The relation between knowledge structures and curriculum structures

A useful starting point is provided by exploring the sets of questions raised by Maton & Muller (2007) concerning the relation between knowledge structures and curriculum structures. Maton & Muller (2007) raise two key questions: first, can a curriculum structure be discussed in the same way as a knowledge structure; and second, what is the nature of the link between a knowledge structure and a curriculum structure?

In relation to the first question, Maton & Muller (2007) point out that Bernstein’s theory of knowledge structures refers specifically to the field of production of knowledge – to the structure of disciplines themselves. They observe that “in terms of Bernstein’s concepts as they currently stand, one would not describe a school curriculum in terms of exhibiting a horizontal or hierarchical knowledge structure” (p. 28). They note, however, that Bernstein’s work “foresees its own reformulation”, indicating that perhaps it would have been Bernstein’s intention to make a more explicit connection in later work. If a curriculum structure can be discussed in the same way as a knowledge structure then this provides the means by which the way that knowledge progresses in the curriculum can be explored: does it follow a scheme whereby knowledge builds upon past knowledge as it does in a hierarchical knowledge structure, or does it build up by adding separate languages as it does in a horizontal knowledge structure?

Several theorists do discuss curriculum structures in these terms. For example, Muller (2007) and Christie & Macken-Horarik (2007) discuss the degree of ‘verticality’

which is present in different curricula: the extent to which elements of the curriculum structure integrate past elements, thus providing “an expanding sense of a coherent knowledge base as students move through their schooling” (Christie & Macken- Horarik, 2007: 157). These writers are concerned with how aspects of cumulative knowledge may be built into the curriculum and how this might be made explicit and visible to students in order to minimise the exclusionary implications for disadvantaged students of an ‘invisible pedagogy’ (Bernstein, 1975 – see also section 4.4). This theme is also picked up by Maton (2009) in his exploration of the possibilities for segmented or cumulative learning within specific curricula. Segmented learning is described as learning where “students learn a series of ideas or skills that are strongly tied to their contexts of acquisition, problematising transfer and knowledge-building” and cumulative learning is described as learning where “new knowledge builds on and integrates past knowledge” (Maton, 2009: 43). A model of curriculum structure as analogous to a knowledge structure is therefore implicit in these studies.

The second question raised by Maton & Muller (2007) concerns the nature of the link between a knowledge structure and a curriculum structure and the extent to which the form of a specific knowledge structure determines the form of the corresponding curriculum structure. Maton & Muller (2007) acknowledge that knowledge structures are not curriculum structures, but suggest that this “raises the question of the degree to which the latter reflect the former” (p. 28). Bernstein’s position on the nature of this link, outlined in his theory of the pedagogic device (1990; 2000), was to emphasise the separation of academic knowledge and curriculum and the ‘imaginary’ nature of

school subjects. As I have previously noted, in relation to physics, Bernstein argued that:

As physics is appropriated by the recontextualising agents, the results cannot formally be derived from the logic of that discourse. Irrespective of the intrinsic logic which constitutes the specialised discourse and activities called physics, the recontextualising agents will select form the totality of practices which is called physics … But these selections cannot be derived from the logic of the discourse of physics…

(Bernstein, 2000: 34)

Muller (2007) speculates that Bernstein opposed the idea of a link between recontextualised discourse (i.e. the school subject) and the discourse of academic knowledge (e.g. research knowledge) in order to “stay true to the postulate that all symbolic formations were specific to a context with its specializing practices. That context is conditioned by a society’s regulative or moral order” (Muller, 2007: 80). Muller (2007) goes on to ask, however, how, if we accept that Bernstein’s position was true, it is that specialised knowledges are reproduced – as clearly they are reproduced: scientists, for example, are trained through engagement with a school curriculum. In relation to mathematics, Muller (2007) observes that students’ performance in school maths predicts their performance in university maths. Citing Gee (2001), Muller (2007: 80) suggests that “school maths competence ‘precurses’ university maths competence, which ‘precurses’ real maths adeptness”. Maton & Muller (2007) also observe that:

Since the specialized knowledges in the realm of production rest directly on the material base, there must surely be a limit to the amount of recontextualizing they can bear before defeating their purpose. This is made clear by the focus in Bernstein's account of the pedagogic device on ‘evaluative rules’; these may be pedagogized artefacts, but if the criteria they construct bear no relation to their parent knowledges in the realm of produc- tion, then schooling will undermine its role as a relay of specialized knowledges.

(Maton & Muller, 2007: 28)

Muller (2007) therefore argues that a relation between knowledge structure and curriculum structure must be necessary. He emphasises the importance of hierarchy and progression in curriculum, concluding that although, “we cannot stipulate a once- and-for-all-path [through a curriculum], we would still have to concede … that there are a specifiable necessary minimum set of steps that must be pedagogically traversed” (Muller, 2007: 82). He also notes the importance of such an explicit mapping of the path through a curriculum for socially equitable outcomes.

Following this argument, it is reasonable to assume that to learn a specific element of a curriculum (Newton’s Laws of Motion for example), a typical path through physics ‘content’ would be indicated. This might include learning specific vocabulary and its scientific meaning (of the terms ‘force’, ‘speed’ and ‘velocity’, for example) and learning how to apply these ideas appropriately. In the realm of physics in particular it is also important to have acquired particular mathematical knowledge, without which a full understanding and certainly full application will not be possible to

achieve.

However, it is also important to note that such a learning trajectory is not necessarily linear, since “particular topics, even for the most hierarchical of subjects, are repeated across learning levels” (Muller, 2007: 81). The subsumption of disciplinary elements is therefore imperfect: the same specific topics play a number of roles in acquiring different general understandings. The relation is more open than would be implied by a simple linear path. Muller (2007: 82) asks, “How are these different cognitive logics to be braided into the artifice called curriculum and pedagogy? This is the nub of pedagogy.” The exact nature of the link between knowledge and curriculum structures therefore remains unclear. Ashwin (2009: 95) suggests that “[i]t seems likely that how close this relation remains is dependent on the dominant voices in determining the rules for recontextualizing disciplinary knowledge into curriculum”. Maton & Muller (2007) propose that the nature of these links is a key area for future exploration.