Fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari's programme Is a Nietzschean conception of the cosmos as
the ceaseless becom ing of a multiplicity o f Interconnected forces. This multiplicity admits
no stable entities b ut only a "dynamic quanta" and therefore must be evaluated/interpreted
in term s of difference rather than identity.
In Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative design the Nietzschean model of the cosmos remains
but with the em phasis translated to forces. In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari identify
the plane of consistency with the time of "aion," and an unextended intensive "spatium". The
plane of consistency, they suggest, is criss-crossed by lines o f continuous variation, which
are sim ilar in ch a ra cte r to a series o f singular points, abstract lines of virtual
possibilities that are m anifested in a variety o f machinic arrangements. Each m achinic
amalgamation is "un ensemble de voisinage" an assemblage of heterogeneous terms composed in
a topological relation o f "proxim ityV vicinity", and it is the abstract line that traverses
the term s and fa cilita te s their interaction. This virtual, abstract line o f continuous
variation is effectively something like the will to power - a self delineating difference that
creates relations o f proxim ity/difference between terms. Additionally the plane o f
consistency as well as sharing many of the features of stoic incorporeals remains a plane of
forces/bodies, each body characterized by the longitude o f its relations o f motion and
velocity/slowness/latitude o f the intensive affects of which it is capable, according to its
internal power or d egree of force. The longitude o f relations o f motion and rest involves
non-formed elements and the latitude of affective powers involves the intensive states o f an
anonymous force Therefore the plane of consistency is, in many respects, an articulation
of a Nietzschean physics, which depicts the cosm os as the becoming of a m ultiplicity of
forces, differentiated in term s of dynamic quanta as opposed to stable objects. Furthermore,
T he Deleuzoguattarian schem e Is essentially a juxtaposition o f difference and unity -
m ultiplicities/haecceities/disjunctions/irreducible - intersecting series are
synchronious/co-present with a univocity/of being and a non-transcendent plane of immanence
Deleuze cannot coherently maintain the primacy of difference over unity without falling back
on a form o f transcendentalism that his entire philosophical system appears poised to
denounce, reducing language to non-comprehension and allowing the surfaces upon which
thought is supposed to occur to shatter into a collection of operating unrelated/individuated
molecules. Therefore in order to be effective difference m ust be conceived as running in
parallel to unity (1).
In o rder to harm onize this dichotom y it is necessary primarily to exam ine the role that
Deleuze designates for philosophy - the creation of concepts - in o rder to subsequently
decide how a typical Deleuzian philosophical proposition is constituted, given that the
principle aim o f philosophy is norm ative Philosophy in this mode/design is a practice that
can only be conceived upon the basis of the effects it initiates, and this conception can have
no grounding in any transcendental position. From such a consideration about the nature of
philosophy it can be concluded that the correct approach to the Deleuzian concept of
difference is an analysis o f how it functions, and not o f how one m ight perceive its
m etaphysical priority. Difference intrinsically operates as a concept that resists
transcendence - positive in m aintaining the irreducibility and contingency of singularity,
and disruptive in rejecting principles o f unification. Deleuzian difference is not situated
in opposition to unity, but sim ply against the transcendental principles of unification that
exclude difference rendering it negative For Deleuze Spinoza's expressionism is the model
for the com patability o f difference and unity, provided that (as in Spinoza’s w ork)
expressionism is in accord with univocity In the conception o f the rhizome one can locate
a univocity of being, the affirmation neither o f difference nor unity, but the surface which
is the fusion o f the two
The Deleuzian project of philosophy is one o f creating/organizing/re-configuring
perspectives - "the discipline that consists in creating concepts" (2). To engage in
philosophy is to develop a perspective, via concepts, within which or by m eans of which the
world is revealed/em erges. In collaboration with Félix Guattari, Deleuze defines three
central concordant traits that form concepts: (A) a concept is com posed of intersections
within o ther concepts both in its particular area of concern and in related surroundings/
areas - Deleuze writes, "philosophical theory is itself a practice, as much as its
o b je cts...It is a practice o f concepts, and it m ust be judged in the light o f o ther
practices w ith which it interfaces” (3). (B) a concept is defined by th e unity it articulates
am ong its constituent parts - the "consistence" o f the concept (4), it occurs w hen
heterogeneous elements accord as a whole that is at once unique and inseparable from those
composing elements (C) a concept is "an intensive trait an intensive arrangement which m ust
be taken a s neither general nor particular but as a pure and sim ple singularity" (5). A
concept is a productive force that resonates across a conceptual field, creating effects as
it traverses through and by the elements/concepts contained within that location. A concept
is not a representation in the traditional sense, but a point in a field - on a "plane" - th a t
is im manently logical/political/aesthetic. It is comprehended/valued n o t by the status o f
its truth/accuracy of its reference, but by the effects it produced within and outside o f the
plane on which it is situated. The concept, according to Deleuze and Guattari, "does not have
reference: it is autoreferential, it poses itself and its object at the s a m e time that it is
created" (6).
Philosophy as the creation of concepts may be regarded n o t simply as an
articulation/dem onstration b ut more precisely as an operation. Philosophy
com bines/initiates new points into planes that it is concentrating upon, and within this
process rearranges that plane - produces a new plane or effects the interaction of that plane
with others To understand philosophy then, is to evaluate its operation/understand the
effects it introduces rather than merely assess its truth
A nother com posite part of philosophy's operation is "Philosophical constructivism " -
"Philosophy is a constructivism, and its constructivism, possess two complementary aspects
elaborate that th e plane traced by the concepts that produce it is not reducible to those
concepts, but in contrast the concepts delineate a plane that is necessarily perceived as an
open system - (a unity but n ot a totality) - a unity in the sense that there is a
relation/context among the concepts located on/withm it open in the sense that the concepts
do not exhaust the interpretative meaning o f the plane but enable developm ent/re-
configuration. Deleuze term s the planes traced by philosophy "planes o f im manence"
indicating that there is no origin beyond the plane that may be regarded as a structuring
principle T he Deleuzian schem e rejects all form s of the illusion o f transcendence in
describing how philosophy functions (8).
'W e do not have the least reason to think that the m odes of existence need transcendent values
which w o u ld compare, select, and decide which am ong them is "better" than another. On the
contrary, th e re are only im m a nent criteria, and one possibility o f life is valued in itse lf by
the m o ve m e n ts it traces and the intensities it creates on the plane o f im m anence”
(Gilles D e le u ze and Felix G uattari) (9)
The Deleuzoguattarian philosophical project is a "practice", a practice whose operations are
evaluated by the effects they initiate. Thus there is a place fo r "truth" in philosophy, but
it is in a secondary/derivative capacity - the prim ary design o f philosophy is orientated
towards the norm ative The place o f "truth" within the context o f this interpretation resides
in the assessm ent o f effects Such a move privileges normative planes in relation to other
planes by m aking them the axes around which evaluation revolves. This Deleuzian view of
philosophy, p e rceives philosophy as a creation rather than a reflection, and theory as
practice rather than basic speculation.
Philosophy is a project of creation, the generation/fabrication of concepts that define new
perspectives It is principally a norm ative procedure, a discipline whose effects should be
judged norm atively. It is within this context that we can now assess the Deleuzian concept
of difference Deleuze essentially privileges difference.
".... in the essence, difference is the o bje ct of affirmation, affirm ation itself. In its
essence, affirm ation is itself difference".
(G illes D eleuze) (10)
W hen Deleuze privileges difference, he engages in the practice he calls philosophy. He is
creating a concept that will contribute to shape a perspective from which to view a situation
within a new dimension. The function o f the concept o f difference is synchronically to
subvert the unifying forces that structure philosophical discourse and to replace such forces
with an alternative perspective via which one m ay continue to think philosophically. Deleuze
s ta te s ," It is necessary that a system is constituted on the basis of two o r three series,
each series being identified by the differences between the terms which com pose it" (11).
Systems should not be regarded as unities but instead as compositions of series, each of which
is initself defined on the basis o f difference. T he thought of such difference at the level
o f compositions o f series Deleuze terms "singularities". Deleuze conceives difference as
intrinsically constitutive and unity as the product of the play of difference.
The concept o f difference is both positive and disruptive - positive in taking series
(singularities/desire/active forces/rhizom atic configurations etc), as
irreducible/contingent forces and disruptive in rejecting all narratives o f these
constituting forces that would place them under the governance of a unifying principle that
would render them and/or the phenomena they constitute as mere derivations from/reflections
of one true wortd/origin. These two characteristics converge to structure the basic impulse
of the concept of difference - that is to resist transcendence. To acknowledge the Deleuzian
form of difference is to reject the illusion of transcendence, and to conduct philosophical
exercises from the surface. To think in term s o f difference is to affirm surfaces, which
occurs when one realizes that those surfaces are not derivative/secondary to an external
component but constitutions of series that come to form them and, in some sense, define them.
The Deleuzian concept o f difference, however, requires the additional supplementation of the
Spinozist notion o f “ univocity o f being" in order for it to function effectively (12).
Deleuze's notion o f difference is essentially anti-transcendental, it preserves the
integrity of surfaces o f difference from any reductive unifying principle that exists outside
planes of immanence. The attraction of Spinoza, for Deleuze, is that in his system there is
no transcendental principle of explanation precisely because there is no transcendence. The
philosophical question posed by Spinoza focuses upon developing a perspective within which
an anti-transcendental position can be effectively established. F or Deleuze the central
concept is "expression". Expression is the relation among substance/essence/modes that
allows each of these e le m e n ts to be determ ined as distinct from a n d yet constituent of
others. For Spinoza it is this concept that, by substituting itself fo r emanation and
displaying all form s o f dualism, introduces into philosophy the anti-transcendental notion
o f the univocity of being. Expression is thus a concept that rem oves the possibility of
transcendence from the philosophical field. Throughout all its expressions, being remains
univocal. It is however vital to recognise that being univocal is not contem porarious with
being identical:
'T he significance o f Spinozism seem s to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees
expression from a n y subordination to em anative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no
longer enamates, no longer resembles anything And such a result can be obtained only wihin a
perspective o f u n ivo city'.
(Gilles Deleuze) (13).
The significance of univocity is not that everything is the same nor th a t there is a principle
o f the sam e that is a basis fo r everything, but alternatively that w ith univocity com es
difference.
If there is nothing outside of the surface and all there is is surface, th e n what demarcates
the surface is quintessent/inherent. There is no other rea lm which may be
discovered/revealed to understand the world/worlds This notion is concurrently Spinozist
and Nietzschean returning us to the complexity and irreducibility that defines surfaces, but
with the affirm ation that such complexity/irreducibility are exactly the characteristics of
a surface. T he crucial point is that Deleuzian difference can only function as such in
relation to surfaces, which are non-transcendent, on the basis o f an ontological univocity.
In this respect difference can be at once promoted and affirmed. It is promoted as the result
of a perspective - the creation of concepts - that negates transcendence and returns to
surfaces and th e ir differences. It is affirmed because those surfaces and differences are
no longer conceived as being derivative from /parasitic upon a unifying transcendental
origin/principle.
Within the Deleuzian view of the philosophical project a perspective is interpreted not as
the product o f difference but the product simultaneously of unity and difference. The dual
necessity of unity and difference in the formation of any perspective is the circum stantial
parameters within which the Deleuzoguattarian concept of the rhizome should be understood.
The rhizome em bodies neither pure unity nor pure difference, it is reducible neither to some
central point that constitutes its origin of evolution/situation of development. The rhizome
is the play o f the unity of its complimentary parts and their contained difference, and it is
only because o f this play that it proposes a view of difference as a positive rather than a
negative phenom ena The rhizome is principally the univocity o f being, a univocity that,
correctly m anifested, is the affirmation neither o f difference nor unity but of the surface
that is the interface/interpolation o f the two.
From this a num ber of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly while at a certain level o f generality
Deleuzian philosophy may be "philosophy in the traditional sense" (14) the kinds of concepts
invented and their rhizomatic assem blage result in a far from traditional
enterprise/process. Deleuze creates untimely concepts, calculated to produce critical
effects on the established forms of understanding: "The philosopher creates concepts that
are neither ete rn a l nor historical but untimely and not present" (Gilles Deleuze) (15).
Secondly, an understanding of the form ation/com position o f the book/text-rhizom e has
implications for h o w we should read/interpret it. "Mille Plateaux" cannot be read as a series
conceptual rhizome has no beginning and no end, it is entirely "middle", composed of plateaux
which are themselves always in-between- each plateau can be read in no matter what order, and
related in any way to another corresponding plateaux. Different plateaux m ay overlap,
sometimes deploying the same concepts, although not in the same manner, but they remain self-
sufficient trajectories.
Despite the notable presence of a metaphysical tendency, (a system-constructing im pulse
evident in the proliferation o f concepts/distinctions), it would be futile to attem pt to
reconstitute a system from Deleuzoguattarian philosophy or "Mille Plateaux". Such an
architectonic analysis would suppose the existence o f a stable conceptual inferiority which
their project or works do not posses. The appropriate w ay to proceed would appear to be to
choose a particular conceptual line and track it: exegesis should follow a route/path, rather
than reproduce a system.