When the Australian Democrats formed in 1977, the party made a tactical decision not to direct its preferences to any of the major parties. This decision is consistent with the remarks of Chipp’s resignation speech in the House of Representatives in March 1977 when he said:-
‘The parties seem to polarise on almost every issue, sometimes seemingly just for the sake of it, and I wonder whether the ordinary voter is not becoming sick and tired of the vested interests . . . and yearn for the emergence of a third political force, representing the middle of the road policies which would owe allegiance to no outside pressure group.’
Sharman et al (2002:548) call this approach ‘no allocation’ of preferences, meaning Democrat voters were not directed but given a split how-to-vote alternative.
In subsequent elections, the Australian Democrats continued to issue a ‘split how-to-vote card which directed voters on how to direct their second preference to either the ALP or to the Liberals Nationals Coalition. Given that the Australian Democrats were appealing to both disillusioned Liberal and Labor supporters, disciplining the Party’s second preferences to a single party would have been very difficult.
However, this policy was abandoned by the mid-1990s as the Australian Democrats started to look upon preference allocation as a useful strategic device, not to be ignored and ‘the party went on to use preference allocation ‘as a way of influencing the political process, signaling their place on the political spectrum and securing partisan advantage in both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament.’ (Gauja 2010:492), (Sharman et al:2002). This approach included using an ‘ideological similarity’ approach (Sharman et al 2002:548), whereby preferences were given to Greens parties in 1990.
In the 1998 Federal election, the Australian Democrats preferenced a number of minor parties ahead of both the Labor and Liberal Parties. The Democrats second preferenced the Australian Greens, with third preferences directed to the Nuclear Disarmament Party. Parties that were at opposites to the Democrats, such as the Fred Nile Group, were preferenced after the two major parties. The complete Senate preference allocation by the Democrats at the 1998 Federal election was as follows:
Table 19: Australian Democrats – Preference allocation
Preferences to Labor Party Preferences to Liberal/National
Australian Democrats Australian Democrats
Greens Greens
Nuclear Disarmament Party Nuclear Disarmament Party
No Aircraft Noise Party No Aircraft Noise Party
Unity Unity
Natural Law Party Natural Law Party
Labor Party Liberal/National Party
Fred Nile Group Fred Nile Group
Mouldfield Group Mouldfield Group
Schollbach Group Schollbach Group
Lees Group Lees Group
Melville Group Melville Group
Democratic socialists Democratic socialists
Socialist Equality Socialist Equality
Ungrouped Candidates Ungrouped Candidates
Citizens Electorate Council Citizens Electorate Council
Poulos Group Poulos Group
Reduce Immigration Reduce Immigration
Gallagher Group Gallagher Group
Abolish child Support/Family Court Abolish child Support/Family Court
Australia first Party Australia first Party
One Nation One Nation
Source: NLA Manuscripts MS Acc 05.133 Australian Democrat Whips Files Box 5 folder ‘Preferences strategy’
This preference allocation chart is instructive for a number of reasons as well as the provision of a how to vote card in respect of each of the major parties. Firstly, the Democrats have
preferenced One Nation Last and the other anti-immigration party Australia First, second last. Also of note the ‘ungrouped candidates’ were preferenced ahead of a number of parties. Ungrouped candidates are usually unknown and a diverse group of candidates and parties.
Later on, the Democrats feeling the threat from the rise of the Australian Greens began trading off their second preferences in the House of Representatives in return for receiving second preferences in the Senate. This was done primarily with the ALP (Gauja 2010 492). The interactions between the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens will be explored in the next chapter.
Table 20: The Australian Democrats in the Senate 1977 – 2008 Year new
Senate appointed
ALP Lib/NP AD Greens Others ADs Balance of Power 1978 26 35 2 1 no 1981 27 31 5 1 shared/ negate 1983# 30 28 5 1 yes 1985 34 33 7 2 yes 1987# 32 34 7 3 yes 1990 32 34 8 1 1 yes 1993 30 36 7 2 1 shared 1996 29 37 7 2 1 shared 1999 29 35 9 1 2 Shared/negate 2002 28 35 8 2 3 shared 2005 28 39 4 4 1 no 2008 32 37 0 5 2 no Note
# Double dissolution election.
In 1975, the number of senators increased from 60 to 64 with two senators being elected for each of the two territories.
From 1985 the number of Senators increased from 64 to 76
The above table show the rise of the Australian Democrats from their formation in 1977. The rise continues up to 30 June 2002 where the party had nine senators in the Senate. The reasons for the fall in the number of Democrat senators at subsequent elections will be considered in the next chapter.
The party’s strongest point was the period from 1983 to 30 June 1990 when it held the balance of power in its own right. The party’s second strongest point was the period straight after that from 1 July 1990 to 30 June 2002 when with between seven and nine senators it shared the balance of power.
In respect of longevity, in January 1997 the then leader Cheryl Kernot was excitedly able to report to the Party members:-
This January we mark another milestone. We eclipse the DLP’s nineteen years and one month of parliamentary representation. We’ve now had continuous federal representation since Janine Haines’ appointment as our first Senator in 1977 (Kernot 1997:3).
Kernot went on to advise the members ‘1996 was a golden year for our party’.
It was the year that we came from behind to win, with a model election campaign. Unfortunately, we were very reliant on my own image (and stamina). It was sometimes a little confronting to see myself plastered on posters and super-size billboards around the country. Luckily, I was too busy to ever see our television advertising, although it was widely remarked upon.
As leader Kernot carried a certain amount of prestige and as leader attracted additional support and votes. It is natural therefore for the party to rely upon its leader. In a minor party the leader is often the most well-known of all of the candidates and in some cases the only known
candidate. So of course, the party was ‘very reliant’ on Kernot’s ‘image’. Kernot went on to advise the members that with the election result the major achievement ‘was to secure a future for the party’. Kernot concluded with the comment:-
I hope that more and more people come to see the Democrats as being more than Cheryl’s party, because it is. It is a vibrant professional and compassionate team of progressive politicians. A team of which we can all be proud.