Triggering a SSC norm cascade

The timeframe for stage two of the cycle – the norm cascade – is hence designated as 2010 onwards. The Southern donors can be classified as the norm leaders and the focus has shifted to convincing all nations of the South – the norm followers – to become a part of the SSC norm regime and engage in cooperation that conforms to its principles. Within the LAC region, this role was filled by Brazil and Venezuela, and more specifically by Presidents Lula and Chávez during the early years of the

12Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that one third of all states may be the sufficient amount to classify as a “critical mass”; however, this is an estimate and varies depending on the number of prominent and powerful states – in this case, the emerging powers can be viewed as the “critical states” in this stage.

norm cascade (although as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, they varied in message and emphasis). The drivers behind this included a search for influence and international prestige (in the case of Brazil) and ideological conviction (in the case of Venezuela). Throughout the end of stage one and into stage two, both nations established/joined organisational platforms to expand their message: Brazil with the BRICS and IBSA groups, as well as the regional UNASUR group; and Venezuela with the ALBA and PetroCaribe groups. These groups contributed to the growing institutionalisation of SSC, as conferences and summits on this topic became more common both within BRICS, IBSA and ALBA, as well as through the UN structure that sought to mainstream SSC within all departments.

Brazil and Venezuela (and other Southern donors) continued to use rhetorical persuasion through their foreign policy documents and general promotion of SSC ideas within their respective groups; however, the dominant mechanism became persuasion by demonstration, as shown in the expanded SSC activities both countries offered throughout the region. In this respect, countries such as St Lucia and Grenada witnessed firsthand the SSC norm regime in practice. The drivers behind norm followers adopting this norm regime include the continued search for development support, pragmatism that allowed them to accept support from whomever was offering, and a growing sense of the need to conform with a norm that had become an established part of Southern relations.

I suggest that the life cycle of the SSC norm regime, during the period of research, remained in stage two, having not yet progressed into the norm internalisation stage. To achieve this, the norm regime would have to be followed and supported by the vast majority of Southern countries and become embedded within cooperation structures as an unquestioned practice. At the time of research I argue that this cannot be said to have occurred – as indicated by the amount of research being produced on SSC as “new” or “revitalised” or “emerging” that show it is not taken for granted as an accepted norm regime that can be studied in the past tense. This research therefore focuses primarily on stage two by examining the responses of Southern stakeholders to the SSC norm regime and attempting to identify the effectiveness of the tools of persuasion and demonstration in gaining norm followers. In this way, this research may be illuminating as to how SSC may progress into Stage 3 and what has held it back from reaching this milestone.

Successful norms

While the life cycle of norms explains how norms become embedded in international structures, the question remains as to why some norms succeed and others do not. A number of aspects have been suggested that increase the chances of a norm progressing to the internalisation stage, including characteristics of the norm itself and the context within which the norm is situated. These criteria will be considered throughout the research and in the conclusion as to how they could be applied to the SSC norm regime.

The first useful characteristic is the ability for the norm to demonstrate coherence, precedent and analogy with other norms. Norms that can be more easily connected to existing norms are more likely to gain traction and legitimacy (Florini 1996; Payne 2001; Kacowicz 2005; Sandholtz 2009). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) refer to these as “adjacency claims”. This aspect highlights the path dependent nature of norms – norms tend to build on those that came before them. If the new norm requires the toppling of an old norm, however, then the norm entrepreneur must explain why it is

“bad” and why this is a necessary change (Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Krook and True (2012, 111) highlight a potential pitfall with using consistency to promote a new norm, stating that this tactic “opens up the possibility that norms can be co-opted to purposes that undermine at least part of the meaning of the norm itself”. During the framing process, norms may become compromised and absorbed by competing forces – in the case of SSC, there is the danger of the Northern-led cooperation framework drawing on the principles of SSC, which has the potential for SSC to seem redundant as an alternative norm regime.

Secondly, appealing to foundational and universal norms that aren’t connected exclusively to specific issues – for example, the values of equality, individual dignity and freedom – can lead to greater uptake (Sandholtz 2009). Likewise, appealing to norms that transcend context and are more global may be more successful than local ones – for example, appealing to the broader notions of human welfare may be more effective than specific cultural norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Thirdly, outcome-based norms will be more successful than vague norms or those that can’t be measured. This was demonstrated in a study by Krook and True (2012) that examined attempts to change organisational gender norms. They found that promoting gender-balanced decision-making, which included the measurable target of increasing the number of female decision-makers, was more successful than gender mainstreaming, which included the more vague instruction of encouraging

gender sensitivity in policy making. This may prove more difficult with abstract principles such as solidarity; however, it reinforces the need for tangible targets rather than relying solely on relational feelings – something that should be kept in mind when examining SSC norms.

While it is helpful for norms to display certain qualities, as listed above, there are also contextual factors that are said to improve the chances of norm success – specifically the amount of resources available to the norm entrepreneurs and leaders, including communicative resources, worldwide diplomatic representation, significant presence in major international organisations and negotiations, and an effective mass media that can broadcast the benefits of the norm (Sandholtz 2009).

Actors with access to these resources will have more opportunity to spread their ideas. This highlights the significant imbalance in global abilities to shape and encourage the uptake of new norms. The more powerful Northern nations (such as the US and Western Europe) have long had these systems in place and have prominent positions in international organisations that are frequently the forum for norm dissemination. If these prove less effective than desired, these states also have access to other “persuasive” resources (ie coercion via sanction or force). The South has historically lacked these resources; even those states that had more developed communicative and media structures on a domestic level were usually limited in their international influence. The rise of the emerging powers was therefore an important milestone in the progression of the SSC norm regime and showed that ideas and principles are rarely enough to drive change – tangible resources to persuade others of their virtue is an essential component.