12 The materials demonstrate the training and expertise of the detectives who had conduct of the initial stages, and of other calls on their time:
12.1 DC Keys's training record (44963). 12.2 DCI P39’s training record is (72535).
12.3 Insp Alan McCrum was interviewed by Supt Karen Kennedy. He stated that there were no blood stains or anything to indicate a scene, there was nothing to indicate that this was any different from what had taken place on previous weekends (10376).
Submissions by Edwards & Co Solicitors (Serving and Retired Police Officers) The Panel will remember the evidence of P39 when she stated that DC Keys was one of the most experienced Detective Constables. With this being her first major investigation, the Panel may feel that she was entitled to rely on that experience.
Submissions by John P Hagan Solicitors (Robert and Eleanor Atkinson) See the composite submission above
Submissions by the Police Service of Northern Ireland See sections 14-15 below.
P39
Oral Evidence
13.1 She was a Detective Chief Inspector in April 1997. She clarified that MSX in 72535 is “fax machine” training. “Coms Rels Induction” is Community Relations (p.2). She has never completed a course on HOLMES or MIRIAM. She has taken a one day “Crime Strategy Seminar” but that does not include HOLMES (p.3). She retired in March 1998 (p.62). There were two other incidents that were equally as serious on the same night as Robert Hamill was attacked (p.145). Within the RUC there was not an intelligence cell, but there was a regional intelligence office (p.147).
Henry McMullen Oral Evidence
13.2 He was the weekend duty officer (p.39) His role was to ensure there were adequate resources for the investigating officers by checking that they were happy with their resources. In the Hamill investigation there was no shortage of resources (p.40). He had no role in the investigation (p.41). It was in his power to enable more Constables, for events such as house to house enquiries. The DCS and he would make the case up the chain of command but in this case that did not happen (p.43). He arrived at 08.30 on 27 April. The person in charge at the time was the duty Inspector. It was a serious incident as he was called out at 08.30 and he normally arrived at 11.00 on Sundays (p.62). He was technically on duty overnight and could be called out for specific reasons, e.g. to get Mobile Support Units from headquarters (p.62).
13.3 There were the resources to call out a scene of crime officer within an hour. He has experience of SOCOs arriving four or five hours after they were called, as they were at other scenes (p.71) but there would be a record of who was on duty and why there was such a delay (p.72).
Ronald McCreesh Oral Evidence
13.4 Supt McCreesh believed he may have had dealings with the investigation beyond Monday 28 April 1997 as ACC Hall may have been at Regional Headquarters. He was fairly certain he had discussions with senior CID officers as to the nature and type of investigation on the Sunday and the Monday. He also discussed putting extra resources into the Portadown area (p.9). Insp McCreesh dealt with resources and at no stage was he asked for additional resources (p.10).
Michael Irwin Statement
13.5 (81418): Moved to CID Portadown on 6 January 1997. DCI P39 was his line manager and was responsible for ‘J’ Division CID. DCS McBurney had overall responsibility for South Region CID.
13.6 (81419): HOLMES, in RUC, was a substantially under-resourced unit. It did not have the resources to enable a strict adherence to RUC policy.
13.7 (81450): The availability of resources was a constant issue. He knew DCI P39 sought additional CID and Regional Crime Squad personnel to support the investigation, however there were no officers immediately available. Uniform personnel were also fully employed within the Sub-Division.
13.8 (81452): On 10 May he briefed uniform and accompanying CID personnel regarding six arrests and four searches. There were issues regarding limited uniform personnel being available for the arrests and searches. As a result, there were the minimum number of officers available to allow all arrests and searches to be conducted.
William McCreesh Statement
13.9 Para. 6: He was deputy ACC in 1996.
13.10 Para. 15: He knew DCI P39 was called out and she would have had responsibility for the investigation. Any press release would have come from the investigating officer and not through him.
13.11 Para. 20: Part of his area of responsibility was Mobile Support Units. If there were any dispute over the allocation of resources, then it would be brought to his attention. He was unaware of Mobile Support Unit officers being deployed on arrests on 10 May 1997.
13.12 Para. 21: ACC Hall would have assumed responsibility for liaison on 28 April 1997.
Ken Armstrong 1st Report
13.13 Page 47, Para. 1.8.7: CID was so overworked that they did not have time for training and had to use inadequate resources. Many CID officers lacked awareness of what was required at the beginning of an investigation.
Oral Evidence
13.14 There were heavy demands on resources, both time and training (p.171). This does not detract from the internal training given by observing senior officers (p.172).
Submissions by John P Hagan Solicitors (Robert and Eleanor Atkinson) See the composite submission above
Submissions by the Police Service of Northern Ireland See sections 14-15 below.
Comment
14 This issue is raised at this stage so that when the concrete examples of forensic strategy and the approach to the CCTV footage are considered, the resources available can be in mind.
Submissions by John P Hagan Solicitors (Robert and Eleanor Atkinson) See the composite submission above
Submissions by the Police Service of Northern Ireland
The PSNI do not accept that resource and training issues are relevant to the forensic strategy or to the approach to CCTV in this case.
15 It is plain that the RUC had a shortage of trained detectives who could take charge of a serious investigation and progress it in a coherent manner. No doubt the panel will have in mind, when considering any potential criticism of P39, that she had not received training in key areas. Further, although this Inquiry is concentrating on acts and omissions by detectives in relation to Robert Hamill’s murder, the evidence shows that the detectives had other important cases to manage at the same time.
Submissions by British Irish Rights Watch and Committee on the Administration of Justice
We accept that the RUC was under-resourced and under-trained. Responsibility for that state of affairs must lie ultimately with the Chief Constable at the time, Sir Ronnie Flanagan. However, there was much more wrong with policing in Northern Ireland in 1997 than a mere lack of resources, as the report of the Patten Commission showed, and as Professor McEvoy's report explains.
It seems incredible that P39 could have risen to the rank of DCI with so little training in basic detection skills. Nevertheless, many of those skills are
personal rather than a matter of training. One would expect a DCI to show leadership skills; to understand the need to acquire and preserve evidence; to be methodical; and to have the ability to prioritise competing demands for time and resources, to give just four examples of the skill-set required. DCI P39 does not appear to have exercised any of those skills in relation to this incident.
We cannot acccept that the systematic failures in the police investigation into Robert Hamill's murder were solely attributable to lack of resources or training. There are only two conclusions that can be drawn from such an inadequate investigation: either the RUC was a hopelessly incompetent police force incapable of the detection of serious crime, or every single officer involved simply did not care what had happened to Robert Hamill and had no desire to find out the truth. If the Inquiry conclude that the latter is the case, then they will need to consider whether the failure of the officers concerned was a matter of individual responsibility or whether the failings were institutional. If, as we believe, the RUC as an institution failed Robert Hamill, then we invite the Inquiry to consider why that was, and whether sectarianism within the RUC accounted for its failure.
Submissions by Edwards & Co Solicitors (Serving and Retired Police Officers) Having regard to the fact that P39 had received very little training, she managed and supervised the initial stage of the GBH investigation with professionalism and enthusiasm. She went a step further than the norm in a GBH investigation in setting up a mini Miriam system. It must be borne in mind that she was actively involved in two other equally serious incidents that occurred that weekend within the sub-division and other CID officers were involved in other day to day work. Despite this, as she herself stated at p11, on being called out she did not want to waste time and was conscious that evidence might be lost if she did not act quickly. The Panel may feel that she did all she could.
Submissions by John P Hagan Solicitors (Robert and Eleanor Atkinson) See the composite submission above
Submissions by the Police Service of Northern Ireland
The PSNI accept that it is relevant to consider an individual's training and experience, as well as the other demands on their professional time when assessing the performance of their duties and whether criticism is appropriate.
The PSNI refers to and relies upon the helpful report of Mr. Ken Armstrong which brings to the fore the demanding circumstances in which the RUC and its officers were expected to deliver a policing service in 1997.
THE FOURTH ISSUE: FAST-TRACK FORENSICS