2 and thought it undesirable to give publicity to the Mishmi mission.

But Captain Poole, the only reporter to accompany the Ahor ex­

pedition, in spite of being a serving officer in tie East Yorkshire Regiment, was not selected by the government. He was selected by the two Agents for the Pioneer and for Reuters. Moreover, it should be remembered that the official decision to allow only one

^Abor Blue Book, No.19. 2

Bailey, No Passport to Tibet, p.29 footnote; P.0.371, vol. 1066, No. 48949; Lamb, oo.cit.. p.361.

vated by the desire to conceal facts about the expedition; it was at least partly due to the decision to keep the number of non-combatants to a minimum.^ There were, it seems, two main reasons for the official attempt to maintain secrecy. First, the India Office had been aware, even before there were parliamentary criticisms from Byles and MacNeill, of the implications of Section 55 of the Government of India Act, 1858. Since they had not yet decided how best to dsfend their action, their first attempt was to endeavour to maintain secrecy. It was only later, as we have seen, that Montagu defended the official action by distinguishing the Outer Line from an international frontier. But even before Montagu, this distinction had been pointed out by Ferard, Assistant

Secretary to the Political aid Secret Department, India Office, in August 1911. He recognised that the Outer Line was not an external frontier Mlaid down by the Government of India with an organised Power, and the proper external frontier would be the Indo-Chinese Frontier, exactly what we have not got, though we are striving

to get it”. Secondly, it was felt desirable to avoid drawing public attention to the Chinese threat on the frontier and also probably Chinese attention to the British plan of action to meet that threat.

^Hardinge* s tels. to Crewe, 4 October, 17 October 19115 Hardinge Papers, No. 95, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, pp. 217, 223.

T'erard to Peel, 30 August 1911: P.S.S.F.Vol. 15 (1910), Pt. 3, 497/1911; Shuckburgh to Max Muller, 4 November 1911: F.0.371, Vol. 1066, No. 47933; Hirtzel*s minutes P.S.S.F.Vol. 1 4 (1910), 2457/1912.

Dr. Lamb is right in indicating this official attempt at

maintaining secrecy.^" But he fails to admit that the presentation of the Abor Blue Book and the parliamentary discussions brought much into the open which the authorities had, at the beginning, been unwilling to disclose. It did not remain secret that, in

addition to the Abor expedition which alone had relevance in the context of Williamson’s murder, the ^iri and Mishmi missions had been despatched, since these missions were repeatedly mentioned

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in the Abor Blue Book. Nor was it a secret that in view of the Chinese activities on "the frontier, one principal aim of the oper­ ations was to layjdown a boundary line. This was clearly revealed in the Abor Blue Book at several places.-^ Especially the version of the Government of India1 s despatch tothe Secretary of State of 21 September as given in the Blue Book, unequivocally stated, HWe recommend that, at the same time, advantage should be taken of the expedition to survey and explore the tribal area, as far as possible, in order to obtain knowledge requisite for the deter­ mination of a suitable boundary between India and China in the locality; and that a friendly mission, under an escort of Mili­

tary Police, shouldjbe sent into the Mishmi country with the object... of obtaining information as to the nature and limits of their country.

^Lamb, The McMahon Line, p.561.

2Abor Blue Book, Nos. 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 26. ^Abor Blue Book, Nos. 13, 14, 19.

"We would observe in this connection that the unusual political activity displayed by China in recent years along our border, the claims which she has advanced to suzerainty over Nepal and Bhutan, her effective occupation of Tibet, and the despatch of a force to Rima in the immediate vicinity of the Mishmi country, have introduced a disquieting factor into the case. During the past few months there have been further developments in this policy of expansion which it is impossible to ignore.... We see no objection to the erection of cairns and boundary stones on what may be considered a suitable frontier line.... in the event of our demarcating our external limit, we

should explain that we regard it as the line within whicl^io Chinese officials should come....11^ In view of such a clear

statement in the above despatch in the Blue Book of the aim of laying down a frontier, Montagu was fully justified in referring Byles to it when the latter a^ced whether one purpose of the Abor expedition was to determine an India-China border. As Byles wanted to clarify the matter further, Montagu said that "one of the objects which it is hoped to achieve by the expedition is the laying down

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of a frontier". In spite of such open statements in the Blue Book and Montagu’s unequivocal reply, Dr. Lamb suggests that Byles

^Abor Blue Book, No.19.

180

.

was given no adequate reply.^

The operations in the hills in 1911-12 resulted in the proposal of a number of measures for the protection of the frontier which fall into two broad categories- the establishment of outposts and the construction of roads. While the Mishmi country - the most

threatened section of the frontier - received the,greatest attention, there -was no such proposal for the Miri section which was not only the least threatened but also the least known of all the parts of the frontier.

In January 1912 Major Bliss suggested three sites for the estab­ lishment of outposts in the Lohit valley. The first and most im­ portant was the farthest point up the Lohit at the Indo-Tibetan border, which was, for the time being, to be near Menilkrai. The second was the farthest point up the Delei so as to command the path leading into the Mishmi country from Tibet through the Glei Dakhru pass. The third was the Biraphu (or Buruphu) hill near the Delei-Lohit confluence where a post would serve as a supporting

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post to the two other posts. Menilkrai enjoyed some military advantage which alone was the reason, as Dundas thought,'why the Chinese had planted flags there. Had it enjoyed no such advantage they could easily have chosen the Yepak to the north, or the Shet

^Laiib, op.cit.. p.362.

^iajor Bliss1 report, 12 January 1912: P.S.S.F.Vol. 14 (1910), 909/1912.

Ti to the south, of Menilkrai, both of which being natural features were far more intelligible than Menilkra^ks a boundary. Though Dundas supported the idea of an outpost at Menilkrai, he did not recommend its establishment before the place was connected with the plains by a good bridle path with permanent bridges over the rivers in the Lohit valley like the Dou and Delei. Without such a path the out­

post would be isolated and paralysed by the loss of all communication with Sadiya during the rains when these rivers rose in flood. ^

Subsequently, on the basis of further investigation by Cap­ tains Le Breton and Hardcastle, Dundas suggested for the first time that Walong, lying further north, was strategically a far better .

p

site than Menilkrai. The General Staff also held that the Chin­ ese had chosen Menilkrai Mwith the evident intention of denying to us the only suitable site in the valley for a frontier post -

Walong - an ideal site ... commanding the valley to the north on

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either bank”. Dundas suggested the establishment of three out­ posts at Walong, Buruphu and the point where a branch road over the P a M o n pass into the Bebejiya Mishmi country would take off

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from the proposed Sadiya-Walong road. Later on, he proposed that

Dundas, Pol. Officer, Mishmi mission, to E.Bengal & Assam, No. 7 M.C., 15 January 1912; E. Bengal & Assam to India, Foreign Dept., No. 25 C.G., 9 Pebruaryl912: P.S.S.P.Yol. 14 (1910), 909/1912.

2Dundas to Assam, No. 15-M.C., 1 May 1912: P.S.S.P.Yol. 14 (1910), 3057/1912.

3

The General Staff* s note onthe North-East Frontier, 1 June 1912: P.S.S.P.Yol. 14 (1910), 3057/1912.

two more intermediate posts should be established at Minzang and Theronliang for a smooth working of the long line of communication.^

In June 1912 the General Staff proposed that, since the Lohit valley was easily accessible from the Chinese base at Rima, it was of prime importance to construct a road up the Lohit as far as Walong with permanent bridges above flood level over the Tidding, Delei and Dou rivers.^ Besides the Lohit valley road, the Chief

Commissicner recommended the construction of a bridle track up the left bank of the Dibang to the Dri-Dibang confluence, a second track up to the Painlon pass taking off from the Sadiya-Walong road near the Digaru river, and a third track up the Delei to the Glei Dakhru pass. The Bibang track was particularly necessary be­ cause the upper reaches of the Dri were as much open to interference from Tibet as the Lohit valley was.

Though the programme was taken in hand in 1912-13, the entire plan had to be revised and emphasis laid on the Lohit valley for

its great importance. But woik in the Lohit valley was upset by heavy rains, land-slides and floods. No outpost could be established in the Lohit valley and natural disasters caused extensive damage to what­ ever road construction had been done. Consequent to this disastrous

Assam to India,Foreign Dept., No. 98P., 7 January 1913: P.S.S.F. Yol. 28 (1913), 994/1913.

2

The General Staff's note on the North-East Frontier, 1 June 1912: P.S.S.P.Yol. 14 (1910), 3057/1912.

3

Dundas* note, 17 June 1912; Assam to India, Foreign Dept., No. 6 9 P.T. 7 July 1912: P.S.S.F.Vol. 1 4 (1910), 3057/l912.

experience, it was decided to undertake a moderate programme during the next working season in 1913-14. It was planned to go no further than Haiuling and to establish outposts at Haiuling, Theronliang and Digaru.^ But this plan, excepting the con­

struction of the Lohit valley road only up to the Tidding, did not receive any sanction from the higher authorities who were now unwilling to finance any expensive programme in the Lohit

p

valley. The chief reason for this reluctance seems to have been the change in the Tibetan situation. Consequent to the revolution in China, Chinese military power in Tibet was annihilated and

the north-east frontier of India was thus relieved from the strain to which it had been subjected since 1910. There was no longer any immediate Chinese threat. Further, the British, rtio were trying to bring China and Tibet to the conference table for the purpose of

settling the constant Sino-Tibetan trouble, were contemplating

the exclusion of China from parts of Tibet which included Zayul from where the Chinese had operated in the Mishmi country. If the British succeeded at the conference in thus sterilising Zayul by diplomatic means, there would be no need of embarking on any expensive pro-

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