“When everything is said and done, troops will only be prepared to risk their lives if they feel, not merely in their brains but in the marrow of their bones, that their cause is just.”268
The seven criteria are presented here in three categories: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. These divisions are designed so that ethical issues associated with distinct phases of warfare can be focused on separately.269 However, as a theory of ethically justified private intervention, all seven criteria will be considered together as elements of a contract between a principal and agent. The criteria that make up the theory are summarized in Table 2, including test questions to help determine whether or not the criteria are satisfied:
266 Steinhoff, “Ethics and Mercenaries,” 142.
267 Karen DeYoung, , Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Knopf, 2006), 402.
268 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 190.
269 Orend, The Morality of War, 105.
Criterion Test
Right Authority Does the intervener possess local external effectiveness: an ability to end the crisis?
Just Cause Is there proof of crimes against humanity? Is the intervention a response to physical violence?
Right Intention Is there a humanitarian-based end state?
Discrimination
Does the agent discriminate between permissible and impermissible targets? Are there attempts to mitigate the effects of collateral damage?
Proportionality
Are there formal Rules of Engagement (ROE)? Are employees trained in the use of aimed, proportionate fire, and appropriate weapons systems for threat
After hostilities cease, is there a planned transfer of authority to either another agent of the principal or to a public authority, such as the UN?
Table 2. Summary of the criteria that make up the theory of ethically justified private intervention
Most scholars recommend that prior to the privatization of any military operation a solid system of regulation must be in place.270 Apart from the existing licensing mechanisms, conventions, and codes of conduct already in place, this is unlikely to be feasible. Using this theory as a guideline, ethically justified private intervention is possible. In the case studies that follow, three cases will be analyzed, bearing in mind actual events and using counterfactuals, to test the theory and help refine it further.
270 Schreier and Caparini, “Privatising Security,” 134–140; Steinhoff, “Ethics and Mercenaries,” 148;
Hedahl, “Blood and Blackwaters,” 25.
VI. CASE STUDIES
Cases of humanitarian intervention missions carried out solely by private forces are almost nonexistent. In fact, significant cases of tip-of-the-spear intervention of any type by PMCs are rare. Percy suggests that there are only three: Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone, Sandline in Papua New Guinea (PNG), and EO in Angola.271 The first two of these are used here; the last case, EO in Angola, is not included because the main actors are almost all the same as in the EO in Sierra Leone case and would not provide sufficient variance for a meaningful comparison. Furthermore, the case of EO in Sierra Leone more closely resembles a humanitarian mission, due to the unparalleled savagery demonstrated by the enemy in that conflict. In contrast, the case of Sandline in PNG could not be characterized as a humanitarian mission at all. This case is presented as it occurred, but in the analysis counterfactuals are presented that help refine the conditions under which an ethical intervention could have happened. The final case is concerned with the Rwanda genocide; it is purely humanitarian, and the intervention is purely counterfactual. It is unique in that a PMC was not hired by any entity to intervene, and since it provides the impetus for this thesis in many ways, it is uniquely suited as a case study. The Rwanda case represents the archetypical scenario under which a PMC seems to be most appropriate, and therefore, it will also be used as a thought experiment to help refine the conditions under which an ethical intervention could have happened. To help with the feasibility of the counterfactual, a previously studied PMC will be used as the notional intervention force: EO. As opposed to using the Angola case, the use of EO in a theoretical intervention in Rwanda is meaningful; this PMC had a plan for an intervention and the available assets at the time of the genocide. Furthermore, this case presents an opportunity to consider a unique principal not previously encountered—the altruistic individual with the resources to employ a private army.
The three cases presented here were selected based on: data richness, extreme values on the values of the IVs, large within-case variance on the values of the IVs, the
271 Percy, Mercenaries, 217.
idea that predictions made by competing theories disagree with the hypothesized outcome, their similarity to current policy issues, the relative similarity of case background conditions, their suitability for comparison with other cases, and their fundamental importance.272 The central hypothesis of the theory of ethically justified private intervention is that under certain conditions, humanitarian intervention carried out by a private force, such as a PMC, is permissible. The IVs in this study are the seven criteria that make up the theory of ethically justified private intervention presented in Chapter V; the SV is the permissibility of the case as an ethical intervention using a PMC. It is not necessary to predict the value of the SV in these cases because it is already known based on the historical outcome. However, as discussed in Chapter I, if the value of an IV is determined to be false, counterfactual conditions will be used to help formulate conditions under which the variable would change to true. A summary of the cases, some selected variables, and the known outcome is presented in Table 3.
Case Humanitarian? PMC Principal Outcome –
Permissible?
Other prominent cases, such as MPRI in Croatia, Keenie Meanie in Sri Lanka, or any of the companies that were present in Iraq, are important but not suitable for this
272 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 77–88.
273 Revolutionary United Front 274 Bougainville Revolutionary Army
study.275 These companies did not provide direct intervention services; in fact, they could not rightly be classified as PMCs. They would be more appropriately described as PSCs, since their products are dominantly training and security. Blackwater’s tasking in Iraq was mainly personal security details (PSDs), to include the individuals involved in the Nisour Square incident in which seventeen people were unjustly killed.276 They were not paid to conduct independent operations against a determined enemy, unlike EO in Sierra Leone and Sandline in PNG, as the following sections will illustrate.
A. THE NEW CORPORATE WARRIORS: EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES IN