Take the first question, is it always morally better to try to understand more people than fewer? Even if we grant that one is trying to understand celebrities by staying on top of the news about them, we wonder whether she is doing anything morally better than another person who is relevantly similar in all respects except that she does share this interest in celebrities because what they really are is simply none of her business. “None of her business,” for she holds no relationship whatsoever with these celebrities, and they do not figure in her moral decisions. Perhaps there is some epistemic value in achieving understanding of a diverse range of persons, for we will thereby have honed our cognitive skills and broadened our horizons. But it is not clear what additional moral value there may be in, say, understanding more celebrities. If there is moral value in the moral virtues we typically display in attempts to understand, the value is not tied to the number of people we try to understand, but only to the exercise of virtues. Could there be “indirect” moral value in understanding more people — valuable for its contribution to making one better at understanding different sorts of people, and hence in a better position to respond to moral situations that call for (a high level of) understanding? Presumably, there are many skills or abilities that can contribute to our acting well in certain moral situations — good communication skills, for instance
— but our practice in them does not therefore become morally valuable itself.
Instead, I want to suggest that it is whom we understand, not how many, that matters morally. One place where understanding the other is especially valuable is a close friendship. As we have seen in previous chapters, a close friendship consists in part in a mutual willingness to understand (and not just empathize with) each other, and depends for its flourishing on sustained efforts to understand by both parties (and perhaps also a relatively high degree of success?). As we move away from close personal relationships to cases where no relationship whatsoever is present, the importance of understanding another declines accordingly. The example with celebrities is one of the latter. The vast majority of people we meet in daily life fall somewhere in between the two ends. Some are more like the case of celebrities: there’s nothing wrong with not trying to understand the Starbucks barista with whom my interaction stops at getting a cup of Espresso.3 There are also persons who are, relative to the barista, more involved with us in various kinds of impersonal relationships. Take, for example, the students I teach in a seminar. While it is morally good for me to understand them (to some extent), it is not necessarily better that I also try to understand as many of the student population as possible in the absence of a similar relationship. At the same time, also because of the relationship I hold with my students, I do not need to understand them as well as their friends do, but a sense of what they are like in their capacities as participants in the seminarwould be important.4
This is not to say, however, that there cannot be moral value in our understanding a person in the absence of any relationship with her. Sometimes we may be involved
3This is not to say that we should therefore see the barista as nothing more than her occupation. On the contrary, I think it is morally good to recognize that she is a potential object for understanding as a person who inhabits a world no less meaningful and rich than our own.
4Here, understanding my students more may be good, if in so doing, I create a more friendly and relaxed learning environment for them; or not so good, if it gets in the way of maintaining a professional relationship with them.
in a moral situation such that our decision about the right thing to do is contingent on some understanding of persons we have barely met. For example, one might think that the public can have a legitimate interest in understanding, and not just knowing about, public officials (potential or incumbent) even though they are as removed from us as celebrities. Insofar as we as citizens have a moral responsibility to select the best candidates for political office and hold them accountable while they are in office, and assuming our evaluation of them requires some understanding of them in their capacities as public officials, understanding is then morally required, though to a limited extent. To be sure, the public is divided on how much understanding is appropriate here. Some might think knowledge of one’s credentials, policy commitments, or record in office is enough for evaluating candidates, while others demand to understand them more holistically in terms of how well they exhibit leadership qualities. And some might insist that leadership qualities include certain character traits such as honesty, self-discipline, and integrity. Consequently, that would require a deeper understanding of the candidates and knowledge about them beyond their performance in public office to areas in their personal lives. Regardless of how this disagreement is to be settled, at least all parties to it can agree that it is morally good, and even required, for us to understand (to a satisfactory extent) the persons running for or occupying public offices.