If development were to go ahead, there will be many people who would not feel any different from how they felt before the development. This will include people who did not use the tract at all, including those who did not even know the tract existed. But this – even on the supposition that these are people who do not swim in the water that would be polluted and whose health would thus not be threatened by the development-produced pollution – does not mean that the development would not negatively affect their well-being. It does not mean that the cost-benefit analyst need not take account of them. If the land were developed, these people would lose the opportunity to discover the tract and the recreational opportunities therein. This point connects up with one made by Bryan Norton102 and Andrew Brennan.103 Norton tells a story about a teenager who is required to attend a performance of classical music. The teenager is not at all excited to go; she has always preferred pop music, which is essentially the only kind of music to which she has ever listened. Much to her surprise – perhaps to everyone’s surprise – she has a great experience at the classical music concert. She goes on to develop a sincere interest in, and eventually a deep love of, classical music. Brennan says that this example shows that “attending the concert has transformed her
102
Norton, Why Preserve Natural Variety? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987)
considered preferences.”104 We can imagine that had she not had the opportunity to go to that classical concert, she would not have become this great lover of classical music.
Similarly, we can imagine someone who has spent no time in “undeveloped nature.” This person might understandably have no appreciation for the kinds of recreational opportunities it provides. She is the kind of person who would not know that the tract even exists. Still, this does not mean that they would not, under certain conditions – including, perhaps, if she were able to spend time out in nature (exploring this tract, etc.), especially with someone knowledgeable and experienced – come to prefer for it to remain undeveloped. One implication for CBA is simply that those who know nothing about the tract should not be excluded from responding to a survey about the tract, since they could, if it were not developed, at some point learn of its existence and then come to use and love it. This is not purported to be an overriding reason for not developing the land, because these people could, on the other hand, learn of the tract’s existence and form the view that it is an utter waste of valuable real estate space. The point is simply that these people’s views matter. The fact that they do not currently know about the issue is not a reason to exclude them from the survey. This is an issue that their government has taken up. If the government is seeking guidance on the issue, it should not simply consult those who already know about the tract. The city should seek guidance from all of its citizens. Perhaps this does not mean that they should consult every single citizen, but each citizen should be included in the group from which the sample is drawn.
Some worry CBA is unable to take into account the transformative value of new experiences. Brennan says that “the impact of transformative value is completely unpredictable, and the degree of impact (when it occurs) will vary massively from person to
person.” This is an understandable worry; but it is too strong to say that CBA is unable to take transformative value into account. Perhaps we should not force people to go spend time on the tract of land in the way that the teenager was forced to go to the classical concert (though perhaps we should. I will say more about this later). But at the very least, providing complete as possible information about the tract to the townspeople would increase the chances that preferences liable to transformation will actually be transformed prior to being measured and recorded by the analyst. It is also unfair to single out CBA for failing to completely take transformative value into account. Many experiences will transform people’s considered preferences, and many projects will limit the ways in which people’s preferences can be transformed in the future; but this is no less true of policies that are not justified via a CBA than it is of those that are supported by a CBA. It is, for example, no more severe a problem for CBA than it is for voting, which is another mechanism for public decisions.105
There are other difficult questions regarding what the best possible CBA regarding this tract of land will look like. What other effects would there be to townspeople if this land were cleared and homes were built? What, if any, ecological services are being provided by this tract that would no longer be provided (at least in the same way) if the tract were developed? Imagine that I know about and am accustomed to using the tract, that I know it may be developed, know that development would not have any deleterious health effects, and know that similar opportunities for recreation are an hour’s drive away. Imagine, in addition, that I believe that if the land were developed, the animals who live there would all be able to relocate to another wooded area, but that it is in fact the case that most of them will die.
Finally, imagine that I care a great deal about animals; I do not want them to be killed, and would be willing to pay something to help prevent them from being killed.
If the state knows that the animals will die, must it share this information with me before it measures my preferences? The answer is yes. One possibility is that the death of the animals has the same basic kinds of effects on area residents as the aforementioned pollution would on the swimmers. If I am one of the swimmers, the pollution affects my well-being independent of whether or not I am aware of the pollution. Does the death of animals that I care about affect my well-being even if I am unaware of the deaths? Often yes, though it will be less direct than in the swimming case. In many situations, animals provide services that have direct physical consequences on me. For example – and here I am oversimplifying, though seemingly not in a pernicious way – birds in a flock eat from plants and later, in excreting seeds from the plants in another location, help the plants propagate. The excreted seeds grow into adult plants that produce fruit that I can eat, trap CO2 and
release O2 that I breathe, and prevent soil from washing into and contaminating water that I
drink. If animals providing services to me die and the services go unperformed, I am worse off whether or not I know about their death. Consequently, if the state has knowledge that the animals will die, it should share this information with me.
Let us modify the case again to delve into deeper issues. Suppose that the animals who are expected to be killed do not perform the aforementioned kind of services, but that I still care about them and how they fare. Would there still be reason for the state to share with me (and others) the information that the animals are expected to die? Here I clearly have preferences regarding the animals and their futures. These are other-regarding preferences. My concern for them is not rooted in a concern about how the way they fare affects the way I
fare. It is the same kind of concern that non-swimmers might have for swimmers who would be affected by the pollution. Perhaps, for example, those who regularly swim in the swimming hole are my employees; I then have self-interested reasons for wanting them to be healthy. But it is also possible that they are simply people about whom I care. I could care about them without even knowing them personally. I simply know that they enjoy swimming in the hole, and if I knew that it would be polluted, I would be willing to pay something to ensure that the land was not developed. These preferences – be they for the welfare of the animals or that of the swimmers – should be among those captured by the CBA. Information that would affect these preferences – that the animals will in fact be killed, or that the swimming hole will in fact be polluted – is relevant, and should be provided.106
On what grounds could anyone justify withholding such information? Surely those who maintain that the purpose of CBA is to promote individual and societal well-being could not do so. The informed-preference account surely could endorse the judgment that I am worse off when animals about whom I care have been killed – that is, worse off independent of any services the animals perform or provide (or would have) to my benefit – even if I do not know that anything bad has happened to them. If I had full-information, I would prefer for the animals about whom I care not to die (ceteris paribus, at least). If I would, were I fully informed, have preferences that the animals not die (ceteris paribus), then the death of
106 One may be tempted to say at this point that the real problem with the cases I have introduced involving the
death of animals about whom the respondent cares is that animals and swimmers have a welfare that matters independently of whether or what people are willing to pay for them. I believe, and will later argue, that it is true that animals’ welfare and preferences matter independently of what people are willing to pay. Animals are not mere resources. But there is an additional point that I have been after here. The point could have been made via an example that had nothing to do with animals. The reader may satisfy her- or himself by revising the preceding example such that it is a totally inanimate object that the development would damage, where this inanimate object is still cared about by those whose WTP is sought, and still is a consciousness-independent welfare influence.
the animals affects my well-being, and does so even if I do not actually know about the death. Another way of putting the point is to say that how much I am willing to pay will differ according to (among other things) whether or not I know about the animals’ death. Surely the analyst wants to measure my preferences regarding what actually will happen, or at least regarding what the most educated extant prognoses suggest actually will happen, not my preferences regarding whatever it is I happen to believe will happen. By providing me with information – in this case, information about the expected fate of these animals – and then working to satisfy my informed preference, the state is able to promote my well-being, and does so in a manner consistent with respecting my autonomy within a citizen/state relationship.
The general response is the same regarding the person who cares about the health of the swimmers, and does so independent of any services that these swimmers may generally provide for her. Some people – though not all – are such that their well-being is connected to things that do not benefit them, and certainly not in any direct, physical sense. Surely a parent would deserve to have her WTP for the tract gauged if her child was swimming in the swimming hole that would be polluted by development of the tract. This would be true even if the parent did not actually know that the development would cause such pollution. This parent would also need to be provided information before her WTP was gauged. Presumably no stranger will care about this child’s health as much as the child’s own parent will. But there are probably many people who are not the child’s parent, and who do not do any swimming in the swimming hole, who would be willing to pay something to keep the child’s swimming water from being polluted. These people should be provided with the information about the pollution.
This discussion is important in no small part because of how it bumps up against a large and difficult issue, namely the role that so-called “existence values” or “non-use preferences” should play in CBA. Existence value is another one of those terms whose meaning is often not made sufficiently clear by those who use the term. The basic issue is that we are capable of having preferences for an enormous quantity and variety of things, and that these things are sometimes very far away from us, and things that we will not ever, and will not even ever want to, consume, use, or even encounter in person. For the lack of a better term, I will call these non-use preferences, though technically this is a bit of a misnomer. To see why it is a misnomer, suppose that I am a Parisian who prefers going every day to the Louvre to see the Mona Lisa. It is odd to say that I use the Mona Lisa. I certainly do not use it like I use a kitchen knife when I am cutting a carrot, or like I use that carrot after I have cut it. But I do experience it first hand, and on a daily basis, and I do derive pleasure from it. Is this a case of me demonstrating a non-use preference? As I intend the term, this is not such a case. Strictly speaking, my preference here is not one that should be counted as a non-use preference. It is, in this case, not merely the existence of the Mona Lisa that matters to me, but also my ability to see it regularly. The kind of case that will really illustrate non-use preferences is one where I prefer something and where the only benefits I enjoy come merely from knowing that the thing exists (or that it flourishes, or whatever). Such preferences could (and do, I am sure) exist for the Mona Lisa, but the best illustration of a person who has such preferences is someone who has preferences for the Mona Lisa – wants it to be preserved, for example – but who never even plans (or hopes) to see it.
To say that something has existence value is to say that a person has a non-use preference for it. A thing has existence value to someone if that person cares about how the thing fares though he or she does not use it, does not have first hand experiences with it, and does not engage in any behavior vis-à-vis the thing. What is so interesting about existence value is that if a thing “has” such value, there is essentially no way to prevent people from enjoying the good. This is what Koff has in mind when he says that “non-use or existence values are nothing more than values for a very pure public good.” But note that many things that are not conventionally thought of as pure public goods can have existence value. A grove of ancient Redwoods on my private property is not typically thought of as a pure public good, because I can exclude people from seeing them. But again, what I cannot do is keep people from caring about them, and from deriving some kind of psychological gain from the mere fact that they exist. (Another way of putting this would be to say that all that I could do to keep them from deriving benefits from the Redwoods is to interfere with their awareness that the Redwoods exist.) This is what it means to say that the Redwoods – or whatever one might want to say it about – have existence value. The person who has non-use preferences for the good – the Redwoods on that piece of private property, say – does not see, hear, touch, see, or (tangibly) feel the good, or even plan or hope to do so; but what happens to the good can affect whether that person’s preferences regarding it are satisfied, and thus can truly affect that person’s well-being.
How does this bear on CBA? Notice that a person who has non-use preferences for a good that is technically another person’s property can derive benefits from that good – more specifically, from its continued existence – without ever the owner ever knowing, let alone being able to collect some compensation for this. The market will thus surely not capture
this value. The good’s “price,” were the owner to take it to market, would perhaps reflect the “standard” (use-based) preferences people have regarding the good, but would sure not really reflect the non-use preferences people have regarding it. This has something to do with why CBA exists in the first place: economists recognized that a good’s price may diverge from its “true value” and allows for this good to be shadow priced. But this is not the only implication that the existence of such preferences has for CBA. The existence of non-use preferences makes even more difficult the question of precisely which preferences CBA ought to take into account. More to the point: there is disagreement as to whether CBA ought even to take existence value into consideration, which is to say that there is disagreement as to whether what I have called non-use preferences ought to be counted in a CBA.
Why is this? We can imagine someone who does not live near the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), does not plan or want to visit, does not think that an undrilled ANWR contributes to his health better than it would if drilled, and does not even believe that the reason to refrain from drilling ANWR now is so that we have the option to exploit its