Theory vs Metatheory: 1922

Early Hilbert’s attempt at a proof of the consistency of mathematics employed a proto-proof theory. The attempt at a positive proof examined the structure of the proofs, defined a purely syntactic property (heterogeneity), and demonstrated first that any contradiction had this property and second that no proposition with this property could result within the proof system (§3.1.2). It was vulnerable to a Poincar´ean style objection because the system lacked a formalized differentiation between reasoning donewiththe symbols and reasoning doneabout the symbols them- selves. A semantic/syntactic distinction was absent, as was differentiation between the object language and the proof theoretic language.

In 1922, Hilbert made this distinction. He introduced the object level, in which there were only the ‘number-signs’ that “are themselves the object our consideration, but otherwise they have no meaning [Bedeutung] of any sort” [31, p. 29]. The formal system is restricted at first to definitions of formulas, signs, and the length of signs. As an example of the sort of proof possible in such a limited system, Hilbert gives a sketch of a proof of the statement ‘a+b = b+a’ for any strings a and b. By so restricting the system, Hilbert confidently claims, “. . . no contradictions of any sort

are possible. We simply have concrete signs, objects, we operate with them, and we make contentual [inhaltliche] statements about them”[31, p. 31].9 _{Though this}

restricted system cannot prove much, it provides the basis to which the addition of axioms allows Hilbert a derivation of arithmetic.

However, the introduction of any new axioms immediately requires a proof of those axioms’ consistency. The way that Hilbert endeavors to perform such a proof is by

mov[ing] to a higher level of contemplation, from which the axioms, for- mulae, and proofs of the mathematical theory are themselves the objects of a contentual investigation. But for this purpose the usual contentual ideas of the mathematical theory must be replaced by formulae and rules, and imitated by formalisms. . . and at the same time it becomes possible to draw a sharp and systematic distinction in mathematics between the formulae and formal proofs on the one hand, and the contentual ideas on the other [31, p.33]

Postponing a full discussion of the contentual/formal contrast until §3.2.4, these two terms for the time being should be read as shorthand for ‘having some meaning’ and ‘pure manipulations of symbols’.10 _{Hilbert not only differentiates the subject}

matter of the theory and the metatheory, he also differentiates between the type of reasoning that takes place in each. The subject matter of the theory is solely composed of the basic symbols. It is the instantiation or application of axioms to form proofs.

9_{Note the use ofinhaltlicheeven in this early paper. There will be numerous uses of the contrast—}

particularly in the following quotation—throughout the next three sections, but discussion of this distinction will be postponed until§3.2.4

10_{I do not want to impute to Hilbert the sort of formalism wit which he is often labeled , something}

akin to thinking that mathematics is simply a game that one plays with symbols devoid of meaning. In fact, the inclarity with which he uses the terms ‘contentual’ and ‘formal’ suggests his reluctance to accept that particular view of mathematics. In particular, I think that Hilbert wants to say that the operations in the object language arepurely formal insofar as they have no given content. However, in reading them and doing the manipulations, I can impute some content or meaning to the proof, even if it lacks that “official” meaning. For example, when I prove that ‘a+b=b+a’ in the object language, it has no meaning. What I have shown is merely something about strings. However, I might whisper to a student who is not understanding, “Pssst, what I’m doing here is proving the commutativity of addition of integers.” In this way, I canthink or reasoncontentually about purely formal notions.

Reasoning within this object language is wholly and completely determined by the axioms and is solely the manipulation of eligible objects according to given rules. In contrast, Hilbert has as the subject matter of the metatheory those very things that are taking place in the object language: proofs, formulae, and axioms. Reasoning in the metatheory has content since it is about something, whereas object language manipulations are uninterpreted and purely syntactic. This distinction is brought out explicitly by Hilbert:

To reach our goal[of proving the consistency of the axioms in the object language], we must make the proofs as such the object of our investigation; we are thus compelled to a sort of proof theory which studies operations with the proofs themselves. For concrete-intuitive number theory, which we treated first, the numbers were the objectual and the displayable, and the proofs of theorems about the numbers fell into the domain of the thinkable. In our present investigation, proof itself is something concrete and displayable; the contentual reflections follow the proofs themselves [31, 59, emphasis in original].11

The purpose of the metatheory, or as Hilbert calls it the ‘metamathematics’, is to prove the consistency of the axioms in the object language. Thus, he envision the process of deriving mathematics as a two step cycle. Step 1 is to derive provable for- mulas within the object language using the existing axioms. This first step provides the desired mathematical results. However, once the fruitful results of the current set of axioms are exhausted, proceed to Step 2, which adds new axioms to the already existing axioms and proves their consistency via metamathematical means. Having proven the new axioms’ consistency, Step 1 begins again to obtain more mathemat- ically fruitful results. Once all the necessary axioms are introduced, the whole of arithmetic is a consequence.

By explicitly bifurcating the theory and the metatheory, Hilbert has a potential response to the Poincar´ean style objection of circularity. To the charge that he em-

ploys induction in the proof of the consistency of the axioms (on of which is induction itself), Hilbert could reply that because the purported consistency proof is done in the metatheory, the principle of induction employed is metatheoretical rather than theoretical. Metatheoretical induction is utterly different from the formal principle of induction. Hence, Poincar´e’s objection is defanged. On the face of it, this rebuttal seems effective and complete. However, this efficacy will become our topic later in section §3.3.