined in the same way as above; ππΌπ is non-income index computed from the different scores
of non-income which are economic indicators (see appendix A4.1); ππΌπ·π(ππΌ
π) is non-income relative
deprivation of youth i who belongs to reference group, r, defined above; (. ) πππ πππ’π‘π and (. ) πππππ‘ππ£π
are parameters for absolute and relative income, non-income and social capital to be estimated, respectively. In the estimations, I employ a number of different specifications to check the robustness of our results. For instance, I separately estimate the different specifications presented above for youth members and youth household heads, and for young men and women. I also include father and mother characteristics (Eq.4.9), and interaction terms (Eq. 10), to the above specifications, expressed as follows: πππ΅ππ‘β = π½πππ πππ’π‘πlog(πππ‘,β) + π½πππππ‘ππ£π log(π π·π(πππ‘)) + ππππ πππ’π‘ππππ‘+ ππππππ‘ππ£π ππ·π(πππ‘) + πΏπππ πππ’π‘πππΌππ‘+ πΏπππππ‘ππ£π ππΌπ·π(ππΌππ‘) + ππΉππ‘+ ππππ‘+ πππ‘β²πΎ + ππ+ π’ππ‘ (4.9) πππ΅ππ‘β = π½πππ πππ’π‘πlog(πππ‘,β) + π½πππππ‘ππ£π log(π π·π(πππ‘)) + ππππ πππ’π‘ππππ‘+ ππππππ‘ππ£π ππ·π(πππ‘) + πΏπππ πππ’π‘πππΌππ‘+ πΏπππππ‘ππ£π ππΌπ·π(ππΌππ‘) + π½πππ πππ’π‘πlog(πππ‘,β) β πΈππ’πππ +ππΉππ‘+ ππππ‘+ πππ‘β²πΎ + ππ+ π’ππ‘ (4.10)
Where F and M denote father and mother characteristics. As stated earlier, I expect that absolute income, non-income and social networks or social capital affect SWB positively (π½πππ πππ’π‘π> 0; ππππ πππ’π‘π >
0; πΏπππ πππ’π‘π> 0), implying a higher income, non-income and social networks or social capital is
associated with a higher welfare. However, the effects of relative income deprivation, non-income deprivation and social deprivation are a priori undetermined i.e. their effects could be negative or positive.
I pre-determined that I would not use combinations in the analysis where the minimum number of individuals in the reference group is less than 5. I will use the whole sample βallβ as a reference group, an indicator of the same ethnic group. To control for as well as to capture the likely impact of youthβs own separate income on well-being, I include a dummy variable (1 if youth have a separate cash income, 0 otherwise).
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For further robustness check, I propose an alternative specification to Eq (4.8) expressed as follows:
πππ΅ππ‘β = πΌ log(πππ‘) + π½πlog(π¦Μ ππ‘) + π log(πππ‘) + ππlog(πΜ ππ‘) + π log(ππΌππ‘) + ππlog(ππΌΜ Μ Μ Μ ππ‘) + πππ‘β²πΎ + ππ+ π’ππ‘ (4.11) Where in this equation π¦Μ π is the average income of reference group r, defined as:
π¦Μ π= 1
πβ (π¦π
π π
1 ); Where π¦π is income of individual i in the reference group r, and the same method of
computation and interpretation is applied for average social and non-income of reference group r; the rest as defined earlier; π½π, ππ, ππdenote relative deprivation of income, relative social deprivation and
relative non-income deprivation, respectively. I find virtually similar conclusions, not reported here. Unlike that of the Yitzhaki index where individualβs RD is the weighted sum of the excesses of incomes, non-income or social capital higher than individualβs income, non-income, or social capital such that each excess is weighted by its relative incidence; individuals compare their income, non-incomes or social capital to the average income, non-income or social capital of their reference group.