Problems arise when systems are structured to address perceived linear problems that are actually nonlinear and complex, as is the case in the border security environment.
Meadows writes, “The world is nonlinear. Trying to make it linear for our mathematical or administrative convenience is not usually a good idea even when feasible, and it is rarely feasible.”176 She uses the term “traps” to describe these problems. Below is a discussion of the system traps the border security system has fallen into.
175 Meadows, Thinking in Systems, 111–41.
176 Ibid., 111.
1. Policy Resistance
Policy resistance stems from the bounded rationalities of system actors and is prevalent in systems whose actors have differing, mutually exclusive goals. Meadows explains policy resistance the following way:
When various actors try to pull a system stock toward various goals, the result can be policy resistance. Any new policy, especially if it’s effective, just pulls the stock farther from the goals of other actors and produces additional resistance, with a result that no one likes, but that everyone expends considerable effort in maintaining.177
Policy resistance is key in understanding DTO innovations in smuggling tactics as a response to the intensification of border security agency activities along the border.
Also, this trap is the primary reason why efforts to stop the flow of drugs and illegal immigrants at the border are futile.
2. Escalation
Escalation occurs when competing system actors establish a reinforcing feedback loop trying to get ahead of one another. This trap is not necessarily bad if the competition is towards achieving a desirable goal; however, escalation can become an insidious trap leading to a self-reinforcing arms race when goals are not aligned. In the context of border security, escalation presents itself in the continual competition for funds and prestige among the various border security agencies. Escalation, in part, explains why agencies are hesitant to work with one another and share information.178
3. Shifting the Burden to the Intervener
Shifting the burden to the intervener occurs when a system actor performs an action that temporarily reduces a problem’s symptoms, but nothing is done to address the problem’s root cause. After a while, the original problem reappears and the intervener is required to apply more of the “solution.” This results in a system that becomes dependent on the intervener. Meadows describes this trap:
177 Ibid., 116.
178 Ibid., 124.
Shifting the burden, dependence, and addiction arise when a solution to a systemic problem reduces (or disguises) the symptoms, but does nothing to solve the underlying problem. Whether it is a substance that dulls one’s perception or a policy that hides the underlying trouble, the drug of choice interferes with the actions that could solve the real problem. If the intervention designed to correct the problem causes the self-maintaining capacity of the original system to atrophy or erode, then a destructive reinforcing feedback loop is set in motion. The system deteriorates; more and more of the solution is then required. The system will become more and more dependent on the intervention and less and less able to maintain its own desired state.179
The trap of shifting the burden is widely prevalent in the realm of border security.
The United States has shifted the burden of immigration, drugs, and terrorism to border security agencies, without adequately addressing the root causes of the problems. This has manifested itself into such policies as expanding the amount of border fence and explains the exponential growth of border security agencies—the USBP alone has seen a 518 percent increase in manpower since the 1990s.180
4. Rule Beating
Rule beating ensues when system actors behave in a way that looks like they are obeying the rules, yet in actuality are distorting the system’s goals. This trap normally occurs at lower levels in a hierarchy and is synonymous, in the context of border security, to corruption.181 Corruption has plagued Mexican institutions for years, but has recently become an increasing concern for U.S. agencies. David Aguilar, acting CBP commissioner, testified before Congress stating:
Since October 1, 2004, 141 CBP employees have been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption. Of the 141 arrests, 102 are considered mission compromising acts of corruption, which means the employee’s illegal activities were for personal gain and violated, or facilitated the violation of, the laws CBP personnel are charged with enforcing. Examples of mission compromising corruption include such offenses as alien
179 Ibid., 135.
180 Eric L. Olson and Erik Lee, “The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” Border Research Partnership, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, August 2012, 3.
181 Meadows, Thinking is Systems, 136–37.
smuggling, allowing loads of narcotics through a port of entry or checkpoint, providing sensitive information to drug trafficking organizations, selling immigration documents, or circumventing CBP’s detection systems.182
5. Seeking the Wrong Goal
Seeking the wrong goal arises when goals are poorly defined and are measured with the wrong metrics. Meadows explains:
System behavior is particularly sensitive to the goals of feedback loops. If the goals—the indicators of satisfaction of the rules—are defined inaccurately or incompletely, the system may obediently work to produce a result that is not really intended or wanted.183
The trap reveals itself in border security when effort is confused with results, as is the case in the goal of stopping terrorism. The desired state of the system, concerning terrorism, is to prevent attacks and is primarily measured by the amount of money spent.
This leads to a system that produces spending on border security, but in actuality does little to prevent terrorist attacks.