Theoretical Approaches Used To Decipher Symbolic Behaviour

Understanding the evolutionary need for symbolic behaviour leads us to the theoretical approaches used to define and understand these behaviours. These approaches are based upon far larger movements of thought within archaeology itself, not only in the methods of examining material culture but methods in scrutinising archaeological practice as well.

3.2.1

PROCESSUALISM

The model of science adopted by New or Processual archaeology was the one current in the 1950s, and in broad terms reflected an effort to make traditional archaeology into a scientific anthropology (Whitley 1998:3). Processual archaeology’s main points included an interest in systems theories, where a system was defined as a group of interacting parts and the relative influence of these parts followed rules which, once formulated could be used to describe the system no matter what the actual components were. Archaeologist Kent Flannery (1968) did some very important and pioneering work in this field in his paper Archaeological Systems Theory and Early Mesoamerica. Systems theory allowed archaeologists to treat culture as just another natural system that could be explained in mathematical terms.

This approach considered cultural changes as driven by evolutionary ‘processes’ in cultural development, which will be adaptive relative to the environment and, therefore, be scientifically

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predictable. Cultures were then measured and defined by their material culture, changes occur through diffusion and interaction with other cultures, and new developments are driven by evolutionary processes (Jones 2007:73). In this structural-functionalism society is considered structured or organised in a fashion analogous to an organism: all parts (like the organs in your body) work together towards the good of the whole.

One can understand the logic of this approach. From the point of view of a user, an object, if it is to be selected for the manufacture or use must satisfy a number of criteria: it appropriate for its intended function, it must be within the ‘budget’ of the group, etc. But the ideological and symbolic associations of the object are also central to whether it will be considered desirable, valuable and ultimately used (Lillios 1999:182). The Processual model makes it difficult to account for such symbolic behaviour within the system.

3.2.2

POST-PROCESSUALISM

The criticisms of Processual archaeology resulted in various attempts to recombine the notions of function and symbolism in new forms of archaeological practice. But in reality, the label ‘post- processual’ says nothing about what it stands for, other than a relative position in respect of processual archaeology (Shanks & Hodder 2007:70). The objective of Post-Processual archaeology is the same as interpretive anthropology in general: to confront the question of meaning. Culture is no longer viewed simply as a device for adaptation or as a unit of cultural information, or in the form of the artefact: but in the arrangement of those artefacts (Jones 2007:77). Hodder, for example, argued that it is possible to view material culture as part of cultural expression and conceptual meaning, to go beyond the immediate physical uses and constraints of objects to the more abstract symbolic meanings (Hodder 1992b:10). Jones, in turn, offers a useful metaphor: “rather like geneticists who have no interest or understanding of animal physiology or behaviour, and only a passing interest in the mechanisms of animal reproduction, any theory which separates out the process of cultural transmission from an understanding of the material properties of artefacts and the way those material properties are employed in practice to reproduce or transmit cultural ideas is unsustainable” (Jones 2007:75).

But these approaches came with their own backlash and criticisms. Post-Processualism has come to be seen by some as anti-science, celebrating subjectivity, the historical particular in place of generalisation (Shanks & Hodder 2007:69). In practice, however, it is not Post-Processualism against science: scientific method in archaeology is of paramount importance. It is instead Post- Processualism pitted against Positivism, the idea of scientific absolute truth, generic, and cross- cultural, without consideration of specific contexts and circumstances. By this definition, the research undertaken here falls within the Post-Processual paradigm. A rejection of generic cross- cultural ‘truth’ in relation to social practice, by the application of scientific method to create a body

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of data with which to explain and interpret past behaviour in the Neolithic, and disentangle economic, social, and symbolic developments.

3.2.3

SEMIOTICS BY FERDINAND SAUSSURE

With the new approaches posited in Post-Processual archaeology, some scholars became interested in linguistic models, believing that it directly reflects, through symbolism, uniquely human cognitive processes a way to ‘read’ the archaeological record as a ‘text’ (Schiffer & Miller 1999:30; Whitley 1994:257). The ‘father’ of modern linguistics was Ferdinand de Saussure with his dyadic model of the ‘sign’ (signifier) and the ‘signified’ (the concept) (Boivin 2008:31), where the relationship between the signifier and the signified is entirely arbitrary, simply a matter of convention (Lee 2005:201; Tilley 1994:185). This idea has been influential in archaeology. The notion that material culture meaning is entirely relational, that it is based on relationships within a system, has been embraced. However, many observe that material culture as a ‘second order type of writing’ was not directly comparable to language, but rather that these symbols may be ‘motivated’ (Boivin 2008:38)

3.2.4

SEMIOTICS BY CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE

According to Peirce (Peirce, Hawthorn & Weiss 1860-1911: V2.308), “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign”. This interpretation process occurs by relating a sign to familiar systems of conventions and, hence, the sign becomes part of an organised collective of interactions and cannot exist outside such a collective (Tsotra, Janson & Cecez-Kecmanovic 2004:4211). For Peirce, semiotics is the process of communication by any type of sign, a sign being anything that stands for something (its object), to somebody (its interpreter), in some respect (its context). Like Saussure, Peirce explained sign processes in terms of relations (Mick 1986:198). Peirce, in contrast to Saussure, conceived of the sign as a three-part relation:

 a vehicle that conveys an idea to the mind

 another idea that interprets the sign

 an object for which the sign stands

The sign itself could be envisaged as having three forms:

 Index (i.e. lightning = thunder)

 Icon (i.e. outline of aeroplane = airport)

 Symbol (where like Saussure it is a sign-vehicle that stands for something else, is understood as an idea, but is arbitrary and regulated by culture)

(Hiraga 1994:6; Jones 2007:18)

Compare, for example, the colour black, a symbol standing for death, with the sign ‘I’. Black is a symbol loaded with a deep but diffuse significance whereas ‘I’ is a sign which stands unequivocally

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for the number one. Symbols and signs are used differently: symbols help us to conceive and reflect on ideas, whereas signs are communication devices bound to action (Schmandt-Besserat 1992:89). In another example (Figure 3.2) we have a dustbin (an index), in association with a person (an icon), throwing away (a very precise contextual relationship), a swastika (interpretable as an image of a sun or a star, or even as a diagram of movement — with people with extreme right wing political views) (Farias & Queiroz 2006:294). We recognise this sign to mean ‘get rid of Nazism’, a meaning beyond its constituent parts, understood because of our specific social and historical context.

Figure 3.2 An example of symbols used to convey specific meaning, as described by semiotics according to Pierce, and in line with metaphorical structuralisation (Farias & Queiroz 2006:295)

3.2.5

METAPHOR AND STRUCTURALISATION

Signs, in this model, would have been part of a shared social structure understood by the group and the person who produced it would be expressing themselves through structures which already existed in the community to which they belonged (Llamazares 1991:242). So, these symbols or idioms did not derive their meaning from their contrast with other symbols within a system, as with the Semiotic approach, but rather as metaphors, drawing on some inherent connection between form and meaning (Boivin 2008:48). As Conkey more succinctly and evocatively states in her example: “the form of a horse's hoof is just as much an image of the steppe it treads as the impression it leaves is an image of the hoof” (1982:120).

As a modem example, graphical metaphors are pervasive throughout our understanding of computer systems. Metaphors were adopted because they allowed new users to quickly learn new concepts by applying their existing knowledge to the browser interface (Sherson 1999:2). The world of the web is the perfect hot house for metaphor development, and the ground has been prepared from years of interface design experience and developers have access to well-developed text and graphical tools. Even the terminology of the ‘web’ and ‘browser’ are metaphorical and make use of metaphor in the way they function. An example of this can be seen in the internet browser: the default page or home page appears in the browser when an iconic representation of a ‘house’ is clicked; a red coloured icon to stop a page from loading; findings things on a page is represented by a magnifying glass (Sherson 1999:4). Looking again at the throwing away of Nazism figure, we now see the metaphorical use of pre-existing knowledge and system – culturally set symbols for a person,

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rubbish bin, and throwing, and our historical and social context in understanding the meaning and implication of Nazism.

However, whilst Peirce’s model of semiotics is more appropriate for understanding representational qualities of material culture, there are still problems associated with the application of the structuralist method in archaeology. The primary concern is with the failure of structuralism to account for either agency or intentionality (Boivin 2008:37). Mick (1986) presents an example of the inescapable relationship between signs and agency, by using a modern example of a study by Kehret-Ward. Product designs and styles evolve the meaning of already-owned products and the perceptions of their owners are altered even though the products themselves and their owners have not changed. For instance, the domestic car owner who is perceived as successful, in part, because she drives a large automobile may be seen as indulgent or wasteful years later. In response to this shift of view, new models of the cars are downsized to emulate imported automobiles and improve fuel efficiency. Thus, neither the automobile nor the owner is an autonomous, un-arbitrary sign; each is a symbol made meaningful by its distinction from and relationship to competing symbols (Mick 1986:203) and these meanings and association change through agency and intentionality.

3.2.6

AGENCY AND STRUCTURATION

Shanks and Tilley were among the first archaeologists to explicitly elaborate an agency approach within archaeology: “individuals are competent and knowledgeable while at the same time their action is situated within unacknowledged conditions and has unintended consequences” (Shanks & Tilley 1987:116). They advocated that material culture should not be conceived of as a passive reflection of society but rather integral to creating and supporting those relationships. Material culture acts back, changing the ways in which they act, think and perceive. It restructures social practices, becoming a particularly effective medium through which to legitimate the social order (Shanks & Tilley 1992:133).

One possible form of understanding agency, arguably the dominant form of current archaeological thought, is through ‘structuration theory’, a term first coined by the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1979). Giddens’ structuration theory proposes that agency and structure are dialectically related (Dornan 2002:308), that ‘every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member’ (Giddens 1979:3). Social agents have their own goals and select strategies to achieve those goals, but they do so within a social structure. That structure, however, is not an external given but is rather constantly coming into being. It is constantly being reproduced and renegotiated through the many small actions of individuals and groups and there is a tendency for the agents to replicate the structure rather than transform it (Bernbeck 1999:91; Johnson 2006:122).

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Structure Rules and resources organised as properties of social systems. Structure only exists as ‘structural properties’.

System Reproduced relations between actors or collectivities,

organised as regular social practice.

Structuration Conditions governing the continuity or transformation of structures, and, therefore, the reproduction of systems.

Figure 3.3 Connections between the three concepts within structuration (Giddens 1979:66)

But agency is more than simply individuals exerting their will upon material culture and cultural systems. Agency is the material culture itself. Few ideas about the material world have provoked as much controversy as the notion that matter may have agency (Boivin 2008:129). We operate in a conceptual universe where objects have no independent life, where things have no meaning unless meaning is endowed upon them by human agency. But, are we detached from objects in which case we act upon them in a disinterested fashion as and when we choose, or are objects attached to us and as such are the components of what makes us act (Jones 2007:34)?

This aspect of agency theory is of particular relevance to archaeologists addressing the symbolic dimension of culture because it moves theory away from a concern with what goes on in people’s heads. Instead, the focus moves toward a concern with material culture, habits of living, and configurations of space as the media for social reproduction (McCall 1999:18). Artefacts ‘speak’ not so much because actors created them as ‘texts’ but because they are marked with the gestures and habits of their production and use, they are inscribed by the social process involved in their creation, employment and abandonment (McCall 1999:18). An example of the adoption of this method can be found in an analysis of objects made from animal remains and the roles they played in producing and transforming human bodies at the Early Mesolithic site of Star Carr (Conneller 2004). This is the standpoint that I take in the research here. Looking not at what the symbols mean as if I were merely interpreting a language or code, but rather how they were used for social reproduction and address their meaning through their function and agency.