Theoretical framework

When developing the theoretical framework for my research, I drew on grounded theory as I was attracted to this approach in terms of how it might help me to make sense of my data. This is not to say that I undertook a grounded theory study, adopting the methodology and methods rigidly from start to finish. Rather, I drew on aspects of grounded theory and adapted it to suit my aims of undertaking an interpretative study.

Grounded theory finds its roots in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, ‘inherited largely from John Dewey and George Mead’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 2). Symbolic interactionism focuses on the meanings human beings place on things, and the way in which this influences how they act and interact:

… human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that these things have for them […] the meaning of such things is derived from, and arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. (Blumer, 1969: 2)

It is through the ‘existence of symbols, like language’ that human beings are able to ‘give meanings to objects’ (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011: 20). Symbolic interactionists propose that it is through these symbols that a person can ‘become aware of the perceptions, feelings and attitudes of others and interpret their meanings and intent’ (Crotty, 2003: 75 – 76). Clearly, then, these ideas lend themselves to an interpretative study and resonate with the language of Weber’s theories (discussed above). Further, it suggests that interviews are an appropriate means of generating data since language is one of the symbols through which we might come to know the ‘perceptions,

feelings and attitudes’ (Crotty, 2003: 75) of others. However, some symbolic interactionists suggest that it is the ‘putting of oneself in the place of the other’ (Crotty, 2003: 75) that is important. Whilst I would agree that it is the ‘actor’s view of actions, objects and societies that has to be studied seriously’ (Psathas, 1973: 6 – 7), I am cautious about the extent to which it is possible for the observer to take the ‘role of the actor in the situation […] in order to see the social world from his perspective’ (Psathas, 1973: 6 – 7). This does not quite fit with an interpretative approach, since it removes the construction of meaning which the observer (or the researcher) engages in. Whilst we might come to know the perspective of the actor through the symbols they use, this is not the same as saying that we might see phenomena through their eyes. The interpretation of the symbols used has somehow been removed, leaving a ‘relatively naïve set of assumptions about how we come to know social phenomena’ (Mitchell, 1977: 115 – 116). Instead, I prefer the recognition of complexity and an acknowledgement of the challenges presented in coming to know the ‘actors’ perspectives’ (Strauss, 1993 cited in Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 7). Indeed since their perspectives and interactions are contingent on ‘their memberships in social worlds and subworlds’ (Strauss, 1993 cited in Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 7) it is important to recognise that these are ‘complex, overlapping, contrasting, conflicting, and not always apparent to other interactants’ (Strauss, 1993 cited in Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 7).

Grounded theory has taken many different forms since it was first ‘discovered’ by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Whist there are notable differences between each version, there are also commonalities. Strauss and Corbin (1994) describe grounded theory as a ‘general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 273). All versions of grounded theory tend to agree that ‘theory is emergent from data rather than predefined and tested’ (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011: 598). There is no hypothesis that is tested through the data, but rather it is through the data that theory emerges. However, what exactly is meant by theory and how is one to go about generating it? Hage (1972) defines theory as a ‘set of well-developed categories (themes, concepts) that

are systematically interrelated through statements of relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some phenomenon’ (Hage, 1972: 34 paraphrased in Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 55). The first part of this definition is relatively unproblematic and most grounded theorists seek to build themes and concepts from their data, linking them to build a theoretical framework. However, not all researchers would maintain that the end result ‘explains some phenomenon.’ Some would maintain that the end result is one possible explanation, whereas others would question whether an interpretative study should ever claim to be explanatory. My aims were of furthering understanding of the experiences of the participants. As such, any concepts or theories developed were in relation to the experiences of the participants. I did not set out to explain the phenomena of being long-term unemployed. Nevertheless, through gaining an understanding of the participants’ experiences, I was open to the possibility that their interpretation of their experiences might offer fresh insights.

I was conscious that I wanted my research to be robust analytically since it is only through proper analysis of the data that new insights might be gained. Further, I was aware that there are many researchers who apply the methods of grounded theory but end up with description rather than theory. Clearly this is problematic if they claim to have developed theory but only present description. Silverman (2000) critiques the work of researchers that ‘describe their data in terms of sets of categories which either reproduced participants’ categories or put a common-sense gloss upon them’ (Silverman, 2000: 288). For Silverman, such research lacks ‘analytic depth’ (Silverman, 2000: 288) and fails to ‘build useful social theories’ (Silverman, 2000: 288). Silverman suggests that it is the theoretical framework employed, along with ‘imagination’ (Silverman, 2000: 252) that prevents the researcher from using ‘common-sense interpretations’ (Silverman, 2000: 289). Yet it was clear to me from the outset how challenging it is to develop theory from data, especially if we are to accept that the grounded theorist embarks upon their research without knowing what they are going to find. Further, the use of the word ‘emerge’ in relation to theory is somewhat misleading, since it suggests that

the data will somehow offer up its meaning to the researcher, presenting a coherent theory which they might articulate.

Grounded theory is both methodology and method, and there are a number of guidelines, or techniques, which grounded theorists follow to aid them to tease meaning from data. These methods relate to both the way in which data is gathered and analysed. Grounded theorists use an approach known as theoretical sampling which ensures that ‘data are collected on an ongoing, iterative basis, and the researcher keeps on adding to the sample until she has enough data to describe what is going on in the context or situation under study’ (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011: 599). They do not, therefore, have a particular sample size in mind from the outset and neither do they know exactly what data they are going to gather. It is clear that this approach lends itself to a longitudinal study, such as the one undertaken in this research. Whilst theoretical sampling does not necessarily require multiple interactions with the same participants, meeting participants on more than one occasion certainly presented the opportunity to test out emerging themes and concepts. Further, in the case of this research, it encouraged me to analyse early in order that further sampling could be ‘responsive to the data’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 144). This meant that my analysis guided me to explore particular themes with participants, to return to ideas raised in previous interviews and to check my understandings with them. It also meant that I paid close attention to my own practice as a researcher, refining my interview technique and gaining an understanding of the importance of reflecting on each interaction.

I was initially drawn to grounded theory as I thought it might protect me from presupposition. Having worked with long-term unemployed 18 – 24 year olds, I was aware that I held pre-existing ideas and opinions. I was concerned about prejudice in my interpretations, or that I might end up looking for what I expected to be there. Grounded theory requires that the ‘matching of theory against data should be rigorously carried out’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1994: 273). This therefore seemed reassuring; perhaps it would prevent me from drawing conclusions, or suggesting theories, that did not have a solid

grounding in the data gathered. Over time, however, I came to realise that these intentions were somewhat naïve. Further, these aims seemed to imply that I could come to know the experiences of my participants in some kind of objective way. This did not fit with the aims of my study, and I realised that there was a danger that I could fail to position myself in relation to the research undertaken.

In addition to grounded theory, I was also influenced by ideas related to constructionism since it allows for the possibility that ‘meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views’ (Creswell, 2007: 20). I found social constructionism of particular interest, with its emphasis on ‘the hold our culture has on us: it shapes the way in which we see things (even the way in which we feel things!) and gives us a quite definite view of the world’ (Crotty, 2003: 58). Meaning, according to the social constructionist, is ‘negotiated socially and historically [it is formed …] through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives’ (Creswell, 2007: 21). This is in some ways reassuring since it offers a framework for the way in which meaning is constructed; it limits the otherwise infinite possible meanings that might be forged by the individual mind. However, it is also potentially restrictive since the individual must, necessarily, be constrained by their own culture. This has implications for the researcher since the meanings they construct will inevitably be socially and historically situated within their own culture. What if this culture is different from that of their participants? Does it matter that social constructionism has the potential to create multiple layers of meaning? It is through the constructivist grounded theory of Kathy Charmaz that I feel these questions are addressed effectively.

Charmaz’s grounded theory takes a ‘reflexive stance on modes of knowing and representing studied life’ (Charmaz, 2005: 509). It moves grounded theory away from Glaser’s version of grounded theory which Charmaz (2005) suggests had an ‘objectivist cast with its emphases in logic, analytical procedures, comparative methods […] and assumptions of an external but discernible world, unbiased observer and discovered theory’ (Charmaz, 2005: 509). Constructivist grounded theory, by contrast, gives ‘close attention to

empirical realities and our collective renderings of them – and locating oneself in these realities’ (Charmaz, 2005: 509). It does not assume that ‘impartial observers enter the research scene without an interpretative frame of reference’ (Charmaz, 2009: 509). This does not mean that as a researcher our findings are entirely dictated by our own position. If this was the case, there would be little value in gaining empirical evidence. I would therefore agree that ‘what we know shapes, but does not necessarily determine, what we ‘find’ ’ (Charmaz, 2005: 511). Crucially, constructivist grounded theorists also make different assumptions about the nature of data, recognising that it does not ‘simply await discovery’ (Charmaz, 2009: 509) but rather that ‘we share in constructing what we define as data [and that our…] conceptual categories arise through our interpretations of data rather than emanating

from them’ (Charmaz, 2005: 509). From this perspective, ‘our theoretical

analyses are interpretative renderings of a reality, not objective reportings of it’ (Charmaz, 2005: 510).