The methodological approach to truthmaking

Each of the views we have canvassed so far are all particular doctrines: we have

considered what it is to be an advocate of truthmaking by looking at some of the various theses to which advocates of truthmaking subscribe. Theorists typically begin with such a doctrine, and then set out to discover what truthmakers are needed to satisfy that doctrine. I suggest a different approach.83 My suggestion is that we understand what it is to be an advocate of truthmaking as not a kind of doctrinal stance, but rather as a methodological

stance.84 That methodology is as follows: Metaphysics is the enterprise of giving a complete account of the nature of the world. Ontology, specifically, concerns questions of what exists. The truthmaking relation takes us from truths that we accept to what it is that exists that grounds those truths. So one way of doing ontology is to uncover the best account of what the truthmakers are for certain truths. We can accept that approach to ontology even before we commit to a strong thesis such as truthmaker maximalism, or that all truth supervenes on being. Starting with truths that we accept, we offer a theory of truthmakers for those truths.85

Now (and here is where I begin to differ from others who are concerned with truthmaking) when we reach a trouble spot, a spot where it is difficult to find a plausible truthmaker for some truth (or where a truth just seems like it does not require a truthmaker),

Friederike Moltmann (2007: 385), by contrast, use it to refer to truthmaker necessitarianism—that truthmakers necessitate their truths.

83_{For more criticism of the doctrinal approach to truthmaker theory, see Liggins 2008.}

84_{Hence I could not disagree more with the very first sentence of Dodd 2007: “To be a truthmaker theorist is to}

commit oneself to a principle stating that the members of a certain class of true propositions have truthmakers” (383). Without maximalism, Dodd rejects truthmaking as a “pointless” enterprise not worth pursuing (2002: 70, footnote 2; see also his 2007). Naturally, I disagree.

85_{The methodology I am here suggesting recommends moving in the direction from truths to truthmakers, not}

the reverse. That is not to say that the set of truths with which we begin our ontological investigations is immune from being questioned; we can expect some reflective equilibrium (as in Rawls 1971) to lead us to reject certain things we previously took to be true, given the results of our ontological inquiries. See chapter 3 of Armstrong 2004 for a more elaborate discussion of the direction of inquiry I am upholding.

we should pause and weigh our options. Since we have not yet committed ourselves to one of the doctrines surveyed above, we have choices in how to respond. Other accounts of

truthmaking prejudice and limit the choices we have available to us when we are faced with troublesome cases. My ultimate suggestion is that by attending to those cases where

truthmaking runs into the most trouble, we can offer a better doctrine of truthmaking that its advocates ought to adopt, and also shed light on the various realism/anti-realism debates that plague the metaphysical terrain. Proceeding in such a fashion, we shall not assume that all truths have truthmakers (or that all contingent truths have truthmakers, or that all atomic truths have truthmakers, etc.).86 Yet it goes without saying that some truths have truthmakers. Our interest, then, will be in how we should react when we are unsure of whether some truth has a truthmaker, and what consequences it would mean for ontology depending on how we answer. Is there something that binds together the class of truths that lack truthmakers, be there any such class? If we think there are good grounds for saying that some truths lack truthmakers, can we give a principled account of when truths do have truthmakers, and when they do not? Does the distinction between those truths with truthmakers and those without offer anything by way of elucidating the various realism debates across philosophy? If so, can the notion of truthmaking be put to use in solving such disputes? Such questions, which will fuel much of this project, come to the fore when particular doctrinal stances are set to the side.

To better appreciate the methodology I am here advocating, it will be useful to

contrast it with the competing approaches adopted by Armstrong and Merricks. First consider Armstrong’s view. Armstrong heartily subscribes to truthmaker maximalism. But he also

86_{In fact, we are continuing on the assumption that maximalism is false (for we are excluding analytic truths}

articulates how that doctrine invites a metaphysical methodology very much akin to what I am suggesting. He writes:

To postulate certain truthmakers for certain truths is to admit those truthmakers to one’s ontology. The complete range of truthmakers admitted constitutes a

metaphysics, which alerts us to the important point […] that the hunt for truthmakers is as controversial and difficult as the enterprise of metaphysics. I think that

proceeding by looking for truthmakers is an illuminating and useful regimentation of the metaphysical enterprise, or at least the enterprise of a realist metaphysics. But it is no easy and automatic road to the truth in such matters. (2004: 23)

Here Armstrong is suggesting that, equipped with the doctrine of truthmaker maximalism, we can be guided by a methodology that takes us from truths to truthmakers. How should we build our preferred ontology? Look to the truths that we accept, offer a theory of what truthmakers ground those truths, and read one’s metaphysics off of the list of truthmakers.87 So far so good. However, Armstrong’s commitment to truthmaker maximalism limits the options available to him when we encounter difficult cases in metaphysics. He goes on to write:

We take certain things to be true, and then ask what truthmakers these truths demand. It may be that at times we will think that we must have certain truthmakers, and as a result add to what we take to be our stock of truths. Or we might find ourselves unwilling to postulate certain truthmakers and therefore having to reject what we had previously taken to be truths. (2004: 26)

In difficult cases, we find ourselves with truths that we accept, and candidate truthmakers that those truths demand that we cannot accept. If we choose not to accept the candidate truthmakers, Armstrong says, we must give up the truths.88 So we have two options: give up the truth, or countenance the truthmaker. What we cannot do is hold on to the truth, and reject its candidate truthmaker. Truthmaker maximalism prevents such an option: if all truths

87_{This is not to say that truthmaker theory offers a unique account or criterion of ontological commitment in}

competition with Quine’s (1948, 1960), as Cameron (2008c) thinks. We shall take up this topic in greater detail in section 4.2.

88_{An example of this strategy, to be explored in depth in chapter 5, may be found in J. L. Mackie’s moral error}

have truthmakers, then there is no possibility of accepting a truth but no accompanying truthmaker. To do so would be of a piece with the phenomenalists’ or behaviorists’ positing the truth of certain counterfactuals without also supplying an ontological ground for them.89 It would be, in effect, cheating.

Guided by his commitment to truthmaker maximalism, Armstrong’s methodology takes him to conclusions that others are loath to accept. One particularly uncharitable commentator chastises certain consequences of Armstrong’s metaphysics as being “wrongheaded”, “bizarre”, “implausible”, and “confused” (Melia 2005: 69). Infamously, Armstrong admits totality states of affairs into his ontology. Suppose the world has just two things, a and b, both of which instantiate the universal F. Here we have two states of affairs: a’s being F, and b’s being F. It is true in this world that everything is F. What makes it true

that everything is F? A natural response is that a is F, that b is F, and a and b are all there is

in this world. So everything is F. Armstrong takes seriously that response, and finds in it an additional state of affairs: a and b’s being all the things in the world. Since the initial two

states of affairs fail to necessitate that everything is F, we do not yet have a truthmaker for it.

We need to combine those two with our third totality state of affairs—a state of affairs that holds that all the first-order states of affairs are all the first-order states of affairs that there are.90 Now we have necessitation, and a genuine truthmaker. Armstrong thinks his totality states of affairs are the best available option, and he offers as parsimonious an account of them as he can (for instance, he shows how they do double truthmaking duty by also handling negative existentials). Despite the bad taste they leave in others’ mouths, totality

89_{See Armstrong 2004: 1-3 for a discussion and history of the role that arguments against behaviorism and}

phenomenalism have played in the truthmaker literature.

90_{See Armstrong 2004: 72-75 for his account of totality states of affairs, and Heil 2006 for criticism. Cheyne}

and Pigden humorously refer to totality states of affairs as “Porky the Pig facts” (2006: 254). Th-th-that’s all f-f- folks!

states of affairs are embraced by Armstrong because he thinks they are the best solution to the problem of truthmakers for general and negative truths. Armstrong’s methodology forces him, in full ontological honesty, to accept what he thinks are the best candidate truthmakers for such truths. Since he is not willing to reject all general truths as false, he owns up to what he takes the requisite metaphysical commitments to be.

One way to interpret Armstrong’s approach to truthmaking is that he is more

committed to truthmaker maximalism than he is to any particular preconceived metaphysical prejudices. If maximalism leads him to postulate totality states of affairs, then he will

postulate totality states of affairs. If others are prejudiced against such things, the burden is on them to produce an alternative truthmaker, or to get out of the truthmaker game. One thing is apparent: in Armstrong’s work on truthmakers, truthmaker maximalism is not up for question.

Now compare Armstrong’s view on truthmaking with Merricks’s (2007). Merricks (himself ultimately a critic of truthmaking, not an advocate) focuses on truthmaking as cheater catching. If the issue of cheating is simply a metaphysician postulating a truth without offering any truthmaker, Armstrong would agree. But Merricks goes further. Metaphysicians also cheat when they posit “suspicious” properties or entities as candidate truthmakers. So one can cheat even when proposing truthmakers for various truths. How is this possible? Merricks thinks that truthmaker theorists should build into their accounts of truthmaking substantial metaphysical commitments. Specifically, truthmaker theorists need to come equipped with an account of what sorts of properties or entities are suspicious. Then, if anyone offers a suspicious truthmaker, they can be disregarded as ontological cheaters. Hence Merricks writes:

To catch certain cheaters, Truthmaker must deem some properties to be suspicious. So a fully articulated Truthmaker would tell us which properties are suspicious and which are not. […] A full account of which properties are suspicious is itself a full- blown metaphysics. Thus a fully articulated Truthmaker is not a neutral litmus test that competing theories must pass to be taken seriously. Instead, it is one of the competitors. (2007: 37)

Whereas Armstrong focuses on truthmaking as a way of discovering what should go into our ontology, Merricks focuses on using truthmaking to filter out views that we find unsavory.91 For Merricks, the truthmaker theorist starts with a metaphysical view, and then weeds out views that appeal to what he judges to be metaphysically suspicious. Of course, truthmaker theorists need not come to the table with a fully sketched metaphysical theory. But they need to have some idea of what is allowable as a truthmaker and what must be disallowed, if truthmaking is to fulfill its goal of catching ontological cheaters.

Different methodologies lead to very different reactions in troubling cases of

truthmaking. Consider once again negative existentials: it is true, for example, that there are no unicorns. What is it in the world that grounds that truth? Committed to truthmaker

maximalism, Armstrong finds the best candidate truthmaker he can, and embraces it: totality states of affairs. Lewis (1992, 2001b), Melia, and Merricks, among others, find totality states of affairs unacceptable, and use negative existentials as counterexamples to truthmaker maximalism. In the hands of George Molnar, someone committed both to maximalism and the suspiciousness of totality states of affairs, the case of negative existentials leads to aporia:

“We need positive truthmakers for negative truths but we have no good theory of what these

91_{The difference in focus is perhaps best explained by the fact that one of Merricks’s favored metaphysical}

views, presentism, has been argued against in the name of truthmaking. Presentism, it is said, advocates the existence of truths about the past while explicitly denying that the things those truths are about exist. Hence presentism is accused of cheating, of trying to earn truths without the requisite metaphysical commitments. See Lewis 1992: 219, Bigelow 1996, Sider 2001, Armstrong 2004, chapter 11, Keller 2004, Parsons 2005, Crisp 2007, Heathwood 2007, Kierland and Monton 2007, Merricks 2007, chapter 6, Stoneham 2009, Tallant 2009a and 2009b, and Goff 2010 for related discussion.

might be. […] It is an impasse and at present I cannot see the way out” (2000: 85; recall also Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 31).

The methodology I have prescribed for advocates of truthmaking avoids the doctrinal commitments that Armstrong and Merricks both require. Both kinds of doctrines are risky additions to truthmaker theory. First, Armstrong admits that he does not have an argument for truthmaker maximalism, the doctrine that informs his approach to truthmaking.92 Rather, he simply hopes that “philosophers of realist inclinations will be immediately attracted to the idea that a truth, any truth, should depend for its truth on something ‘outside’ it, in virtue of which it is true” (2004: 7; see also his 1989b: 89). Bigelow says much the same:

I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet I have never really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate anchor to hold me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism or idealism. And that is altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital realist about almost everything. (1988: 123)

Armstrong and Bigelow both announce their instant and automatic attraction to truthmaking. Both cite canonical cases of cheaters (phenomenalists, behaviorists) as instances where the fundamental idea behind truthmaking seems to have been violated. Truthmaker theory seems to say exactly what is wrong with such theories. Still, many have wondered whether the gut instinct motivating Armstrong and Bigelow is enough to justify belief in maximalism. (Indeed, Bigelow ends up not believing in truthmaker maximalism). Lewis captured the

sentiment of many when we wrote:

All too often, philosophical positions posit truths that fail to supervene on being. Consider phenomenalism, with its brute counterfactual truths about nonexistent

92_{Nor does anyone else seem to have a good argument for maximalism, though Cameron attempts one in his}

2008d. He thinks that all truths need truthmakers because he thinks that all truths require grounds, and takes for granted (falsely) that grounding can only be accomplished by truthmaking (see section 4.2). Cameron also thinks (again falsely) that truthmaker theory is a theory of truth, and so applies across the board (see chapter 2). And, finally, Cameron (falsely) equates the project of giving truthmakers with the project of giving “reasons for truth” (108). See section 1.4 for the problems with this view.

experience. Armstrong has told us how Charlie Martin long ago persuaded him to smell a rat. […] Right! But the way Martin explained the bad smell, namely as the stink of truths without truth-makers, cast suspicion not only on the ratty

counterfactuals that well deserved it, but also on innocent negative existentials and predications. By all means find something wrong with phenomenalist counterfactuals. But if my denial that there are arctic penguins is likewise true without benefit of any truth-maker, true just because there aren't any arctic penguins to make it false, then is it really a companion in guilt? (1992: 218-219)

Lewis is here acknowledging what is right about truthmaker theory, and for what purpose it can be used. But, he thinks, truthmaker maximalism is the wrong response to phenomenalism

et alia. He who offers no truthmaker for that there are no Arctic penguins is different in kind

from he who offers no truthmaker for that if I were to be staring at an emerald, I would be having a greenish experience. The latter is guilty, certainly. But the former is no companion

in guilt. Lewis does not here tell us why one is a cheater, and one is not. (Though he suggests that the phenomenalist is somehow denying supervenience.) Yet if we are not going to advocate truthmaker maximalism, we will want a principled account of when truths do have truthmakers, and when they do not. Such an account has not been offered, and one goal of this project to move toward forming one.

Truthmaker maximalism, as we have seen, is a very controversial thesis. Some think it is quite appealing as is; others think the thesis far outstrips its motivation. On the latter view, there is something right about truthmaking, but not enough to justify maximalism. I have no argument for it, and neither does Armstrong, its biggest supporter. Besides, we have already argued against it. But even setting aside negative existentials and analytic truths, we still have to face the question whether there are any more truthmaker gaps to be found. (Ethical truths? Mathematical truths? Certain counterfactuals?) Without being committed to some restricted maximalist doctrine from the outset, we can entertain the thought that perhaps there are more truths that lack truthmakers. Furthermore, had we been committed to

maximalism from the outset, we could not have explored the live possibility that truthmaker theory might be misapplied to the class of analytic truths. Armstrong’s methodology forbids such explorations. My hypothesis is that we can make some metaphysical progress by

attending to the similarities among truths where we may be disinclined to supply truthmakers. Thinking about truthmaker gaps might also shed some light on various realism debates across philosophy. If so, we should keep an open mind as to which truths have truthmakers, and which do not.

Merricks’s methodology is also risky in that it must build into truthmaker theory an