represented the triumph of a code of international behaviour that Nkrumah believed to be irrelevant to African conditions. Article III upheld the principles of the sovereign equality of African states, of non-intervention in the domestic
affairs of other countries, and of "respect for the sovereign and territorial integrity of each state and for its
inalienable right to independent existence." Henceforth, the colonial frontiers were to be recognised as unalterable national boundaries - an idea explicitly rejected in Ghana's I960 Constitution. The rights of individual states were accepted as more important than the future of the Pan-African community or a "revolutionary" alliance of peoples.
The Charter provided a stable framework for the conduct of inter-African relations, a hope for order and freedom from foreign intervention, and a challenge to the prevailing balance of power in southern Africa. It did not assure future progress towards the political union of Africa. That goal had seemed appealing to too few. While the
francophone states looked to the OAU to "normalise" politics in Africa, radicals of Ben Bella's stamp saw it as the tool of a single purpose: total de-colonisation. From the Charter that resulted, it appeared that the "functionalists" had won. Pan-Africanists of the old stamp would now have to decide whether it was possible to exercise effective pressure from within the new organisation, or whether they would have to reject it in favour of some alternative instrument.
feigned enthusiasm. Only through self-delusion could he have believed what he said at the signing of the Charter:
"An African continental government is on the horizon."1^ Two days later, meeting the Press at the Accra airport, he continued to stress the positive outcome of the conference. He found most praise for the fact that the OAU had outlawed in principle all lesser political groupings. "The existing
y\ o
blocs in Africa have come to an end." This was at least a fresh start, and it seemed that Nkrumah was not going to sabotage the new organisation before it had been tested thoroughly.
The new organisation was lauded in Ghana’s Press.
One editorialist headed his article "Osagyefo's Dream Comes 19
True", y while another wrote that "Today, African unity is achieved. Free Africa has created a fortress against the pestilence of neo-colonialism. Today, Ghana has particular
20
reason to be proud of the leadership of Osagyefo."
Even the extremist party newspaper hailed the Addis meeting as "the new voice of Africa" : "civilised" because it
accepted U.N. conventions, "militant" because it called for immediate de-colonisation and the abolition of apartheid, "progressive" because it saw the raison d'etre of African
21
governments in social welfare. The Nigerian Press, in contrast, hinted at hidden reefs. One Lagos Journalist
17 New York Times 26/5/63 18 Evening News 28/5/63 19 Evening News 27/5/63 20 Ghanaian Times 27/5/63 21 The Spark 31/5/63
warned of the malefic ambitions of those who thought of the Charter as "hot air" and were "already planning to destroy whatever may be the prospects this Charter spells out."22
The first murmurs of dissent actually came from the francophone bloc. Early in June, Kami Allialy, foreign Minister-designate of Ivory Coast, claimed that it would be wrong to abolish the UAM and the OAMCE because of what had been achieved in Addis. "What already exists, should continue to exist as it could serve as an example to the newly-formed organisation which we have just realised. However, this is my viewpoint in regard to what some Heads of State say about the 'disappearance' of other organisations in Africa. I do not know what my Head of State is thinking about this. Psychologically, what already exists should
2d
remain." Here was word from Houphouet-Boigny, through a convenient semi-official mouthpiece, that the "existing blocs" might not come to an end as abruptly as Nkrumah had opinioned. The Western Press appeared to agree.
Thus, The New York Times speculated that the Charter would soon be forgotten, and that Africa would relapse into the
24
old rivalries; The Guardian observed that the OAU was 2S
"in no way meant for action". v
22 Nigerian Morning Post 28/5/63
23 The African Chronicler Vol. 1, No. 4. 24 New York Times 27/5/63
25 The Guardian 26/5/63« Compare the response of Radio Moscow which saw Addis as "the only correct line" (The African Chronicler Vol. 1, No. 6.).
On June 21, the Ghanaian National Assembly ratified the Charter. In his speech before Parliament, Nkrumah
was still optimistic about the OAU's constructive potential, claiming that areas of mutual co-operation were now "wide enough" to lead to continental union. In the same speech, however, he made a statement radically at variance with the Charter's insistence on state sovereignty as the fundament for inter-African relations. Obviously inspired by the developing critique of "neo-colonialism", Nkrumah spoke of two kinds of freedom fighters: those operating in territories still under colonial rule, and "those who consider that they have a duty to fight in order to strengthen the independence of their countries where colonial rule has been overthrown but where it is still necessary to create conditions for the welfare of the people and for the elimination of neo-colonial
26
interference and influence." This amounted to an apology for the programme of subversion that Nkrumah was already practising, and was bound to bring him into conflict with Article III of the Charter.
The OAU Council of Ministers met in Dakar early in August. Kwesi Armah made a speech on Nkrumah's behalf in which he returned to the demand that political and diplomatic
157
union be put on the agenda. He criticised the Council for inaction in the most vital areas of common concern, and castigated the survival of political blocs and the movement
27
towards East African federation. This trend in East Africa, he suggested, gave "ample evidence of something vital lacking in our organisation." In a second speech, delivered on
August 8, Armah called for the preparation of a Constitution
28
for a Union Government of Africa. Ghana continued to play her well-established role as the megaphone for Pan-African unionists. Nothing came of Armah's proposals.
In October, 1965? the OAU had its first chance to prove its mettle as a framework for mediating disputes between
African Governments. Border-fighting between Algeria and Morocco was arbitrated by Ghana, Ethiopia - and the Arab
29
League and Iraq. The intervention of the Arabs proved that the OAU was by no means accepted as the kind of supreme arbitration court its founders imagined. Its influence on many occasions proved less decisive than that of non-African allies. The ceasefire accords signed between Morocco and Algeria under OAU auspices on October 27 could, therefore, by no means be regarded as a triumph of the new organisation alone. They were at least equally the product of demands for a united front (against Israel) coming from within the Arab bloc.
27 The African Chronicler Vol. 1, No. 15* On June 5? Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Milton Obote, had announced their determination to achieve East African political federation by the end of the year. (See
The Times 6/6/65; The African Chronicler Vol. 1, No. 6). 28 Evening News 10/8/65
Ghana was not directly associated with the
de-colonisation programme initiated hy the OAU. It came as a considerable slight to Nkrumah that Ghana was not among the nine countries represented on the Organisation's "Liberation Committee". The African states most intimately involved in military support for the freedom fighters were neighbours, like Zambia, who housed exiles, or countries like Algeria, which - because either of greater size or because of an exceptional experience of war - provided not only training, but also arms and volunteers. The moves against South Africa and the colonial powers with which. Ghana was most closely involved were those amounting to a campaign to ostracize South Africa and Portugal from the U.N. special agencies, and - if possible - from the United Nations itself. In 1963? the African lobby at the U.N. scored some notable moral, or diplomatic, victories in this
31
respect. Thus, Portugal was excluded from UNESCO and South Africa was driven from the International Labour Organisation and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.
30 Ben Bella visited Ghana in August, 1963? where he
proclaimed - rather glibly - that "Arab Unity and African Unity are one and the same thing." He announced that
Algeria was ready to put 10,000 volunteers and 900 officers at the service of the southern freedom fighters.
(The African Chronicler, Vol. 1, No. 14).
31 Nkrumah's personal campaign against Portugal dated back to early 1961, when he urged the ILO to exclude Portugal for failing to comply with international conventions relating to the abolition of forced labour. (Ghana Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2).