Time-bar should not be applied retroactively

Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29, 1999, and the new rule took effect on Dec 1, 2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and 3 months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.

“Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.”

The 2-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It shouldn’t be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Ratio behind the Time-Bar Rule

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the

accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES V. NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC against St. Martin Funeral Homes. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Homes. However there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating Php 38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its VAT to the BIR.

Petitioner on the other hand alleges that PR is not an employee of St. Martin Funeral Homes but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner ST.

Martin’s Funeral Home. PR was a former overseas worker, asked for a financial assistance from the mother of Amelita and as an indication of gratitude, PR voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

The mother of Amelita passed away and Amelita took over the management of the business and this time the PR and his wife were no longer allowed to participate and the latter filed a complaint charging petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.

Labor Arbiter decided in favor with petitioner wherein based on the position papers presented it was established that there was no employer-employee

relationship that existed between the parties and therefore his office has no jurisdiction over the case.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC.

NLCR issued a Resolution remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution for lack of merit. Hence this petition alleging that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can review the decision of the NLRC

Held: Yes. However under the present law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. The present Section 223 instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within 20 days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute;

that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law (declogging of the regular courts) on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

SECTION 5

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

MACEDA V. VASQUEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Maceda is the presiding judge in RTC Antique.

In 1991, respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. He alleged that Judge Maceda falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,"

when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Similarly, Judge Maceda allegedly did the same falsification for other months totaling to 17 months’ worth of certification.

In other words, it is alleged that Judge Maceda certified that he rendered decisions in all civil and criminal cases at a certain date, within the 90 day period set by the Constitution and Rules, when in fact, he hasn’t.

The Office of the Ombudsman issued orders:

(1) the order denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.

So now Judge Maceda contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the said case against him because the said offenses arose from the judge’s performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC, not the Ombudsman.

He contends that this constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

ISSUE: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the SC. W/N the referral should be made first to the SC.

HELD/RATIO: The Ombudsman may entertain it BUT the case must be referred first to the SC. Only after the judge is found administratively liable and a criminal complaint is instituted against him under the RPC may the Ombudsman step in. But just answer na ang SC ang may jurisdiction in this case. 

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious

misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.

Ombudsman directed to dismiss case and refer it to the SC.

SECTON 6

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

NITAFAN V. CIR

FACTS: Nitafan et al. were duly appointed RTC Judges (Manila). Previously, the Chief Justice issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction

of withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that this constitutes diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law and that

“during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.”

ISSUE: W/N the salaries of judges are subject to tax. – YES.

RATIO: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David (declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office) do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

SECTION 11

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

VARGAS v. RILLORAZA

Facts:The constitutionality of Sec. 14 of the People’s Court Act (CA No. 682) is assailed by the counsel for the defense on the ff. grounds:

1) It provides for qualification for SC members other than those provided in the Consti.

2) It authorizes the appointment of SC members who do not possess the qualifications set forth in the Consti 3) It removes SC members from office by means other than impeachment, contrary to the Consti

4) It deprives the Comm. on Appt. of Congress the prerogative to reject or confirm appointments to the SC 5) It creates 2 SCs

6) It impairs the rule making power of the SC

Sec. 14 provides: Any Justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Phil. Executive Commission (PEC) or under the government called Philippine Republic (PR) may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under sec. 13 hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the PEC and the PR.

If on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges (Rules of Court), or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability…the President may designate such number of Judges of CFI, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justice of the SC.

Issues:

1. Does the Congress have the power to add pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice in the SC under sec. 14? - NO

2. Can a person act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Comm. on Appt.? – NO

3. Whether by the method of designation under sec. 14, a Judge of First Instance, etc. designated by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as an SC Justice – NO

Ratio:

Congress cannot modify or add disqualification of judicial officers

Before the enactment of the People’s Court Act, it was not only the power but also the bounden duty of all members of the SC to sit in judgment in all treason cases duly brought or appealed to the SC (this power derived from the Consti.). If sec. 14 were effective, these affected Justices would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the case. What the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by the Justices would be prohibited by sec. 14. What the constitution directs, the section prohibits. For repugnancy to the constitution to result, it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the Justice or the continued enjoyment of emoluments; rather, it is that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases coming before the SC.

Whether the matter of disqualification of judical officers belong to the realm of the adjective or substantive law, whatever modifications, change or innovation the legislature may propose to introduce therein must not contravene the provisions of the Consti. nor be repugnant to the genius of the governmental system established.

Under the Consti, the SC may not be deprived of its appellate jurisdiction, among others, over those criminal

cases where the penalty may be death or life imprisonment. The SC can only exercise its jurisdiction if composed by a Chief Justice and Associate Justices. To disqualify any of these components of the SC, in this case a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the SC itself of its jurisdiction established by the Consti.

Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. This disqualification made by Congress affects the very heart of judicial independence.

No person not appointed by the President with the confirmation of the Comm. of Appt. may act as Justice of the SC

The designation authorized under sec 14 does not comply with the Const requirement of confirmation of the appt by the Comm. of Appt. Further, the designated Judges under Sec. 14 do not have the constitutional qualifications of a regular member of the SC (different in terms of age, number of years practicing as a judge or practice of law).

The fact that it is temporary is not helpful for no temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Consti. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 of Art. VIII can not be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. That said

The fact that it is temporary is not helpful for no temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Consti. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 of Art. VIII can not be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. That said