Theories of source control

This section addresses theory and practice in two main areas of source control:

development-oriented and law enforcement approaches. In each instance, a roughly chronological overview of developments in theory and practice is followed by a section outlining key problems. In practice, the two areas overlap because, in a cost-benefit formulation of these strategies, development assistance equates roughly to benefits and punishment equates roughly to costs. Hence, the strategic manipulation of these costs and benefits (which include psychological and other elements in addition to monetary

costs and benefits) is the overarching theoretical framework within which this discussion takes place.

2.3.1. Development-Orientated Approaches (DOA)

DOA¹ to drug control are centred upon a perception that illicit production is ‘closely linked to development problems’ (Berg, 2003:4). While the beginnings of DOA are often traced to projects administered in early-1970s Turkey (Chouvy, 2009) or Thailand (Pleumpamya, 2009) there is documented evidence relating to India and Iran that DOA has been around for a minimum of well over a century. Fairly sophisticated DOA were undertaken in India in the late-nineteenth-century after Chinese competition pushed legally produced, but illicitly exported, Indian opium from the market. While there was no opium ban improved transport infrastructures allowed farmers to grow bulkier and more perishable crops and the Government of India began to diversify its exports thus creating markets for alternative crops (Windle, 2011).

During the mid-1920s, a League of Nations Commission was sent to Iran to investigate opium production. The Commission suggested a 15 percent increase in the yield of certain crops would make them as profitable as opium and they recommended:

teaching modern agricultural techniques; re-establishing the silk industry; increasing trade with neighbours; and a gradual reduction in opium production after development projects had begun (Delano, 1926; League of Nations, 1926). This said, a lack of foreign support or funding prevented inauguration (League of Nations, 1927).

In the early-1970s, the UN supported its first DODCP with the administration of

‘crop substitution’ projects in Thailand and Pakistan. The projects were centred upon finding crops that could compete with opium in terms of agricultural and economic viability. The underlying theory is relatively straightforward: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce the cultivation of illicit crops when provided with agriculturally viable alternatives. UN experience and resources were, however, limited (UNDCP, 1993) and project workers were often ignorant of local cultures and traditions (Bruun et al., 1975): they seldom included the target populations in design and administration (Renard, 2001). Several potential substitute crops were identified but by the mid-1970s, it had become apparent that projects would require significant supporting infrastructure. In particular, adequate processing, transportation and

1 The GTZ define their organisational approach as ‘development-orientated drug control’ (Berg, 2003). The term is used here to catch the diversity across approaches centred upon incentives rather than disincentives. The term could, however, be perceived as contrary to AL theories which argue that development should not be orientated by reducing drug production.

marketing of new or improved crops proved to be fundamentally necessary conditions if substitute crops were to produce any income (UNDCP, 1993; also Berg, 2003b;

Mansfield, 1999; Renard, 2001).

In the late-1970s in Thailand and the early-1980s in Pakistan, crop substitution gradually gave way to ‘integrated rural development’. These projects placed greater emphasis on: facilitating marketing by constructing transport infrastructures, processing and storage facilities; generating off-farm employment and extending social welfare (i.e.

healthcare and education) (UNDCP, 1993). The underlying theory had developed to become thus: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if provided with alternatives that were agriculturally and economically viable. Theory aside, projects were often poorly designed, and a key source of problems was held to be the exclusion of local populations (the farmers and their local community) from project planning and implementation (UNODCCP, 2000).

In the 1990s, the theory of crop substitution was superseded by that of ‘Alternative Development’ (AD)² (Renard, 2001). UNGA (1998:preamble) define AD as

‘specifically designed rural development’ with the primary objective of suppressing and preventing illicit crop production. Poverty reduction was a secondary objective. AD projects should be culturally, legally, socially, economically and ecologically specific to the project area and contribute to the promotion of democratic values. Thus, target populations are included in project design and administration.³ Additionally, projects should extend demand reduction and addiction treatment services (UNGA, 1998:para 18; see UNODC, 2009). Here, articulation of the underlying theory is a more complex task: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if they have ownerships of (i.e. involved in the design and implementation) economic alternatives, which can include but are not limited to agricultural activities that significantly enhance the welfare of both the individual and the community as a whole. Nevertheless, it is also clear that in some instances drug control was a secondary objective to more general economic development. In that context, the underlying theory is that illicit cultivation would be reduced as a side-effect of general economic development.

These apparent developments in theory and practice have taken place mainly in the last four decades. Mansfield (2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005) has criticised AD

2 The term is criticised by Mansfield and Sage (1997) as misleadingly implying that drug crops support development.

3 The utility of target population participation had been illustrated by scholars of development studies in the early-1980s (Renard, 2001).

projects for: often consisting of little more than crop substitution; being unconnected to national development objectives and administered by drug control agencies that possess no comparative advantage for the delivery of effective development. These weaknesses and the growing knowledge base of what motivates opium farmers as individuals or communities rather than a homogeneous transnational group (see Atkins, 1996;

Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 1999, 2007b; Mansfield et al., 2006; Potulski, 1991, 1992;

Smith, 1992; Ward et al., 2008; chapters in Bennett et al., 1992) resulted in the formation of the ‘Alternative Livelihoods’ (AL) model.

In AL, ‘the structural and institutional factors that shape... [farmers’] decisions to grow’ (Youngers and Walsh, 2010:11) are purportedly addressed. Thus, increasing state legitimacy in production areas (Armenta et al., 2010) and building a foundation for sustainable reductions (Brown et al., 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2008) are key elements of the AL approach. It is also intended that AL projects are administered by development practitioners and supported by advice from drug control experts on what drives opium farmers (Mansfield, 2007). As development is the primary objective, rather than a means to reduce opium production (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; see Youngers and Walsh, 2010; Vargas, 2005), projects are ‘mainstreamed’ into national or local development strategy (Byrd, 2010; EC et al., 2008; Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield et al., 2006; Ward and Byrd, 2004; Ward et al., 2008; Youngers and Walsh, 2010). For example, drug control might dovetail with the strengthening of state institution (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Youngers, 2010; World Bank, 2005) or conflict resolution (Byrd, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2006). In this framework, illicit crop output should be one of several measures of success (Mansfield and Pain, 2008) and conditionality should be based on multiple development targets rather than drug control (Mansfield et al., 2006).

As such, AL resembles more traditional rural development projects, with the addition of

‘sequenced law enforcement’ when appropriate (World Bank, 2005:122).

Apparently ‘new’ AL concepts such as mainstreaming have been around for some time. ‘Mainstreaming’ was proposed by academics (Bruun et al., 1975; Der Meer, 1987) and practised by the Thai Royal Family in the 1970s (Renard, 2009; Pan and Bruun, 1979). Institutional change was part of BMZ (2004; also Berg, 2002) AD projects during the 1990s and had been advocated by academics (Lee, 1991; Riley, 1996). The significance of AL may be as a progression of nuance; each theory has fine-tuned the previous.