The priopriological distinction proposed here is defined by two modes or senses of ―possession‖ or ―being-proper-to‖. As for the definition of ―ontic possession‖, this is relatively straight forward: S possesses ontically whatever takes S as its metaphysical subject. Such an expression seems to resist further analysis, beyond specifying what ―takes S as its metaphysical subject‖ means roughly (something like: is a component, determination or property of S). ―Dynamical possession‖, however, calls for more thought. In this section, a preliminary reading or explanation of this notion is offered, by invoking different modes of being or phases of actuality. This reading of dynamical possession is non-committal in respect to the propriological distinction (the latter is neither implied nor excluded).
Turning to Smith and Leibniz first, one can distinguish between two stages of actuality when it comes to the ―force‖ component of the agent-monad. It would appear that the force enfolded into the body of the monad originally, could not possibly be given its tension by some act of the monad. For the innate tension of ―force‖ is supposed to be sufficient in enabling the monad as an agent to begin with (this does not exclude the efficacy of God in endowing the monad with this force in the first place). The tension that already lies in (or which simply is) the force-component is the pre-supposition of the monad‘s acting, and in
that sense cannot be ―actualised‖ by the monad. However, it does not seem problematic to say that on this basis, the monad brings its force into expression. On this evaluation, while the monad-agent cannot possibly be responsible for the primal tension of its force- component—or in other words, for its own virtuality or being-in-tension—it is responsible for the expressive actuality of its force. That is to say, the monad-agent brings itself (its virtuality) into expressive actuality, but is not responsible for the enabling presence of what it brings into expression. To hazard a definition, then: to say that the monad ―dynamically‖
191 possesses its force-component is to say that the monad is responsible for the expressive actuality of that force whenever it occurs (and for as long as it occurs, see below).46
Positing a certain ―dynamic interval‖ between virtuality and actuality, or between tension and expression, seems unavoidable here. It was just argued that an entity cannot bring into being that (tensile) state-of-affairs which is said to be the presupposition of its acting.47 And yet if an entity cannot bring about a new48 state-of-affairs in any sense—not even by mediating a higher principle—then it can hardly be called an ―agent‖ (note again that immanent agency, not transitive agency, is the primary focus here). Taken together, these two observations lead one to conclude that there is one mode of being in the agent that the agent does not enact (since this mode of being is the presupposition, since it is/provides the dynamic origin, of its activity), and another mode of being that the agent does enact (or which is its activity). Such a difference is what is signified in the contrast between ―virtuality and actuality‖ or between ―tension and expression‖.
Note that this ―dynamic interval‖ was not arrived at by introducing a propriological distinction. This interval already appears once it is asked how it might be possible for an entity to act, where it is granted that the formal principle of its agency is an ontic component of that entity, as per the Smith/Leibniz paradigm. However, on the basis of this, one can usefully define ―dynamical possession‖ more generally as follows. The dynamical possession of a formal principle of agency F by a creature S, denotes that S is responsible (in a sense that does not yet imply intelligence or freedom) for the actual expression of F in S, when such
46 See §6.10. below.
47 This is related to a well-known Scholastic principle. See David L. Schindler, ―Agere Sequitur Esse: What Does It Mean?
A Reply to Father Austriaco‖ in Communio 32 (2005), 795-824. ―The plain meaning of the Thomistic axiom … is that agere sequituresse [he puts sequitur in bold]: acting follows—is thus (ontologically) consequent upon, and just so far distinct (not separate) from—being. On a proper reading of the Thomistic axiom, in other words, being is the cause of acting (even as being appears in its acting); and acting is the effect of being (even as it is being that acting manifests)‖ (804). Schindler‘s emphasis. See also Aristotle, Metaphysica Θ. 3, against the Megarian view that abilities exist only when they are in action.
192 occurs. From now on, ―actuality‖ and ―act‖ shall be used to denote only this ―second stage‖ perfection for which the subject as agent is said to be responsible.
As promised, this formula is neutral as to whether F is taken as (1) an ontic component or as (2) an indwelling ―other‖ instead. According to this formula, a creature can be said to be responsible for the expression of F without being responsible for the innate tension of F; this does not change according to whether we think F ontically or non-ontically. Indeed, this general formula is even able to accommodate the case in which (3) F and S are really identical (at least if S is allowed to mean any agent, complex or simple). Thus it is allowed that even God is not responsible for the innate tension of his divine nature, by which he brings himself (eternally) into expression. Here God is still understood to possess dynamically the formal principle of his agency; this does not appear to conflict with the Thomistic claim that the formal principle of God‘s agency is not really distinct from God,49 not even in the weaker sense where F is an ontic component.