15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 4-2 Figure 4-1. Theater Army 5.4 CCP Organization
986
4-1. The Contingency Command Post (CCP) is a relatively lean, deployable element of the theater army 987
headquarters, designed specifically to meet the GCC’s requirements for a limited command and control 988
capability, which is theater-committed and immediately available to respond to a crisis anywhere within the 989
AOR. Figure 4-1 depicts the Theater Army 5.4 CCP. The real value of the CCP is its immediate response 990
capability rather than its capability to command and control complex or sustained operations. During 991
steady-state operations, the CCP will normally co-locate with the MCP for stationing purposes but, as 992
determined by the Commander or Chief of Staff, the CCP will remain organized as a separate command 993
post. The Chief of Staff establishes and determines CCP’s business rules, battle rhythm, and work schedule 994
based on its assigned tasks and missions, which are distinct from those assigned to the MCP. One example 995
is the planning, preparing, and executing of Joint or Combined exercises. Maintaining the CCP as a 996
separate command post facilitates the training of the CCP staff in their operational command and control 997
functions. The separation enhances the CCP’s ability for rapid response or deployment as well. 998
4-2. The CCP is capable of providing command and control of operations within its limitations. 999
Normally, command and control over the execution of operations within the AO will require the CCP to 1000
operate continuously 24 hours a day, seven days a week from initiation of the operation until completion or 1001
until the CCP is relieved of its mission. The CCP staff elements provide two fully functional 12-hour shifts 1002
to operate the Current Operations Integration Cell (COIC). Other staff capabilities, which are not required 1003
on a continuous basis, are organized to provide 24/7 on-call services, as required 1004
Theater Army Contingency Command Post Organization
15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 4-3
4-3. CCP provides the theater army with a capability to directly command and control smaller types of 1005
Limited Intervention or Peace operations. These operations can range from contingency assessment to 1006
facilitating theater army forward command and control to Non-combatant Evacuation (NEO) or Foreign 1007
Humanitarian Assistance, in both permissive and non-permissive environments where major combat 1008
operations are not anticipated, to Peace Operations, such as peace enforcement. These operations may 1009
involve some combat, but are limited in scale, scope, and complexity and expected intensity and duration. 1010
The CCP also provides the theater army commander a flexible command post to meet some Theater 1011
Campaign Plan (TCP) related requirements to provide exercise control headquarters for and/or participate 1012
in joint and combined exercises with the ground forces of partner nations within the AOR. This is an 1013
incidental capability rather than a specific design requirement. The CCP can be tailored and reinforced 1014
with additional staff personnel from the theater army’s MCP and/or with staff and capabilities from theater 1015
supporting units (e.g., theater signal, medical, civil affairs, sustainment) to meet the METT-TC 1016
requirements for either C2 of military operations or TCP-related exercises, exchanges, and other activities. 1017
The following sections further describe the CCP’s roles, missions, capabilities, limitations, and 1018
dependencies. 1019
4-4. The CCP provides one of several command and control options available to the GCC and the theater 1020
army commander to meet AO-specific requirements for command and control (C2) of Army and/or joint 1021
forces conducting military operations within the AOR. The CCP design allows it to be small and 1022
affordable, while providing an easily tailored and rapidly deployable C2 capability. It is immediately 1023
available to the GCC and theater army commander, to facilitate C2 of a limited range of military operations 1024
for a limited duration of time. The CCP cannot function as the primary command post for major operations 1025
involving multiple brigade-sized formations operating for extended periods or in intense combat, unless 1026
augmented. A variety of sources can provide the needed augmentation - the MCP, GCC staff, other service 1027
component commands, and JMD request. 1028
4-5. Every mission begins with mission analysis, which will determine which of the Army’s available 1029
headquarters is most appropriate to the task. Taking fully into account the CCP’s inherent capabilities and 1030
limitations, the theater army commander may determine that the CCP is adequate, with or without 1031
augmentation, to provide effective command and control over a given mission from start to finish. In some 1032
cases, the GCC or theater army commander may determine the CCP is adequate to C2 the operation or 1033
provide a forward command post until a more capable headquarters can arrive. The design team 1034
determined 30 days of continuous operations is the upper limit of CCP to command and control operations. 1035
The 30-day rule is not immutable. The CCP is capable of operating beyond 30-days if augmented or 1036
performing relatively simple operations. Thus, the decision on whether or not to employ the CCP for a 1037
given mission involves a trade-off between the CCP’s immediately responsive capability, and its known 1038
limitations with regard to the scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can 1039
effectively command and control without significant augmentation. 1040
4-6. In short, the CCP provides the theater army commander with an organic capability to meet the 1041
GCC’s requirements for immediate response to unanticipated crises within the AOR. As an organic 1042
element of the theater army headquarters, the CCP is committed to the theater, and immediately available 1043
for deployment to command and control operations within an AO. 1044
4-7. The CCP provides several options for employment. The CCP may be employed within the AOR in a 1045
variety of ways, including as the forward command post of the theater army commander providing C2 over 1046
Army and/or joint forces; as the nucleus of a small JTF headquarters working directly for the GCC; or in 1047
other tailored configurations, which take advantage of the CCP’s flexibility and rapid deployability. In the 1048
first case, the theater army may be designated as a JTF headquarters for a Limited Intervention or Peace 1049
Operation, and the CCP (with joint augmentation from the GCC or other service components) forms the 1050
nucleus of a JTF under the direct command of the theater army commander (who is, himself, subordinate to 1051
the GCC). In the second case, the GCC might task the theater army to provide the CCP as the nucleus of a 1052
small JTF (probably commanded by the theater army DCG), which would receive augmentation from the 1053
GCC in the form of either selective augmentation from the GCC staff, augmentation with the GCC’s 1054
Standing Joint Force Headquarters Element (SJFHQ), or with a Joint Manning Document (JMD) tailored to 1055
the existing mission. In this situation, the CCP merely provides the personnel and equipment around which 1056
a tailored (ad hoc) JTF headquarters is organized, and the operational control (OPCON) of the CCP and its 1057
15 July 2010 (Final Draft) FM 3-93 4-4 personnel would pass to the designated Joint Force Commander. Other employment options will take 1058
advantage of the flexibility, expansibility, and rapid deployability of the CCP to employ it in part or in total 1059
to conduct crisis assessments or to function, with augmentation and reachback, as a form of ―mobile 1060
command group,‖ integrating with forward-based staff in existing facilities to provide the theater army 1061
commander with forward presence and reachback during contingencies where support capacity already 1062
exists on location. 1063