2. Two genealogies of experimentation
2.5 Third-wave makerspaces: Mainstreamed for many makers
The third wave of makerspaces has manifested itself through an accumulation of new kinds of spaces calling themselves a variety of monikers, from fab labs to design studios, which aim to draw in more diverse participants who do not
necessarily self-define as hackers. In 2016, user-reported data revealed over 1,400 spaces that called themselves makerspace around the world, 14 times as many as in 2006 (Lou and Peek 2016). Third-wave makerspaces can also be defined by their overtly apolitical styling. Instead of focusing their energies on critiques of
capitalism or the cultivation of hacker subjectivities, they promote making as a meaningful leisure activity, a way to leave politics at the door through the
da e e gage e (Davies 2018, 171) of personal projects.
In order to foster a maker mindset (makerspaces.com 2015, n.p.), the technical affordances of third-wave spaces are typically quite varied, ranging from high tech
ch a 3D i e , CNC achi e a d a e c e , a d ech a e ia like sewing machines and crafting supplies, and many of these sites also focus on the provision of educational programmes for young people. By disseminating deliberately vague discourses about the power of aki g , ake c e and a
ake e e , third-wave sites also aim to democratise making by
distinguishing themselves from their radical roots (Meehan, Gravel, and Shapiro 2014). These evolving discourses can be seen in a 2016 study which found a sharp increase in web searches for the term makerspace while searches f hackerspace declined (Voigt, Suero Montero, and Menichinelli 2016). Sites that call themselves
ake ace have been especially popular in the U.K., where over 100 such sites were found in a 2015 census by the innovation foundation Nesta (Nesta 2015).
In positioning third-wave makerspaces as catalysts for economic and social progress, proponents of contemporary maker cultures argue that making, like public participation in museums, empowers individuals by democratising access to knowledge and other assets. These developments have led to claims of a united, c he e Make M e e ha i b i gi g ab a e i d ia e i which i e e e he a f g ba i a i (Anderson 2012, 2; Brand 2013, n.p.). As Make magazine founder Dale Dougherty (2013, 12) put it in the much-ci ed iece The Make Mi d e hich ca ed f a Maker Movement for children in libraries and schools: "Whether it is figuring out what you can do with a 3D printer or an autonomous drone aircraft, makers are exploring what these things ca d [ ] f ha ce e e ge e idea , hich a ead ea -world applications or new business ventures. Making is a source of innovation."
Makerspace evangelists like Dougherty claim that making can inspire everyday people to become prosumers, or consumers who create. The puritanical roots of the American maker movement in particular has been discussed by Fred Turner in his account of key ake ace di h e c age ake ei agi e
themselves as creators, as entrepreneurs, as innovators in the mould of Elon Musk and Steve Jobs (2018, S165). These assertions are disseminated through widely-read publications like D ghe Make magazine, hich i f ded b O Rei
Media, the Silicon Valley publishing empire that he co-founded in 1975 with Tim O Rei . O Rei Media a Maker Faire, a network of local events which can draw crowds of over 100,000 in science-fair style settings. 400 such events have been organised around the world since 2012; the White House in the U.S. held its first in 2014 during the Barack Obama administration19.
Assumptions that current-day maker cultures originated from the ideas of a few American technology moguls, however, obstruct the heterogeneities of making practices in other historical and regional contexts, and the fact that articulations of
ake c e a widely by nation (Braybrooke and Jordan 2017). In China, for example, where shanzhai20 or copyleft culture is a key influencer of maker cultures, the term aki g c e i a i , c ea i i a d a b i e i d e a narrative that was crafted by makers themselves to distinguish their practices from those of 黑客 hacki g , which has been used to describe more illicit activities (T. Saunders and Kingsley 2016).
Where assertions about the value of fostering making cultures have been picked up by national governments, the discourse has tended to instrumentalise making as an enabler of entrepreneurial subjectivities. The White House has explained that its motivation in hosting a Maker Faire was to e ab e a a i f ake b
f e [i g] he de e e f ad a ced a fac i g i he U i ed S a e a d e a d[i g] he e ce a ai ab e f g ake a d ake e e e e (Obama White House 2014, n.p.). The U.K. government, meanwhile, published a policy guidance21 on makerspaces in libraries in 2018, and makerspaces also featured in the U.K. Digital Strategy in 2017. Much of the focus of governmental, business and third sector attention on making also comes from the belief that fostering digital skills in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics) subjects will promote economic development and address what is efe ed a he digi a di ide b de c a i i g acce e ech gie .
19 The Whi e H e ha e ai ed i i a i e ab e a a i f ake h gh hi e e b f e [i g] he de e e f ad a ced a fac i g i he U i ed S a e a d e a d[i g] the resources a ai ab e f g ake a d ake e e e e (Obama White House 2014).
20 Originally a term used to describe mountain bandits who opposed the government, shanzhaism has become its own philosophy centered on rapid iteration, mass production of counterfeit goods, open sharing and copycat culture. I have discussed shanzhaism in Asia at greater length elsewhere (Braybrooke and Jordan 2017).
21 Thi a ic a g ida ce, hich a da ed 18 Se e be 2018, a i e b he UK g e e Libraries Taskforce, which reports regularly to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).
Another way that third-wave spaces proliferate a maker subjectivity is through temporary techno-social gatherings (TTGs), or community events that are
generally referred to as hackathons, pop-ups or workshops (Braybrooke, Damiani, and Philip Sage 2018). TTGs are important for third-wave spaces because they introduce making practices to new groups in such a way that they are gradually mainstreamed. By introducing a challenge to be solved with digital tools and approaches over a few hours or days, TTGs promote the use of rapid design and development approaches while fostering ephemeral maker networks. As a result of their intensive collocation, or physical co-presence (Trainer and et al 2016), issue-oriented TTGs in particular have been found to address social concerns through material participation (Lodato and DiSalvo 2016). In doing so, it can be argued that they bring a modicum of first-wave politics back into third-wave making. However, it has also been argued that TTGs are more successful at producing neoliberal subjects than socially productive technologies, reinforcing a wider orientation in maker cultures toward the kinds of profit-driven, entrepreneurial values that originate from Silicon Valley, where the hackathon itself was also conceived (Cardullo, Kitchin, and Di Feliciantonio 2018; Irani 2015).
Build Brighton is an example of a typical third-wave space. It was formed in 2009 in collaboration with Mitch Altman, a famous hacker from the Noisebridge
hackspace in San Francisco, and helped organise the first Maker Faire in the U.K.
The space is careful to remain apolitical for "pragmatic" (A. Smith et al. 2013, 113) reasons, preferring to focus on promoting a supportive community that demystifies digital technologies. Like many other third-wave spaces, it has also recently chosen to cha ge i a e f hack ace ake ace , i an effort to distance its practices from what it sees as the more negative connotations of hacker culture (Build Brighton 2017).