Theoretical framework

What does this conclusion mean for my theoretical framework?

The prize which can be gained by winning or maintaining access to water differs highly according to the economic and societal situation. In Darfur having access to water makes survival possible for people living in harsh climatic conditions. In China access to water can mean the difference for a local administrator between stagnated economic conditions and rapid economic growth. The access to scarce water represents a certain value, but because of these different conditions between different societies, groups act according to their water goals. If a group becomes marginalized in society this powerless group can have no other option than violence. This violence might be triggered because otherwise the elite will redistribute the

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water to the disadvantage of the powerless group. Water scarcity might emphasize the impact of already existing societal differences in like ethnic cleavages and skewed distribution of land, wealth and/or power. But if groups were not politically or economically powerless in the first place they would have non-violent options to express their grievances.

Violence might also be triggered because water scarcity becomes water stress without the additional redistribution on which my hypothesis was based. In Darfur the powerless group did have access to water but was grieved about a lack of political rights. In China water is often not redistributed but polluted which harms the use of farmers but does not officially cut of farmers from water. My hypothesis that the elite will redistribute water to other groups in society therefore is incorrect.

In chapter 2 I stated the following about my hypothesis: The state is based on a coalition of different groups in society. For hierarchists to secure themselves with the base they need to maintain in power, they have to provide individualists/entrepreneurs with the income they demand. If a change in the base situation leads to scarcity, redistribution decision have to take into account how the hierarchists try to keep their base of power intact. As water resources become scarce, greed for the water will lead groups to try and attain as much of it as possible, herewith providing for their own income. As marginalized groups in society are faced with elites diverting the water, transitory tension within society arises. When the state is not receptive to the complaints of the marginalized farmers, no other option is left open to these farmers than conflict. In this way water scarcity can lead to conflict. With other words I describe how I thought water loot was going to be redistributed among supporters of the state and how the state would get into conflict with marginalized groups.

But the fact is that in Darfur and in China the water distribution decisions are not made based on which societal group supports the state the most. In Darfur the most bereft of water were the nomadic tribes who did support the central Sudanese government. They started harassing their neighbors because of land and water scarcity. Eventually the farmer tribes escalated the local conflict to a national level and the outcome was that the scarce water was redistributed to the nomadic tribes. But this redistribution happened after water scarcity led to conflict. The redistribution in itself did not lead to conflict.

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In China the redistribution of water to industry is mostly a way for the central government to attain the economic goals set for different local areas. The redistribution is not based on the fact that entrepreneurs/industrialists are more vehemently supporting the state, they are a way for the state to obtain their own goals. This means that my hypothesis about water considered as loot should be rejected. Water does not seem to be important enough for higher levels of government to redistribute. The total lack of water management exemplifies this. But it might be a trigger factor for local actors, the Janjaweed in Darfur expelling the farmer tribes and low level administrators available for bribing by entrepreneurs. Water can be a local cause for conflict because local actors might be greed driven for water. The central government does not really mind who gets the water, as long as the group is supportive of the central government. The farmer tribes in Darfur were and the local protesters in China are safe as long as they do not attack the central government. But on a local scale water can lead to greed driven conflict and the redistribution of water. The price the Janjaweed won because they fought the war for the Sudanese government was water rich territory. For local administrators in China a polluting factory can mean the difference between promotion or demotion. The main question for future research is which loot/rents can be extracted from water and how these rents interconnect with the outbreak of water conflict. How come the income generated by water is only important for local actors and not for higher government levels? And can the right government policy prevent these local conflicts from erupting? Because local actors can be driven by water greed and local conflicts therefore can be triggered by water scarcity. But can the water greed of local actors be prevented with the right institutions? I believe this is also the case on a local level. Even on a local level water can only lead to conflicts if other factors are contributing. For example, if I owned a piece of land in the Netherlands and an entrepreneur would want to build a factory next to my land, I would have other ways to express my grievances. If I was a farmer and expected that the factory would start polluting my water supply I would first protest with the local government about the building of the factory. Then if the factory was approved by government officials and indeed build, I would want to be financially compensated for my loss of income. If the factory was build and I was not compensated I would write the factory owner and the local government’s environmental agency about upgrading the factory’s water

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purification systems. And if that did not solve the polluting then I would sue the company in court. If all the above would not lead to a solution to my problem I would be severely frustrated and might turn violent. But I believe the Dutch government would not allow a polluting factory to take away my source of income without proper compensation. So before water redistribution turns violent people must not have any other option left to express their grievances. Therefore even if an actor on a local scale does need water for survival, even on a local scale the actor only turns violent if institutional quality is low.