PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES
Who are the particeps criminis – that is, those participants in the crime?
They are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. However, for light felonies, the persons criminally liable are only the principals and the accomplices. (Art. 16)
By the personal nature of criminal liability, only natural persons can be the active subject of a crime. However, corporations and juridical persons can be ordered to pay fine as a punishment under some special laws, like the Corporation Law, General Banking Act, Omnibus Election Code, etc. In some cases, the officers of the corporation and/or partnerships are the ones personally held liable.
1. Principals
There are three (3) Classes of Principals – (a) Principals by Direct Participation – that is, those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
(b) Principals by Inducement or Induction – those who directly force or induce others to commit the crime; and (c) Principals by Indispensable Cooperation, those who cooperate in the execution in the offense by another act without which the crime would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17)
Principals by Direct Participation are those who, participating in the criminal resolution, proceed to perpetrate the crime and personally take part in its realization, executing acts which directly tend to the same end. (People vs.
Guballo, 16401-R, February 19, 1957) To hold liable thus as principals by direct participation, they must have conspired with each other (and with other participants of there are any) and went to the scene of the crime to personally execute what they agreed upon, their acts tending towards the same objective.
Thus, if A, B, C and D conspired with each other to kill X and then proceeded to the house of X, but before reaching the same, D pretending to answer the call of nature went out of the way and did not join A, B and C anymore when the three, he did not proceed to the scene of the crime.
So also, if X, Y, and Z passed by the house of W who was apparently not in the mood and upon Z’s loud calling, went out of his house with a bolo whereupon Z tried to wrest possession of said bolo, and while grappling with W, the latter’s wife came out from nowhere and stabbed Z with her spear, W can not be classified as a principal by direct participation as he did not conspire with his wife in killing Z even if he was at the scene of the crime.
The acts of the participants must be towards the same end in carrying out their plan. So that in the first example above, even if A only acted as look-out in the yard of X’s house, and B just accompanied C to the room where X was sleeping, ready to assist C if the need arises, and it was only C who fired the gun that killed X, all the, three (3), meaning A, B and C are principals by direct participation.
Where the accused conspired with this three (3) co-accused to kill the two (2) victims and the role assigned to him was to kill one of the victims which he did, he is a principal by direct participation in the two (2) murders.
Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, there is collective criminal responsibility, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. On the other hand, if there is no conspiracy proved, individual criminal liability may ensue.
Principals by Induction are of two (2) classes: those who directly induce others to commit the crime, and those who directly force another to perpetrate the offence. The one forced or induced is the principal by direct participation.
There are two (2) ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime:
(a) By giving price, reward or promise. To fall under the scenario, the price, reward or promise must be the primordial consideration why the principal by direct participation proceeded to commit the crime. So that if he would commit the offense just the same with or without the price, promise or reward, the one who gave the price or reward is not liable. Necessarily, there must be conspiracy between the giver of the consideration, and the doer of the act.
(b) By using words of command. To hold the principal by inducement liable, it is necessary that the inducement be made directly to secure the commission of the crime, and that such inducement be the determining cause of the execution of the act by the principal by direct participation.
Mere suggestion, or a thoughtless expression or a chance word spoken without any intention or expectation that it would produce the result can not hold the utterer liable as principal by inducement, thus, if A, in response to B who was narrating to him his (B’s) bitter experience with X in a chance conversation, told B, “Kung ako ikaw eh papatayin ko iyang si X,” and later on, B killed X, A can not be considered a principal by inducement.
Even if the inducement be directly made, with the inducer insistent and determined to procure the commission of the crime, he still can not be classified as principal by induction if the inducement is not the determining cause for committing the crime. Thus, if the actor has reason of his own to commit the offense, there can be no principal by induction.
Those who directly forced another to commit a crime are also categorized as Principals by Inducement.
Thus, with a gun in his hand, A gave B a knife and ordered him to kill X who was sleeping nearby otherwise he (A) would shoot him (B). If B would stabbed X to death, A is a principal by inducement by directly forcing another to perpetrate a crime. B, on the other hand, is a principal by direct participation although he would be exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, par. 6.
Principals by Indispensable Cooperation are those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Like in the case of Principal by Inducement, it presupposes the existence of the principal by direct participation otherwise with whom shall be cooperate with indispensably.
The cooperation here is an assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which can not exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act
intended to be executed. (Phil. Law Dictionary by Moreno, 3rd Ed., p. 213) In other words, before an accused can be tagged as a principal by indispensable cooperation, he must have conspired with the principal by direct participation or must have a unity of criminal purpose and intention with him immediately before the commission of the offense, but his cooperation is in the performance of another act without which the criminal would have been accomplished.
Where both accused conspired and confederated to commit rape, and one had sex with the offended party while the other was holding her hands, and thereafter the latter was the one who raped the victim, both are principals by direct participation and by indispensable cooperation in the two (2) crimes of rape committed. (People vs. Fernandez, 183 SCRA 511)
Where A, a municipal treasurer, conspired with B for the latter to present a false receipt and which receipt was the basis of the reimbursement approved by A, and both thereafter shared the proceeds, A is the principal by direct participation and B by indispensable cooperation in the crime of Malversation.
2. Accomplices
An accomplice is one who, not having participated as principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous act.
(Art. 18) He is sometimes referred to accessory before the fact.
The existence of an accomplice presupposes the existence of a principal by direct participation. The accomplice does not conspire with the principal although he cooperated in the execution of the criminal act.
If A approached B, borrowing the latter’s gun, telling him that he (A) is going to kill X, and B Knowing A’s criminal design, lent his gun with which A shot and killed X, B is an accomplice cooperating by previous act.
In the above example, take note that while B did not conspire with A to kill X, he (B) concurred with A in his purpose. Had he conspired with A, B is a principal by indispensable cooperation. That act of A however must have a relation to the participation of B. Thus, if while B, knowing A’s purpose to kill X, still lent his gun to A, but A used a bolo in killing X, then B can not be considered an accomplice.
While X was choking Y, W went behind Y without any knowledge of X and once within striking distance, stabbed Y. even upon seeing the stabbing made by W, X continued choking Y, who died of stab words. choking contributed to the death of Y. in this case, W is an accomplice cooperating by simultaneous act.
If the offender, however, even of performing the acts of an accomplice, has participated as a principal, he will be punished as a principal, and no longer as an accomplice.
3. Accessories (Art. 19) (Also accessory after the fact)
They are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
The most common example is a person who, without having participated as principal or accomplice in Robbery or Theft but knowing that the property being offered to him is the proceeds or subject matter of the said crime, bought or purchased or dealt in any manner with such property, obtaining benefit from said transaction or helping the thief or robber to profit therefrom.
If the robber or thief request him to sell the property stolen, and he does so and thereafter given a share, he is also an accessory.
Under P.D No. 1612, otherwise known as “Anti-fencing Law,” any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft shall be punished depending on the value of the property involved. (Sec. 2)
The accessory however should not take the property without the consent of the principal or accomplice in possession of the same, otherwise he is a principal in the crime of theft since a stolen property can also be the subject of theft or robbery.
A person who profits or assist the offender to profit by the effects of the crime is also illustrated in a kidnapping case where the kidnappers ask a person who has not participated in the actual kidnapping, to contact the parents of the victim to negotiate the delivery of ransom money, and having successfully done so, receives a share from the same. He is also an accessory.
But if a person being co-conspirator in theft or robbery, sold some of the property stolen, he should no longer be punished as an accessory since he will be held already as a principal.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery.
Where A, knowing that B and C had killed X, buried the corpse to prevent the discovery of the killing, he is an accessory.
The body of the crime however does not only mean the body of the person killed. This phrase refers to CORPUS DELICTI – that is, the body or the substance of the offense.
(People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil. 841). Corpus delicti simply means the fact that a crime has actually been committed. (People vs.
Madlangbayan, 94 SCRA 685)
Placing a weapon in the hand of the deceased who was killed by his friend, to make it appear that his friend had killed the victim in self-defense constitutes an act of an accessory.
Where the wife misled the authorities by informing them that the person who killed her husband was a theft who has fled,
when in truth, the killer was her paramour, the wife is liable as an accessory for concealing the body of the crime.
If A, after killing a person, went to B and told the latter to hide the gun he used, which B did with the objective of concealing the crime, B is an accessory by concealing the instrument of the crime. So also, if X would deliver the car he had carnapped, to Y, telling the latter of the carnapping he did, and asking him to conceal the car so that the crime would not be discovered, and Y did so, he is an accessory by concealing the effects of the crime.
3. By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of public functions, or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be guilty of some other crime.
If the one who harbors or assist in the escape of the principal is a public officer, whatever be the crime committed by the said principal provided it is not a light felony, will make him an accessory. Thus, if A rapes a woman, and he is assisted in his escape by a public officer, the latter is liable as an accessory.
However, if the one who assist the rapist in his escape is a private individual, he is not liable as an accessory under the article because in case of a private individual assisting the escape of the principal, the crime committed must be treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive.
Thus, if A and B agreed to fight, and after killing B, A was assisted by private individual C in his escape, C is not liable as an accessory because the crime committed by A is only Homicide there being an agreement to fight.
While accessories’ liability is subordinate to that of the principal, the acquittal of the latter does not mean acquittal of the accessory. So that if A, charged as principal in a murder case, with B indicted as accessory for helping him escape before he was finally arrested, and A was acquitted because of self-defense or that the court adjudged the crime to be only Homicide, B is not liable as an accessory. But if A was acquitted because of insanity, or the case against him dismissed because he died during the trial, B can still be held liable as accessory as long as it was proven that the crime was murder, and he assisted A in his escape.
In connection with this matter, Presidential Decree No.
1829 provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from one thousand (P1,000.00) to six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of subjects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person whom he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction. This is what is popularly known as Obstruction of Justice.