Towards Capturing EU Influence

I believe that Europeanization should work as a notion that acts as a qualifier pointing to a particular aspect that distinguishes EU influence from other external sources of influence causing policy change in a country. By investigating the feedback of European Integration, I refer to EU influence in terms of Europeanization, by which I mean:

“EU influence in terms of Europeanization refers to the process through which the EU intentionally or unintentionally induces policy changes in a state, which can on the national level be contested in terms of political legitimacy.”

Why redefine Europeanization or EU influence as there are already many definitions? That definition permits EU influence on the national level to be better captured as it sharpens the analytical focus on a key aspect of EU influence, which is being contested in terms of political legitimacy. The latter establishes the theoretical basis for Europeanization to move beyond policy implementation studies. By directing attention to the issue of political legitimacy the way is opened to discussing an increasingly important issue as the EU expands into policy areas beyond merely reducing trade barriers and providing for common product standards. In particular, as the EU is often referred to as exerting a regulatory role, the issue of political legitimacy is an important element to acknowledge as it determines the certainty and stability of the regulatory framework that the EU may provide for different policy areas or issues.

Unlike some political scientists believe, conceptualizing the EU as a quasi-regulator does not solve the EU’s political legitimacy issue that results from its democratic deficit. Though, in practice regulators may seem detached from the political sphere as they are established at arm’s length from governments, paradoxically, their certainty and stability (in effect existence) is closely bound to the political legitimization that they enjoy. Thereby, as Baldwin

and Cave (2002: 76–85) remind us, the support for a particular regulatory framework, and as such a regulatory agency, is based among others on its political mandate. Additional certainty and stability factors are the existence of proper control and accountability procedures, due and fair processes, expertise, and efficiency. Thus, including the issue of political legitimacy in the definition of EU influence in terms of Europeanization paves the way to discussing an increasingly relevant issue, as European Integration moves beyond the internal market and becomes more complex. The matter at stake is the EU’s ability to provide certain and stable regulatory frameworks for specific policy areas and challenging policy issues.

By providing an alternative definition to Europeanization, I also address the lack of a common understanding of what Europeanization is. Evidence for that are the various definitions that exist for Europeanization (see for example Ladrech 1994: 69; Börzel 1999: 574; Héritier 2001: 3; Risse 2001: 3; Radaelli 2003: 30; Vink 2003: 72; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 7). Surprisingly, all definitions address the same subject, which is the EU causing change on the national level, or put differently change on the national level resulting from EU influence. Although they are different they share a problematic similarity. They are similar in the sense that the notion of the EU or EU influence can often be replaced by referring to another international organization or global trend, such as globalization. A consequence is that as soon as Europeanization studies take into account alternative explanations for policy change on the national level, tracing back that change to the EU becomes very difficult and blurry. The conclusion in those studies is that either EU influence has to be rejected or seems to be unclear (see Verdier and Breen 2001; Bomberg and Peterson 2000; Levi-Faur 2002, 2004, 2008; Jordana et al 2006).

I believe that EU influence (as feedback of European Integration) shares a unique and uncomfortable characteristic, which is being contested in terms of political legitimacy. The most obvious cases are where EU secondary and primary legislation supersedes national laws, such as for example EU energy market legislation. Given that the EU is expanding into other policy areas the political legitimacy issue is spreading beyond the internal market. According to some observers, today a majority (some refer to up to 80 percent) of economic and social policy decisions, formerly taken individually in a national context, have shifted to the EU level (Streinz 2003: 110).

Is EU influence really contested in terms of political legitimacy? From a legal perspective, the EU is an international organization. Although it is often referred to as a supranational organization, the EU cannot be qualified as anything close to a state or a state-like

organization (Herdegen 2010: 77). Given that the EU is not a state or state-like organization, the influence that the EU exerts in those policy areas where its legislation supersedes national legislation may, thus, raise political legitimacy concerns, or put differently, be contested in terms of political legitimacy. It is most evident in cases where EU legislation expresses and prescribes an explicit policy approach to a certain policy area or issue in a Member State.

As briefly mentioned, the political legitimacy issue has been discussed in political science under the notion of democratic deficit. Contrary to legal scholars who are concerned with diagnosing the democratic deficit, political scientists are more interested in discussing the implications resulting either from different critiques (see Follesdal and Hix 2005) or justifications (see Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002) of the deficit. Thereby, the arguments employed often reflect a personal vision of those scholars concerning the purpose and the finality of European Integration. Logically, solutions proposed to reduce the democratic deficit and directed at increasing political legitimacy are all moving the EU towards a more state-like organization. However, there are also scholars that justify the democratic deficit by arguing that the EU acts as regulatory institution for the benefit of the public, coining the famous notion of the EU as a regulatory state (see Majone 1998). However, as previously mentioned conceptualizing the EU as a regulator, however, does not solve the issue at stake.

In the end, all scholars agree that there is a democratic deficit. As a consequence contested political legitimacy seems to be a key characteristic of EU influence.²⁰

But does the political legitimacy issue apply only to the EU as an international organization?

Is it not a general problem of international organizations? One can argue that political programs prescribed by the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank to states in financial distress, such as fiscal austerity measures, carry the same political legitimacy issue.

However, I would argue that the political legitimacy is less controversial compared to the EU for two reasons. To take effect such measures require previous political decisions by the involved countries. Those are decisions that usually involve national governments and parliaments, which represent a country’s constituency. As a consequence, the measures are clearly provided to some extent with political legitimacy by the public. Another aspect

20 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009 and marks the most recent attempt to reduce the EU’s democratic deficit, or put differently, enhance democratic legitimacy. The institutional changes indicate that the power of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers has decreased in the legislative process in favor of the European Parliament and the European Council representing the heads of states or governments.

However, increased qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the removal of national veto powers in different policy areas may also have reduced democratic control by the public in EU member states and implicitly offset the democratic legitimacy gains. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty’s explicit intention to tackle democratic legitimacy is further acknowledgment of the unique way the EU exerts influence.

concerns decision-making and implementation. The problem increases when a state becomes subject to policy measures that it did not agree with, as it may be the case with decisions in the EU Council of Ministers, where qualified voting applies to certain policy areas.

However, one could argue that the EU and its actions enjoy political legitimacy by the mere existence of the EU. In other words, without political legitimacy the EU would not exist. At first glance this seems logical. Nevertheless, I would be more careful and argue that political legitimacy is not a prerequisite for the mere existence of an international organization.

However, it can be understood as an organization’s mojo that empowers the international institution to effectively exert influence. In that regard, I share a similar understanding as Majone (1998), who argues that the political legitimacy of the EU is (besides being derived from its treaties and secondary legislation) to a huge extent based on its performance as a regulator. For example, with regard to the internal market the EU’s enforcement of competition rules is politically legitimized by the resulting economic benefit that it generates for society. However, though we may argue that a competitive market is a good thing, in effect, this expresses only a subjective preference determined by a particular economic understanding. Given that it is not possible to assess the benefits of EU action in absolute terms, the political legitimacy that we assign to EU influence remains inherently contestable.

Finally, what about EU influence on third countries? Can it also by contested in terms of political legitimacy or democratic deficit? I argue that this may be the case under certain circumstances. Switzerland provides a good example. As a country associated with the EU in certain policy areas based on bilateral treaties, Switzerland adopts EU legislation, or in other words adapts its national laws to EU legislation on an ongoing and deliberate basis. In that context, the issue of democratic deficit crops up if we take a closer look at the political supporters of a Swiss accession to the EU and the opponents. The supporters of an accession highlight the democratic deficit that the current procedure of constantly adapting Swiss legislation carries as the country does not participate in EU policymaking. Those opposing an EU accession point to the democratic deficit to Swiss policymaking that would result from EU membership. Given those concerns, in the context that Switzerland adapts its law and regulations to EU legislation without being explicitly required, we may conclude that EU influence on policy change in Switzerland can also be contested in terms of political legitimacy. Of course, in absolute terms there are qualitative differences with regard to political legitimacy compared to Member States, or members of the European Economic Area, and of course Accession Candidates. However, the Swiss case provides the reason to

refer in the definition to the fact that the EU may induce, besides intentionally, also unintentionally policy changes on the national level.