The Transformative Nudge Model: Two Ethical Principles

The essence of the transformative nudge model, then, is agency-enhancement. Recall the distinction drawn between “System 1” and “System 2” nudges: in brief, the former bring about behavioural modifications via nonconscious automatic processes, while the latter act on us in ways that encourage conscious, deliberative choices. Across both the prudential and moral analyses, it has been shown that at least one form of each type of nudging is permitted. Following on from this, two main normative principles form the basis of the ethical framework for designing permissible nudge policies: (1) the nudge-to- deliberate principle, and (2) the nudge-to-motivate principle. The permissible System 2 nudges relate to the former, while the permissible System 1 nudges relate to the latter. I will briefly explicate each principle in turn.

The first principle of the transformative nudge model is the nudge-to-deliberate principle. It maintains that PCA is morally permissible in so far as it supports people’s practical reasoning and autonomous decision-making. According to this principle nudges can be used to activate or engage citizens’ deliberative thinking processes in contexts in which their behaviour is likely to be subject to a predictable cognitive bias or to predictable motivational or attentional strain.154 _{In doing so, it will often act as a form}

of psychological debiasing and, in some cases, also as a counter-nudge. Much of the world in which we navigate our lives is not set up “neutrally”, as it were. We face a near-constant stream of information and influences seeking to shape our preferences, direct and demand our attention, and steer our behavioural responses. Governments can protect and support their citizens’ exercise of autonomous agency, and support them in freely complying with their moral duties, by using nudges that operate via the nudge-autonomy

and inducing moral deliberation mechanisms, respectively, since these mechanisms involve enhancing in some way an individual’s general ability to engage in deliberation relevant to the situation she is in (the deliberation-activating view). The public-ecological persuasion

mechanism discussed in the context of moral nudging also falls under the nudge-to- deliberate principle (see the top row of Table 1, below), but it differs from these other

154 _{I do not want the terminology of “deliberation” in the nudge-to-deliberate principle to misrepresent}

the principle’s aim. The nudges that fall into this category need not engage their target’s deliberative processes in ways that are cognitively burdensome. In many cases, it will involve only the momentary conscious process of ‘checking’ – which may result in the individual confirming the automatic response or replacing it with a behaviour that is more in line with her reflected preferences, neither of which require any significant cognitive load. In such cases, the term “deliberate” possibly gives a false sense of the type of cognitive processes that are triggered, given its association with long, careful consideration. There will also be some cases in which this more cognitively burdensome consideration is triggered by the PCA, especially in the case of moral nudging. Whether or not this is the case will often depend on whether a particular individual already has a reflected preference on the matter at hand or not. If not, it may encourage her to consider her view, whereas it may only involve a momentary checking otherwise.

151 two mechanisms in so far as it seeks not only to activate deliberation, but to do so in a directive way, i.e., to steer people towards recognition of a particular reason. Hence, this mechanism has the additional aim of enhancing an individual’s ability to track the truth about what reasons apply to her (the truth-tracking view).155

Table 1: A typology of permissible nudge mechanisms captured by the two principles (the top row represents the nudge-to-deliberate principle across both domains; the bottom row the nudge-to-motivate principle).

The second principle, the nudge-to-motivate principle, holds that nudges are permissible in so far as they help people to act in accordance with their own beliefs and intentions (see the bottom row of Table 1). In cases where an agent voluntarily opts in to receiving motivational support from PCA, such auto-nudges count as ways of supporting and enhancing her autonomy by ensuring that her future behaviour is constrained so as to align with her goals and values. In the moral realm, motivational scaffolding encompasses more than (explicitly) consented-to System 1 nudges. It also includes nudges that reduce implicit biases, which highlights that interventions that make use of and seek to (re)shape our automatic responses are not necessarily problematic for autonomous and morally responsible agency.

The table above is structured along the lines drawn by the thesis, and thereby categorises the nudge mechanisms relating to whether the intervention is principally for the sake of the individual upon which the nudge is acting or for the sake of others. The moral column is labelled Moral * because, on my view, although the content of the agency-enhancing nudges in this column is moral (i.e., for the sake of others), prudential reasons play an important role in motivating and justifying these mechanisms. That is, the moral nudges that are justified by the nudge-to-deliberate and nudge-to-motivate principles are partially justified by the idea that it is in the interests of the target of these interventions to act on one’s own judgement; in particular, one’s life goes better when

155 _{It should also be added that an implicit (empirical) assumption of the other mechanisms that fall}

within the nudge-to-deliberate principle is that deliberation-activation will tend also to enhance a person’s ability to truth-track with regards to the reasons that apply to her; but this need not be the case.

Prudential Moral *

“System 2” Nudge-autonomy Inducing moral deliberation; Public-ecological persuasion

152 one is sensitive to the ways in which one’s behaviour and attitudes harm or wrong others, and when the appreciation of this consideration motivates one to act in accordance with moral reasons.

Together, these two principles should direct the design of PCA within those societies that currently employ this policy lever and those that may want to do so in the future. When used in accordance with these principles, nudges can be used by governments as a means of enhancing citizens’ agency in ways that support the recovery of control over their thinking and behaviour. Any nudges that do not comply with one of these two principles – with the exception of the category of moral nudges that might be more effective than coercive measures at bringing about conformity with enforceable duties – are ruled out as impermissible.